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Welcome to this special issue of CTX, “Intelligence and Terrorism.” The articles 
and roundtable discussions gathered in this issue came out of a workshop that 
took place at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, in 
August 2013. We wish to thank the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program 
(CTFP) for sponsoring the workshop and for its continuing support for CTX. 
No matter which strategy we choose to deal with terrorism, the more we know 
about the terrorists, the more likely we are to achieve our objectives. While in-
telligence presumably is important in all of our strategic endeavors, experience 
has found it to be particularly important in the case of terrorism. Terrorists 
hide, and if we are to deal effectively with them, they must be found. Broadly 
understood, intelligence is what does the finding. As both an activity—the 
collection and analysis of information—and a product—the final intelligence 
report—the purpose of intelligence is to inform the decisions of policymakers 
and operational leaders. As the current information technology revolution has 
rolled on, it has affected both the gathering and uses of intelligence and the 
terrorists themselves, who are now among the principal targets of intelligence 
work. For that reason, it is worthwhile to consider the current relationship 
between intelligence and terrorism.  
The August meeting gathered together a small group of military, police, and 
civilian officers with experience in intelligence and in combating terrorism. 
This group included senior officers with decades of experience as well as some 
students currently enrolled in the CTFP curriculum. Participants came from 
the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. Over 
the course of a day and a half, they discussed the ways in which terrorism 
has changed, current intelligence requirements, roles and missions among 
intelligence agencies, and intelligence sharing. Reflecting the diversity of their 
backgrounds and operational experience, the participants offered a variety of 
views about all of these topics. For example, some declared that terrorism has 
changed in fundamental ways over the past two decades, while others, despite 
acknowledging some differences, argued that the fundamentals of terrorism 
have remained the same. There was broad agreement on the issue of require-
ments, but less on roles and missions because the division of labor depends 
so heavily on the circumstances within each country. Several senior officers 
offered some hard-earned wisdom on how to establish effective intelligence 
sharing. The three-part conversation presented in this issue raises a number 
of important questions about intelligence and terrorism and suggests a variety 
of ways to answer them.
In addition to this meeting, CTX commissioned four articles on the role of 
information technology at the nexus of intelligence and terrorism. Dorothy 
Denning leads off with an exploration of the potential roles that social media 
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and social networks can play in large-scale searches for objects and individuals. John Mitra, a CTFP alumnus, discusses 
the uses and limitations of modern technology in India’s campaign against Maoist insurgents, who are a decidedly 
low-tech opponent. James Walsh then considers how access to “big data” through new technological data-mining 
techniques may affect intelligence sharing among governments.  
The final article, by Erik Dahl, is not about information technology. It is a case study of a foiled terrorist plot. In 
recounting this case, Dahl touches on themes raised in the workshop’s conversations, in particular the difficulties posed 
by intelligence work that may end up in court. The case also displays the confluence of luck and skill that is good 
intelligence work and offers an illuminating portrait of what it is like to work with a confidential source. Dahl’s article 
provides a fitting conclusion to this special issue.
For those of you who are interested in delving further into the ideas presented in this issue, we have included an 
annotated bibliography, which provides some suggestions for further reading and offers a variety of views pertaining to 
intelligence and terrorism.
The Combating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP) interview also is a special one this time, comprising two comple-
mentary pieces. In early December, director Peter Berg came to Monterey for a special screening of his new film 
Lone Survivor for students, faculty, and staff of NPS’s Defense Analysis department. The film is based on the book of 
the same title by former Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell. A brief interview with Mr. Berg, which followed the screening, 
is presented first, followed by a subsequent roundtable discussion of the film with three Special Forces officers who 
attended the screening.
The U.S. television series The Wire is the topic of this issue’s Moving Image column. MAJ Matthew Upperman de-
scribes the ways in which this often bleak depiction of inner-city Baltimore can offer lessons to the Special Forces and 
intelligence communities. For The Written Word, MAJ Anthony Keller reviews the book The Way of the Knife, a non-
fiction account of the working relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Joint Special Operations 
Command both before and after 9/11. Finally, be sure to look at the latest offerings from the Joint Special Operations 
University (JSOU) in the Publications Announcements. 
In peace there’s nothing so becomes a man 
As modest stillness and humility: 
But when the blast of war blows in our ears, 
Then imitate the action of the tiger.
 —Henry V (3.1.1), by William Shakespeare
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Dr. David Tucker, guest editor of this special issue of CTX, is an 
associate professor of Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
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rorism and intelligence. From 1991 to 1998, he worked at the Pentagon, 
in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, on 
a variety of defense and intelligence issues. He joined NPS in 1998, 
where he has taught in both the Defense Analysis department and the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security. His publications include 
Illuminating the Dark Arts of War: Terrorism, Sabotage, and Subversion 
in Homeland Security and the New Conflict (Continuum, 2012) and The 
End of Intelligence: Espionage and State Power in the Information Age 
(Stanford University Press, forthcoming in Spring 2014). He earned his 
PhD from Claremont Graduate University.
Peter Berg is an actor, writer, and director. His latest feature film, 
Lone Survivor, was released in December 2013. Mr. Berg earned his 
BA in drama from Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1984. 
After moving to Hollywood, he acted in a number of TV series and 
feature films before turning to screenwriting. His first major writing 
and directing success was Friday Night Lights (2004), which was turned 
into an award-winning TV series of the same name.
Major Patrick Collins is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer with 
12 years of experience and multiple deployments in the Central 
Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) areas of 
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commander, Special Forces Company executive officer, and Mobility 
Commodity chief at Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command. MAJ Collins is currently earning his master’s degree in 
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department and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Dr. 
Dahl is the author of Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success 
from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond (Georgetown University Press, 
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from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. Dr. Dahl retired from the 
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received numerous awards, including the Ada Lovelace Award, the 
National Computer Systems Security Award, and the Harold F. Tipton 
Lifetime Achievement Award. In October 2012, she was selected to the 
inaugural class of the National Cyber Security Hall of Fame.
Major Anthony A. Keller, U.S. Army Infantry, is currently studying 
in the Defense Analysis curriculum at NPS. He has served in Stryker 
and Air Assault units and the 75th Ranger Regiment as an infantry 
platoon leader, a Ranger rifle platoon leader, an infantry company 
commander, and a Ranger company commander.   
D. M. “John” Mitra is the joint director of the National Crime Re-
cords Bureau, India. He has held many posts in the Madhya Pradesh 
Police and the Indian federal government, including superintendent of 
police in three districts; deputy inspector general of the Special Armed 
Force, Administration, and Home Guards; and Additional Director 
General of Railways, Complaints, and Narcotics. Mr. Mitra recently 
contributed a field study for a research project on the impact of 
developmental initiatives in Maoist-affected areas. Mr. Mitra earned a 
BSc in physics (with honors) from Ravenshaw College, Odisha, India, 
and an MS in Defense Analysis from NPS.
Commander Brian O’Lavin graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy 
in 1996 with a BS in systems engineering. In 2009, he graduated from 
the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in national security and strategic 
studies. He is currently working toward his PhD in security studies 
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Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Dr. James Igoe Walsh is a professor of political science at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Charlotte. He is the author of two books, 
including The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (Columbia 
University Press, 2010), and a number of articles in academic journals. 
He is currently writing a book on the political consequences of the use 
of drones and similar technologies in counterterrorism and counter-
insurgency campaigns, and was recently awarded a grant from the 
Department of Defense’s Minerva Research Initiative to analyze how 
armed groups finance their activities and the consequences for military 
conflict.
About the Contributors
A Roundtable Conversation on Intelligence and Terrorism
Part One: The Changing Nature of Terrorism1
The participants in this conversa-
tion were guaranteed anonymity 
to encourage a frank discussion of 
sensitive issues. Their opinions are 
their own and do not reflect the of-
ficial policy or positions of the U.S. 
government or any other govern-
ment, agency, or official entity.
The icons at the beginning of para-
graphs are assigned to individual 
speakers.
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are dealing with people whose 
objectives are millennial, global, 
and perhaps not even clear to 
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MODERATOR: Has terrorism changed in any ways that have changed intel-
ligence requirements, or the way in which the business of gathering informa-
tion about terrorists and their organizations has to be done? 
 I believe there is a fundamental change in the objectives of terrorists and 
what they are after. Back in the days when we were chasing after state-
sponsored terrorist groups, most of the groups had rather specific and 
somewhat limited objectives. This was true of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, for 
example. They started out with a very specific objective, which was to destroy 
the American presence in Germany because of the gang’s opposition to the 
American role in Vietnam. The difference today is that we are dealing with 
people whose objectives are millennial, global, and perhaps not even clear to 
themselves in many cases. I was involved in a project that looked at Libyans 
and others coming through Syria into Iraq. The real thing that bothered me 
was the number of people who just wanted to commit suicide. That was their 
stated goal. They wanted to go to Iraq to get killed in a terrorist bombing and 
take out people with them. In Bosnia and Croatia, we had information on 
hundreds of Arab and Asian volunteers who were being expelled from Bosnia. 
What was amazing was their absolute lack of any kind of central direction in 
life. They were generally young men or men who were failures in one capacity 
or another, estranged from their families in almost all cases, complaining 
about not getting their share of the family inheritance, and with a desire to 
kill. Why? They didn’t even know. That is the only real change I have seen. 
The rest of it to me is just tactics. 
 I agree completely. There are two periods of terrorism. The first period 
was tied to Middle Eastern problems, roughly from the end of the 1960s 
to the end of the 1980s. The groups were more or less organized, were tied 
with states, and shared the goals of those states. Then in France at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, we saw the change to a kind of global terrorism. The GIA 
[Armed Islamic Group] in Algeria at this time was backed by the anti-Soviet 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan and trained in Afghanistan. The GIA published a 
magazine in London [al Ansar], and the GIA was supported by the people in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan as a good example to follow. From the beginning 
of the 1990s, we saw people going to Bosnia from France, who came back 
to France with weapons and materials and wanted to take action in France. 
Later we also had people going to Pakistan, most of the time through London 
because the pipeline was well organized by the Islamists there, and then we see 
Chechnya and so on. And these are largely self-recruited people.
But for intelligence, there is no change of methods. It is a problem of discov-
ering these people. They come from our population, are born in our countries, 
are upset about their social status, as you say. The problem is to have enough 
resources to discover these people. Most of them don’t know what they want. 
That’s true. But security, intelligence, and law enforcement services cannot 
Most of them don’t know 
what they want. That’s true. 
But security, intelligence, and 
law enforcement services 
cannot solve that problem.
We are dealing with a 
transnational terrorist problem 
that forces us to engage in a 
completely different way. It is 
about trying to find terrorists 
hidden among populations.
6
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 1
solve that problem. We do our best to arrest people, to prevent actions, but 
the solution will come from society. 
 Yes, I broadly agree with most of what the previous speakers have said, but 
I do think there are some fundamental differences between the terrorism that 
we are engaging with today and previous forms of terrorism, in the following 
respects. First, the terrorism that we experienced in the 1970s, 1980s, and to a 
certain extent the very early 1990s was in general linked to some form of na-
tionalist agenda. When people talk about the changes in scale since the 1990s, 
as the previous speakers have, I think that is absolutely right because what we 
now have is a nearly global rejectionist philosophy that has been embraced 
by a broad sector within the Muslim communities in a number of different 
countries. It has also tapped into the personal disgruntlement and alienation 
that those individuals have felt 
as a result of whatever socioeco-
nomic or political conditions 
may exist in individual coun-
tries. I think that is funda-
mentally different from what 
came before, because now 
a young man of Pakistani 
ethnic origin in the UK, who 
has never been to Pakistan, 
all of a sudden can feel an 
emotional engagement with 
events that are taking place 
on the other side of the 
world. At the same time, this 
can fuel a personal sense of 
grievance that this individual 
may have. 
The second area where I 
think there is a fundamental 
difference today is that, 
whereas previously a lot of 
the terrorism that we had to 
fight was state sponsored or 
state supported in some way, 
that no longer exists. For 
instance, the IRA [Irish Repub-
lican Army] was supported by the Libyan regime [of Moammar Qaddafi] in 
a number of different ways. A lot of the Palestinian extremist organizations in 
the 1970s and 1980s had support from various countries in the Middle East. In 
fact, their operational headquarters were based in those countries and derived 
significant amounts of support in terms of personnel, materiel, financing, 
and so on. The disappearance of state support makes a big difference. The 
approach the intelligence community took for tackling those forms of ter-
rorism was to target the intelligence services of those countries and engage 
at the political level with them. For instance, if you were trying to tackle the 
PFLP–GC [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command], 
then you knew that you had to try to penetrate the Syrian services. There were 
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longer exists. What we are dealing with is a transnational terrorist problem 
that forces us to engage in a completely different way. It is about trying to 
find terrorists hidden among populations. The problem is compounded by 
the fact that the terrorists are in countries that are at best fragile or, at worst, 
completely dysfunctional. Therefore, again, one of the tools that we were able 
to use in the past no longer exists. In the past, we could try to either penetrate 
a country’s intelligence services to get a better idea of the level of support that 
they were providing to certain terrorist organizations, or engage with those 
intelligence services in order to co-opt them into helping us fight the terrorist 
problem. That is no longer a useful approach.
 Hasn’t religion been one of the changes that has taken place in terrorism? 
When I think of the first stage of terrorism from the late 1960s through the 
1980s, when I think of plane hijack-
ings, for example, and those sorts of 
things, the purpose wasn’t necessarily 
to kill large numbers of people. 
There were specific goals, maybe 
to broker the release of prisoners 
someplace. With al Qaeda and the 
terrorism that we saw developing in 
the early to mid-1990s to the present 
day, advancing religious purposes 
was at least a kind of guiding 
purpose or aim—for example, the 
establishment of a worldwide Ca-
liphate or shari’a law here and there. 
So I am wondering if others see that 
as a significant change in terrorism.
 I would say religion may be the 
motivation of the individual ter-
rorist, but not necessarily the motive 
of those who are directing the 
movement. Osama bin Laden had a 
very clear goal in mind, and that was 
to get rid of the Saudi monarchy. 
The method that he chose was to 
harness the disillusionment or the 
religious grievances of thousands 
of people around the Middle East. 
But I would say that he was not a religious leader. Bin Laden and people like 
him, Abu Nidal and others going back generations, are just very clever public 
manipulators of people, and they will take on whatever cloak they need to get 
other people to do what they want them to do. They don’t risk their own lives. 
The real question is what is driving terrorism, what guides it, what directs it, 
what manipulates it—that may be something very different.
 But does the motivation matter? I mean, in this sense, if you talk about 
religious motivation, would that change the way people organize? Would it 
change the way they think about targets? Would it change the things that 
terrorists do if they have a religious motivation as opposed to a nationalist 
motivation? Would that change any of those things? 
The barriers to entry for 
terrorism are now so low 
that the internet creates a 
fundamentally different situation 
for us all to confront.
The difference is that they are 
ready to die. The people who 
went to Iraq wanted to be killed.
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 The difference is, as we said before, that they are ready to die. As somebody 
mentioned, the people who went to Iraq wanted to be killed. I remember a 
case where we had put a family on telephone taps. The son was in Iraq, and 
he telephoned every day, and he said, “One day if I don’t come back to you, it 
means that I will be in heaven.” 
 If the question is about fundamental changes in terrorism, I would men-
tion a couple of things. One is the rise of suicide terrorism attacks, which were 
not common before the 1980s and have become more common. The other one 
is that the rise of the internet allows groups to communicate with their target 
audience in a less mediated way. They can generate propaganda and distribute 
it more directly to people of interest. So that may influence their ability to 
recruit supporters and do other things. Of course, it was a lot more difficult 
before maybe 10 or 15 years ago. The internet is new, but even earlier, students 
put cassette tapes together and sent them to Iran, and that is what built 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s popularity.
 I don’t think the form of international terrorism that al Qaeda represents 
today is fundamentally different. The brilliance of the al Qaeda narrative taps 
into the sense of grievance that so many young Muslims apparently feel across 
any number of countries, and that is fundamentally different. Furthermore, 
I think now that we are in the internet age, for instance, the barriers to entry 
for terrorism are very low. That is also fundamentally different from before. 
Previously, just going about training yourself was much more complicated. 
Now we see any number of self-starters who are able to go online and find 
out what the best way of making a bomb might be, and away they go. I think 
the barriers to entry from the cyberterrorist perspective are even lower. That 
has made a fundamental difference in terms of the philosophy, if you can call 
it that, that motivates young men and some women to commit terrorism. 
The barriers to entry for terrorism are now so low that the internet creates a 
fundamentally different situation for us all to confront.
MODERATOR: May I ask you if you see those changes you were mentioning 
as fundamentally organizational issues? In other words, the original groups 
recruited people. They trained people, to one degree or another. So there were 
specific organizations—you mentioned the PFLP–GC. And that meant each 
of those organizations had a context, a state sponsor perhaps or a geographic 
location, and that determined how you went about targeting them and trying 
to deal with them. So would it be fair to say that the difference, the funda-
mental change, is an organizational change, so that you no longer have to be 
part of a group to learn how to make a bomb, and that group no longer has 
to maintain expertise and try to pass it on to new recruits? Again, from the 
viewpoint of intelligence, it may be much more difficult now to target or to 
think about how you target the people who are involved. 
 Yes, that’s true. I think there are three aspects to this. First, the narrative 
has tapped into a sense of grievance among many people. Just consider the 
example of the recent murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in London.2 Only one 
of the two men had some connection to groups and individuals who were 
known to the intelligence community as being potentially of terrorist interest. 
That demonstrates that there are potentially any number of young terrorists 
within our communities. Second, you don’t need to go anywhere to get the 
If you asked the young Nigerians 
who killed Drummer Rigby, 
“What is your endgame? 
What do you hope to 
achieve?” I think they would 
have struggled to respond.
The debate we are having is 
whether al Qaeda represents 
the future or is a one-off 
exception to the norm of 
terrorism that has existed 
for thousands of years.
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training. The consequence is that targeting individuals becomes much more 
difficult. The third element is that it is very easy to commit a terrorist act. You 
can go to a shop and buy a kitchen knife. If you run amok in a shopping mall 
and stab lots of people, that in itself would be a very frightening event, which 
will have a disproportionate impact on a government. Why? Strategically, I 
am afraid, the death of one soldier on the streets of London makes absolutely 
no difference whatsoever to government policy, to national security. But the 
psychological impact that this one act has is grossly disproportionate. 
 I want to bring the conversation back to the idea of the historical perspec-
tive of terrorism and the relevance of religion. Religion has always been one of 
the prime motivating factors of terrorism. Beginning back in the first century 
BC, we could be a group of Roman centurions discussing the assassins of the 
Sicarii in Jerusalem for all that it matters. Even the issue of suicide terrorism 
is not necessarily new. It is simply a recurrence of the cycle that we are seeing. 
We see different methods, we see greater effect, but it is not something new. 
I am speaking from a law enforcement perspective in the sense that, as we 
investigate these domestic cases, we are not really seeing anything new. We are 
just seeing new ways that terrorists are trying to implement these methods. 
 I think that is wrong, because you have to ask, “What is the endgame?” 
If you asked your PFLP–GC or Abu Nidal terrorist, “What is your endgame?” 
they would have said that the endgame is either the end of Israel and the 
creation of a Palestinian state, or that a Palestinian state and Israel had to live 
in some form of coexistence. There was an endgame. If you asked the young 
Nigerians who killed Drummer Rigby, “What is your endgame? What do you 
hope to achieve? Was there any deal that we could have done with you before 
you committed this act that would have made you not do this?” I think they 
would have struggled to respond. I think they would have eventually come 
up with, “You need to get out of Afghanistan. You have got to stop killing 
Muslims.” There was no positive endgame that they could have identified that 
would have enabled us to have any kind of rational engagement. I think that 
is why the phenomenon today is fundamentally different. 
 Maybe, but look at Hamas. A lot of their leadership came over from 
socialist movements that failed at the end of the Soviet Union. So they were 
looking for a new organizational tool. 
 But a new organizational tool to achieve what?
 A very limited goal: a Palestinian state. 
 Yes, and as a goal, you could have a discussion with them about that. I 
am sure that people a lot more clever than myself can draw up an interesting 
graph that indicates the number of terrorist attacks conducted against the 
state of Israel while there were ongoing discussions between the Israelis and 
the Palestinians brokered by the United States. There is a correlation, isn’t 
there, between the possibility of the creation of a Palestinian state and the 
level of terrorism in that part of the world? Whereas there is no correlation, 
from our perspective, when it comes to terrorist acts that are conducted in the 
UK and elsewhere, with whatever outcome or endgame might be intended. 
There is no discussion. There is no stated end state other than Osama bin 
Nobody ever penetrated 
Hezbollah because they 
all grew up together.  They 
all know each other.
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Laden’s desire to return to some golden age of the Caliphate, which in reality 
never existed. 
 It seems as if we are talking about al Qaeda as the new terrorism, right? 
We are obsessed with that for good reasons, but then the debate seems to be 
whether al Qaeda is the future as a dispersed network, using the internet, 
with religious millennial goals. Are they the future, or are they the aberration? 
Are they the abnormality and groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and, until a 
few years ago, the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], the Taliban, the 
norm? Some of these groups still have state sponsors. You have a lot of those 
groups that are still out there, but you also have groups like al Qaeda, or at 
least affiliates or people connected to them, killing people on the streets of 
London. So I think the debate we are having is whether al Qaeda represents 
the future or is a one-off exception to the norm of terrorism that has existed 
for thousands of years. That is what we are really coming back to. I don’t 
know what the answer is. I think 10 years from now or 20 years from now, 
maybe we will know, but I think that is where we are at right now. 
 The young people who live in our country, they are asocial people who 
have a problem with society. They know nothing about religion. Absolutely 
nothing. With Sunni Islam—tell me if I am wrong—anybody can preach. In 
France, there was a young preacher. He pushed more than 20 people to go to 
Iraq after the American operation. He was not trained, but he was preaching 
very fervently, and all those young people were waiting for that because they 
want to fight society. I repeat—they don’t know anything about religion. They 
see only black and white. They are white, and the society is black. So they 
want revenge. They want to do something. This is more a social than political 
problem.
You were mentioning earlier the problem of the traditional organizations, 
such as Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, and so on. You think it was easier to penetrate 
them? I don’t think so. Who has ever penetrated Hezbollah? I think nobody. 
When they put bombs in Paris in 1995 and 1996, it took a month to get 
information, and we did so only because one of the people we arrested before 
was tempted by the reward of one million francs and wanted revenge against 
the organization. So it is not as easy as that. I think the real problem, which 
has not changed, is that you need to have a system. We must develop more 
sources because it is more difficult to detect the terrorist within society. It is a 
question of organization, international cooperation, national cooperation, and 
resources, more than the fact that terrorists have changed or not changed.
 I used to keep in my office in Beirut a picture of a soccer team, 11- and 
12-year-old kids, who were in a sporting club. Among that group were Hassan 
Izz-Al-Din, Imad Mugniyah, one of the Nasrallah brothers—you don’t pen-
etrate an organization like that. These kids grew up together, and it would be 
like trying to penetrate Tony Soprano’s gang. You can gather intelligence from 
the outside, you can gather intelligence electronically or using various means, 
but you don’t penetrate the core group. Nobody ever penetrated Hezbollah 
because they all grew up together. They all know each other. 
 I think the important question from my perspective is this. When we pull 
out of Afghanistan, and if there is some success in the negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinians, would that decrease the likelihood of support for 
Syria now is full of terrorist 
organizations. Before the 
Arab Spring, no terrorist 
groups were found in Syria, 
just some Palestinian groups.
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al Qaeda within the Muslim communities in our countries? Ostensibly, two of 
the greatest motivating factors that promote the idea of violence among young 
men within our Muslim communities will be eliminated. 
 It’s a rhetorical symbol, though, for al Qaeda, right? They didn’t fly those 
planes into buildings in Tel Aviv. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is just a rhe-
torical symbol to rally people. They have a few limited goals related to politics, 
primarily in Saudi Arabia, and then by extension in the region. 
 That is my point. There is no endgame for a lot of these people. There is 
no goal, there is no negotiated outcome. 
 If we take away the goalless quality of the violence, does that return us to 
the situation we had with the IRA and PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] and all 
the other groups that we are familiar with? 
 The Mahdist movement in the Sudan lasted 
for 100 years after the Mahdi died. It just kept 
up because there were certain people who were 
disaffected, who were always willing to do 
something. But the Mahdi was long dead. 
 You raised the question of Palestinians. I 
argue that the Palestinian problem is the root 
of all the terrorist organizations. Solving the 
Palestinian and Israeli problem will not end 
terrorism, but it will affect it very much, and it 
will help our narratives in countering terrorism. 
The terrorists don’t care about the Palestinians. 
They are now in Syria fighting the regime 
that is against Israel. But they still have the 
narrative that they are fighting against Israel. 
So the narrative is supporting them a lot if we 
consider recruitment, especially in the Middle 
East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia—the govern-
ments that have good relationships with the 
West. [The people they target for recruitment] 
feel that there is no hope, that their govern-
ments cannot deal with Western governments. 
They arrive at the point that they have to do 
something. That is when the recruiters, the 
smart people that you mentioned, take the 
chance and tell them, “Okay, now you know 
what? You have to do something. This is your 
duty and honor, and you have to go.” That is 
how these people are recruited. That narrative 
is behind the terrorists. We are just waiting for 
them to pop up to try to fight them and will 
continue doing the same thing, no matter how 
techniques and our technology to kill them 
and target them develop. You are targeting a 
man, not the ideas and the narratives behind 
the man. 
Graffiti depicting Hassan Nasrallah (leader of Hezbollah)
In Iraq, we only truly became 
aware of the extent of the 
problem that we faced among 
some of the Shi’a groups 
by actually discovering both 
Iranian and Hezbollah links.
 But we have to pay attention to the environment that is around the 
terrorist organization. In my opinion, the Israeli-Arab conflict is not the 
main issue now in the Arab world or the Muslim world, because the people 
watching the news are watching Syria. They are watching Egypt, they are 
watching Libya. Most of them do not know that there are negotiations 
between Israelis and Palestinians. So the change in the environment will 
decrease or increase the numbers of organizations and groups. Syria now is 
full of terrorist organizations. Before the Arab Spring, no terrorist groups were 
found in Syria, just some Palestinian groups. So this changed environment 
will increase terrorism in the Arab world.
 That is exactly what countries in Europe are concerned about: the conse-
quences of the Arab Spring. If you have a huge Muslim community [in your 
country], 100 people are concerned by this Syrian fighting and will go to 
Syria, through Jordan or Lebanon. According to past experience, a lot of the 
people we have arrested came from Bosnia; they went through Chechnya. The 
jihadis were from Iraq before, and now they are from Afghanistan or Paki-
stan’s tribal areas. They have learned how to bomb, and they come back with 
the will to commit terrorist attacks. In our country, for instance, where the 
majority of the Muslim community is Arab, the Palestinian problem remains 
a very important problem. When you go into a mosque, the people that give 
zakat, they give money for the Palestinian cause.
 Most of the things you are saying apply to India. But the fundamental 
difference is that the funds that used to come to the terrorists because of state 
sponsorship have dried up. When those funds were there, it attracted the 
wrong kind of people. Criminals actually got into terrorism because it was an 
easy way to make money. You get money from the sponsors, but they can’t 
keep track of how you spend it. Then, in the name of terrorism, you can loot 
banks and all of that and make money. So attracting the wrong kind of people 
meant that the movement was going in a downward direction. It was losing 
the narrative and the popular support it was trying to gain. Now, the terrorists 
are not flush with funds, but they don’t need that much money to make these 
IEDs they use. They want to make news; they have to make news. The more 
people they kill, the better. Even just making a blast without killing someone 
can make national news. 
Now when it comes to the future, if we can manage to stop the state spon-
sorship and control, then that kind of organized terrorism, with particular 
objectives, is going to decline because they need some kind of organization 
for that. But then you will have individuals to deal with. Some two or three 
people can decide what to do. They have the internet from anywhere and can 
decide what to do. It is hard to track them. We can’t do much, except that we 
have to handle the border and what is coming in both from a state and from a 
non-state actor abroad. But inside India, they don’t use modern communica-
tions. You don’t have lines to tap, or other things like social networking from 
which you can try to guess who is what, and how it is working. 
 I wouldn’t necessarily subscribe completely to the view that state sponsor-
ship is no longer an issue. There are still links between, for instance, Iran and 
some of the terrorism that takes place in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I think 
in Iraq, we only truly became aware of the extent of the problem that we 
They want to make news; they 
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faced among some of the Shi’a groups by actually discovering both Iranian 
and Hezbollah links supporting those groups. So, I wouldn’t preclude the fact 
that we are going to have to carry on [targeting states and their intelligence 
services]. But not by any stretch of the imagination is targeting state sponsors 
the only solution.
MODERATOR: May I put you on the spot? You worked against the Puerto 
Rican Nationalists and against the Abu Nidal group in Puerto Rico, but also 
more recently against the ALF/ELF [Animal Liberation Front/Earth Liberation 
Front]. From the viewpoint of law enforcement, do you see any fundamental 
changes in those groups, how they operated, or how it was necessary to 
operate against them? I ask because the environmental group is often cited as 
an example of the new kind of terrorism we face, networked, leaderless, and 
so on. 
 Except that it is not really. It still fundamentally involves small cells, 
clandestine activity. It is no different trying to penetrate a group like that than 
it was trying to penetrate a cell structure of the Abu Nidal organization that 
existed in Puerto Rico in 1984. If you are going to develop human intelligence, 
you have to target people who show the greatest vulnerabilities for recruit-
ment, which is exactly what happened in regard to the clandestine cell known 
as The Family that was conducting a number of environmentally motivated 
arsons in the Pacific Northwest [of the United States]. If you are going to try 
to penetrate a clandestine cell of suspected terrorists, you are going to try to 
target those who have the most vulnerabilities, the weakest sense of self, and 
exploit those vulnerabilities. Now, that takes a very strong development of 
intelligence about the individuals in the group. But it is basic law enforcement 
work that you are doing in trying to target them. 
 May I add something? The difference between what we faced in the past 
and what we have to face now is that, in the previous case, the people involved 
rarely lived in the country they were targeting. They came from the outside. 
Sometimes they had some accomplices inside, but they were state sponsored. 
So the intelligence service was enough to work against them, and the intel-
ligence service members were specialists. Now, with the new type of terrorism 
coming from the population, we have to mobilize all the services on the 
ground. You see? Everybody must be concerned—police, educators, prisons, 
social organizations, everything—in order to find the terrorist.
  But that is a European-centric problem because it has always been that 
way in the United States, in the sense that homegrown terrorism is an Amer-
ican phenomenon, and it has been since the United States was founded. 
 But teachers in high schools in the United States don’t think of themselves 
as intelligence collectors. 
 They do in regard to gangs, though.
 But the suggestion is that we need to turn all of the social institutions—
doctors, teachers, all of them—into collectors of information.
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 Also the religious leaders. In France, for instance, we believe that the 
Muslim authorities should help because they are moderates. They don’t do it 
because it is too complicated for them. I think in Great Britain, it is different. 
 That is absolutely right. We have found ourselves in a situation where the 
lead government department for the prevention strategy, which is basically 
tackling the causes of radicalization, is the Department for Communities and 
Local Government. Now, that department 10 or 15 years ago would never, 
ever have imagined that it would be part of the UK counterterrorism strategy. 
It has required from our perspective a fundamental rethinking. Unless you 
mobilize all of these people, the chances of the intelligence or the law enforce-
ment community ever being able to identify potential terrorists is that much 
more difficult. 
 In the United States, there are significant restrictions on law enforcement 
getting access to education records and medical records, so it is very difficult. 
 It is the same in Britain. I think what we are saying is that there is a focus 
now on these organizations, and getting the people who work in them to 
understand that they are part of the solution in a way that would have never 
occurred to them before. 
 Terrorism is not a onetime incident. Leaders have to have a strategy and 
the means to carry it out. It is hard to change objectives. If you change the 
objectives as a leader, people in the organization will question you. When you 
are questioned as a leader, you will lose your support. It means the end of your 
organization. So, it is hard to change objectives. If the intelligence community 
focuses on the objectives or the goals of the terrorist organizations, then it 
slowly will be able to define the ways and means of the terrorist organizations. 
If not—if you focus on the ways—most probably you will not get the target. 
The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, for example, may 
reappear for the one hundredth anniversary of the 1915 Armenian incidents. 
It will emerge again with the same name or another one, but from the same 
ethnic group, and try to accomplish the same goals. So, if we can define the 
goals of the terrorist organizations or if we focus on those as an intelligence 
community, most probably we would get the target, and we will accomplish 
our goals. 
As for the goals, I ask myself, “Does a terrorist organization have a religion 
or not?” I don’t think so. There are lots of organizations, not only al Qaeda 
or Hamas. For example, the Red Army Faction didn’t have a religion. Maybe 
the members of terrorist groups have a religion, but the terrorist organization 
itself, I think, doesn’t have a religion. We should also consider some organiza-
tions recruiting members of various religions. For instance, the PKK. As far as 
I know, there are Zoroastrian, Christian, and Muslim members of the PKK.
 In India, we have some homegrown terrorism, but sponsored and trained 
from outside. Earlier they had to go outside the country for training. That 
was a chance for you to notice that somebody was missing, and if you had the 
support of the community, as a law enforcement agency, you should be able to 
know [somebody was missing]. It was a failure on the ground if you couldn’t 
get that intelligence in time. But if your penetration into certain areas is 
If the intelligence community 
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limited, you might not notice somebody going out. It is a huge country. But 
going across the border has decreased now because these guys don’t actually 
train in handling guns and all; they just know how to make IEDs. That is good 
enough to make a terrorist attack. 
As for religion, you have to distinguish between religion as a motivation 
and knowledge of religion and how religious someone is. Those are different 
things. The biggest motivation, or the satisfaction, that a suicide bomber has 
is that he is immediately going to heaven. If that solace is missing, you don’t 
find a suicide bomber there. Our terrorists have all been linked to religion, 
and madrassas have been used for instilling that feeling that Islam is under 
threat unless you do something, and Allah is there with you. These guys, they 
don’t understand the Qur’an or any of that. But they know this equation: I 
am fighting jihad here; I go [to heaven], so I don’t care. 
 But there are cases where terrorists have a conscience and they give up 
detonating the bomb, and they believe in the same religion [as those who 
carry out attacks]… 
 Yes, yes, it is like people going and trying to commit a suicide attack, and 
at the last minute, they call their parents, who stop them from committing 
suicide. So that happens. We are human beings; the determination may not 
be as strong in some as in others. But religion has played a role in generating 
this feeling of injustice. Not only in India but all over the world. They keep 
targeting Israel, the United States. Of course, in madrassas, there are people 
who will help you in identifying and noticing what is happening. There are 
activities like Tablighi Jamaat [Society for Spreading Faith] in which people 
go around talking about Islam. There is nothing wrong with that. It is a 
constructive approach. But then, there may be one person planted there, who 
tries to locate recruits for terrorist activities. The community is the way you 
know about such things, because intelligence services cannot plant somebody 
everywhere. We had a sponsored attack in Mumbai, the biggest attack we have 
had.3 They were all outsiders, they came from Pakistan…
 Yes, Lashkar-e-Taiba. 
 Yes, and they are still in Pakistan. Nobody has done anything with them. 
There is state sponsorship, some kind of involvement by the state to handle 
them, and some linkages at the lower level of operations. That is still going 
on. But this new phenomenon is something we need to watch out for because 
it is a more difficult, more challenging thing for law enforcement because 
you don’t have linkages to tap on. You have to totally depend on this social 
interpretation to guess which person [is involved]; otherwise, he looks like a 
simple, ordinary person. How do you [identify potential recruits] when even 
the parents and the close family cannot guess that this boy is in that small 
group, a peer group, that is into this kind of activity? So to get at them is very 
difficult. 
 I would like to make a comment on the fundamental change in terrorism. 
At the end of the Cold War, it is true that state-sponsored, state-supported 
terrorism declined, but we should not forget countries like North Korea. They 
are still supporting terrorism, setting up cells in South Korea and in Japan as 
well. They are apparently very quiet now. But in a crisis, I don’t think they will 
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launch a missile attack. They will use terrorism. Second, I think that amateur 
terrorism based on religion will become very popular. I am not an expert on 
al Qaeda, but the comparison some like to make between al Qaeda and kami-
kazes is not true. The motivation is completely different. The typical kamikaze 
suicide was pressured by the organization. The pilots were not happy at all. 
But al Qaeda members feel very happy. Also, in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo was the 
first terrorist group that used chemical weapons. They were very intelligent 
young people. So it is very difficult for the police to find the candidate for a 
terrorist organization. This is a very big problem these days.
 But if you talk about religion and terrorism, the number of religious 
people is much greater than the number who engage in terrorism. 
 Yes, yes, India has a population that is 14 percent Muslim [about 176 mil-
lion people]. It is the second biggest Muslim country, in that sense. You can 
imagine that if the percentage of people wanting to do terrorism was a little 
more, India would be in big trouble.
 So terrorism is not just a religious or Islamic phenomenon.
  I would like to add something to the picture. I am puzzled by the con-
versation. Take Anders Breivik.4 Put aside all the stuff about motivation. The 
interesting thing is how he did it. I learned in our discussion that you need 
a motivator. There has to be somebody behind you. But as far as we know, 
that guy was totally self-radicalized, building a fertilizer bomb of about 1,000 
pounds, which he blew up in central Oslo, driving up to a remote island and 
killing 69 youth. These guys are really hard to find. I agree so much with our 
British colleague here, that when you look at this case in particular, if some-
body was to find out what he was doing, it would be in his school time. There 
was a history of some mental issues, but that is a closed chapter for security 
services. This could be just this guy, but it is a bad sign when in a rather 
transparent country like mine—transparent because if I go and buy fertilizer, 
I will pop up on a list—he masterminded this from a remote farm, building 
a bomb, making his own police uniform, taking legal education to acquire 
firearms, and that is what happened. And 77 people were killed. 
 The Breivik example brings out what the problem is because [even if we 
knew about the mental problems] there is no way to predict. In other words, 
somebody can engage in all sorts of activity that is perfectly legal and then it 
goes beyond that, but there is no way to predict or even to anticipate what 
would be the event that pushes somebody over that line.   
NOTES
1 This discussion was edited for length and clarity. Every effort 
was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the 
participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions 
of all participants are theirs alone and do not represent the 
official positions of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, the 
U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. government, or any other 
government or official entity.
2 Drummer (Private) Lee Rigby, a British soldier who had 
served in Afghanistan, was murdered on a London street by 
two men who called themselves soldiers of Allah. See “Two 
Guilty of Lee Rigby Murder,” BBC News, 19 December 
2013: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25450555 
3 For more information, see the Guardian’s collection of articles 
on the Mumbai attacks: http://www.theguardian.com/world/
mumbai-terror-attacks 
4 For more on the Breivik massacre, see David Blair, “Anders 
Behring Breivik’s Norway Shooting Spree Relived in Chilling 
Detail,” Telegraph, 20 April 2012: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/norway/9217315/Anders-Behring-
Breiviks-Norway-shooting-spree-relived-in-chilling-detail.html 
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Intelligence Requirements
MODERATOR: I would like to talk about roles and missions based on the various 
points that were brought up in the previous discussion on the changing 
character of terrorism. As a transition to that, could we talk a bit about intel-
ligence requirements for terrorism, keeping in mind all the varieties that we 
have talked about? We talked about organizations, and dispersed organizations 
like al Qaeda, and individuals who suddenly pop up. Is it possible to talk 
about a set of requirements for collecting intelligence on terrorism, or does 
that depend on the particulars of the problem we confront?
 The problem [with trying to identify requirements in the abstract like this] 
is that the intelligence community reacts to what our leaders decide are the 
problems. Dick Cheney used the term sleeper cells, and all of a sudden every-
body in the American intelligence community was looking for something that 
doesn’t exist. 
 But we, in this room, don’t have to respond to Dick Cheney… 
 But the political leaders decide what is important, and we do respond to 
them, and it’s very difficult to try to explain to political leaders what this stuff 
is all about. 
 It is possible to define terrorist requirements. I don’t think, actually, that 
intelligence requirements have changed, even if we posit the possibility that 
the form of terrorism has evolved in a changing environment. I think the 
intelligence requirements have remained constant. Whether it has become 
more difficult to meet those requirements is a different issue. 
MODERATOR: And how would you describe those requirements?
 Well, I think they have always been who, what, when, where, why, how. 
Globally, those are the questions. Increasingly we become fixated with the 
“why” to try and work out how on earth we are going to stop it in the future. 
But I think the perception is that those are the key questions.
 In the U.S. case, since 9/11 we have seen two different approaches to 
looking at what we need for intelligence to counter terrorism. One is the 
international connections that national-level [intelligence] organizations go 
after. At the same time, in the U.S. and probably in most other countries, we 
are developing domestic, local law enforcement intelligence structures that 
aren’t as well understood, and that gets back to the point about whether or not 
high school teachers are collecting intelligence. In the United States, we have 
programs of suspicious activity reporting that we are trying to grow. In some 
communities, we train trash collectors, garbagemen, to watch for indications 
of bad activity and then call the cops or [an emergency number]. That is an 
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area that I think is more important when we are trying to prevent homegrown 
and domestic terrorism and the “lone wolf” sorts of things.1 What clues 
law enforcement on to those individuals, in my experience, is a tip from a 
neighbor or somebody who talks to somebody else. We don’t seem to get the 
sort of intelligence that actually prevents attacks within the United States so 
much from international connections.
 You don’t hear about them because it is classified. I can tell you from the 
inside looking out, having experienced that, that there is a significant amount 
of terrorism that is mitigated—maybe not prevented, but at least mitigated—
as a result of pocket litter that is collected in Afghanistan that reveals a phone 
number in Seattle that sends an FBI agent out to talk to somebody. So we now 
know who you are, and we are going to begin an investigation on who is in 
your network.
 I think a state must have a permanent intelligence system with enough 
resources. The work requires mid- and long-term investment, including in 
[electronic surveillance]. Political leaders usually want immediate results, 
certainly in case of attacks, and they don’t understand that [investigating] 
these things often takes time. The problem is that we can’t succeed every time. 
We have to take this into consideration, and the politicians don’t understand 
that. They don’t want to understand that. The important thing is to make 
politicians give us the possibility to build a system, inside and outside, and 
to put all the resources together to do the maximum. Another thing, you 
were mentioning the [surveillance] work in the United States. Things have 
changed, mostly because of 9/11. I remember the first attack against the World 
Trade Center in 1993. It was made by a cell living in the United States, the 
Blind Sheikh2 and some affiliated with him. When we talked to our friends 
in the FBI and said, “You have to put a telephone tap on them,” at that time, 
Congress was absolutely against it. Of course, we can be accused of bugging 
only Muslims, but it is not the case. We also look at the extreme right. It is 
sometimes difficult. We recently arrested a friend of [Anders Breivik]. He had 
plenty of weapons, but we had nothing against him, so we had to release him. 
So we must keep an eye on everything, but we must concentrate much more 
on the main threat. I think this is fundamental. 
MODERATOR: When you were saying who, what, when, where, and why—is 
the assumption there that the principal purpose is to capture somebody before 
they commit the act or target people who may be involved in supporting 
those acts? Someone said earlier that is a losing game, so to speak. If we think 
about the way we have been describing this—lots of information out there, 
self-radicalized people—are those requirements sufficient, or are they really 
the only thing that intelligence can provide? There may be other things that 
need to be done or that we need to know, but is it simply not the business of 
intelligence? 
 Crikey,3 where do I start? I think those requirements remain valid because 
if they weren’t, what would you be admitting? You would be admitting that 
actually the task is so impossible that there is no point in even trying to 
identify the perpetrators before they commit an act. I think that would be an 
admission of failure that none of us would be prepared to make. So I think 
those requirements remain valid. I think that is still the primary responsi-
bility of both the intelligence community and law enforcement, the whole 
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of the state apparatus, to do everything that it possibly can to identify those 
individuals who may be thinking of committing a terrorist act before they get 
to that point. It may be very difficult, but we still have a responsibility to do 
that because our fundamental responsibility is to protect the communities in 
which we serve. 
Roles and Missions
 The target community, if you want to call it that, is now so diffuse that 
it actually requires an integrated approach that is very different from what 
we were doing 10 or 15 years ago. I think that takes us into the area that you 
wanted to explore, which is, what are the respective roles and responsibilities 
of intelligence services and the law enforcement community?
MODERATOR: What I had in mind was the criticism made of certain ele-
ments of the U.S. military in Iraq, who focused on identifying and killing or 
capturing individuals. The argument made by General Flynn in his article4 
was that the environment, the surroundings, so to speak, were ignored. If you 
think about the need for a high school teacher to be a collector of informa-
tion, as someone who knows the environment, the social relationships, it 
seems to me there is an analogy with the kind of argument that General Flynn 
made. His criticism of his own intelligence service in Afghanistan was that it 
was missing perhaps the most important part of what it should be collecting 
on. Then the question becomes, If that is true, how do you collect all of that 
other stuff, the kind of stuff the teacher knows? Is that even a legitimate intel-
ligence function, or do we simply say, “No, that is a policing function”? It is 
the same way the police might deal with a group of kids who are stealing cars 
or something. We don’t think of that in terms of intelligence. 
 We are now taking a quantum leap from a generic discussion of the 
problem to some very specific areas. This takes us into the whole realm of 
intelligence providing the forward screen that enables us to identify potential 
targets that are going to attack us domestically, and also the role of intelligence 
in supporting expeditionary campaigns in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
I think those are two very different areas. I think on occasion, unfortunately, 
they have been seen as one and the same thing, which would be a mistake. 
You are also addressing issues that take us into the examination of the different 
approaches required to conduct a counterterrorist campaign or a counterin-
surgency campaign. Again, I think those have been confused. Certainly they 
were confused in Iraq. I don’t think the term counterinsurgency ever passed 
the lips of most of the U.S. generals I talked to until long after 2005. It was 
an absolute refusal to recognize what was going on, on the ground. But if you 
want to start trying to delineate the various intelligence approaches that are 
required in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, then I would be happy to try to 
start you off on that. 
MODERATOR: I thought when you were talking about requirements [who, 
what, when, where, why, how], you might have been putting more emphasis 
on counterterrorism. I don’t know if we want to continue to use those terms 
[counterinsurgency and counterterrorism] because I don’t know if they are neces-
sarily very helpful. But if, as others have said, the environment—what causes 
people to get involved in terrorism, or what contributes to people doing 
those kinds of activities—is important, then there is presumably information 
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out there that we should know or could know that would help us affect that 
environment. The other view would be to say no, what we are going to do is 
try to go after the individuals before they commit the act, to prevent them 
from carrying out the attack. I don’t mean to say those are mutually exclusive 
approaches; they probably have to be combined. I think other people here 
have suggested that. But they suggest to me different kinds of requirements 
and maybe even different kinds of intelligence functions.
 I think it is important; it is a duty to prevent. In my country, we have 
special legislation: we are allowed to arrest people even before they begin 
to do something. It is with this legislation that we have arrested more than 
1,000 people and we dismantled 40 or 50 or 60 plots. The situation is dif-
ferent outside [one’s country]. I think there is no one policy [for dealing with 
terrorism]. You must prevent and you must attack outside also, because the 
people that we face in our countries have fought in Iraq or Afghanistan and so 
on. Where are the people who trained them? Where are the high-value targets? 
Recently, France had to act in Mali because of the AQIM [Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb]. You have to find these people. You have to neutralize these 
people. So you have to have both policies: prevention inside and attacking 
outside. 
There is a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, which in France is called the 
Union of Islamic Organizations of France. He is a very well respected man. 
He doesn’t ask people to go to fight, to become terrorists. But he is talking 
to the community, and he is developing the argument that you, the Muslim 
population, you are the best. You are different. You will be the future, and 
so on. So it pushes people to feel different from the rest of the population, 
exactly the thing against which we are fighting. 
 The way that we have prosecuted our campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
until relatively recently, has been very different from the way we have pros-
ecuted the intelligence campaign domestically, in one very important respect. 
In the first few years, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, we weren’t addressing the 
intelligence requirement. And, I think we confused counterterrorism with 
counterinsurgency. The name of the game was just going after high-value 
targets in both of those countries. A consequence of that, in part, was actually 
to fuel the sense of grievance among the local population, to actually make 
the operating environment both in Iraq and Afghanistan even more difficult 
because we were failing to win ground with the local population. I think 
we have become more sophisticated now, and the point that General Flynn 
was making when writing his report was that we had completely neglected 
a critical element, in terms of our ability to operate securely in Afghanistan, 
which was understanding the environment in which we tried to operate.5 
You know, we hadn’t actually collected what in old parlance we would call 
“ground truth,” which is who lives where, what do they do, who do they 
know, how do they relate, and how do those communities work, how do 
they then relate to each other, etc. [We didn’t collect that] because we were 
so focused on chasing after high-value targets. So I think we are now much 
more focused on the why. The question then, of course, is who is responsible 
for collecting the why, for collecting that mass of local information? I am not 
sure you can call it intelligence in strict parlance, but who [is responsible for] 
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developing that ground truth, for developing the understanding that allows us 
to then operate more effectively and engage with the local communities? 
 I agree with that. What I took from General Flynn’s report was that we 
understood very poorly the environment we were operating in. That was the 
fundamental lesson. 
 If that is true, in a certain way, this actually diminishes the role of what I 
think of as intelligence. It seems that domestically, if we need to understand 
the environment, that is essentially a police function. If we are talking about 
[understanding the environment] overseas, it seems to be something that 
intelligence, as it has been traditionally practiced, is not very good at. In 
a combat environment like Afghanistan or Iraq, you could argue that it is 
primarily a military function because that is where the military ought to have 
the primary role. 
Maybe [our former FBI colleague] would object to this, but in the United 
States, there is no national domestic intelligence service… 
 Yes, I would object…
 But it seems to me that [understanding the domestic environment], or 
understanding about certain people dispersed in a population, is really a 
police function. That is what [our colleague] was saying about India. And that 
seems to be the situation in France. That’s different from Iraq or Afghanistan. 
It seems to me that the people who are most likely to collect that [environ-
mental] information are not traditional intelligence people carrying out 
traditional intelligence functions. 
 In [France], it is now not the police with intelligence power; it is an intel-
ligence service with law enforcement power. But we use the same methods 
to penetrate, to infiltrate, and to work on terrorism. There is also a separate 
external service that belongs to the Ministry of Defense, but they are com-
pletely different [from the internal services]. 
 In [India], police are provincially organized. Police always had an intel-
ligence wing, and this comes from the time of British control of India. In our 
country, the analysis is done by the intelligence agency because they have a 
pan-country vision or idea of what is happening. They can put things together 
and make a big picture, whereas the fragmented police at the local level are 
looking at individuals and trying to understand why they do this, or why they 
have these friends, or where they were for the last three years. The big picture 
is given by intelligence services to the police. The police and intelligence have 
been working hand in hand. We have problems of sharing intelligence, but 
the intelligence agencies are expected to pay attention to the big picture. 
 To go back to the example of Iraq or Afghanistan, I am not sure which or-
ganization should take the lead in producing the rich picture of that particular 
country that would enable us to really understand who the key players are and 
where the communities are, etc. To be effective in the future, there needs to be 
a recognition that this is something that needs to be done, and that therefore 
anyone who is deployed on the ground ought to be collecting and offering 
up that local information to be fused into some kind of countrywide report. 
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I think it is a very good argument that the military should take the lead. 
Generally speaking, the military people have the biggest footprint, and they 
also have the critical mass that would enable them to do this piece of work. 
That is not to say that there isn’t a very important contribution to be made 
by a country’s external service, be it the intelligence service, or the diplomatic 
service, or NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], or coalition forces. But 
there is a requirement to try and capture all of that information as quickly 
as possible and to draw on, for instance, the expertise that may exist on that 
country before you even deploy. So, for instance, academics, authors, again 
NGOs, foreign service departments, and so on. What I am not saying is that 
it must be the military. It might make sense for the military to do this, but in 
fact, there needs to be a product that enables everyone involved to understand 
what is going on in that country and how it works and why it works in the 
way that it does. 
MODERATOR: In a situation like Iraq or Afghanistan, what do you understand 
to be the specific contribution that the intelligence service can make? 
 I am going to reference a point that [was] made before, which I think 
is absolutely right: the role of the intelligence service is to help support the 
national policy in that country. Of course, there are exceptions to this general 
rule, but certainly in the United Kingdom, the role of the intelligence com-
munity is to answer intelligence requirements that flow directly from an 
articulation of whatever the national strategic interests may be. Those national 
strategic interests are then translated into various different policies. Where it 
becomes more complex is that there is also a role for the intelligence com-
munity to provide force protection–related intelligence. Now you can argue 
where that starts and where it ends. Clearly there is a link between strategic 
interests and ensuring that your nationals deployed in a particular country are 
as safe and secure as possible. There is a role for the intelligence service in that. 
But how you then articulate those intelligence requirements and how you 
then meet those requirements, I think, becomes a separate issue.
 Are you saying that the intelligence service has a focus that is more 
political and strategic, and that the military will probably focus more at the 
tactical level? That is a traditional way of understanding the division of labor 
in a situation like that. 
 In 2003 and 2004 in Iraq, the [intelligence] products that I was seeing 
coming from the CIA were very focused on high-value targets. The things 
that I was reading coming from the military had to do with broad political 
understandings. 
 It depends on the specific time period you are talking about [in Iraq]… 
 In the French case, the DGSE6 does both [tactical and strategic intel-
ligence]. They have their own forces and may make their own operations if 
necessary, but generally the problem is really how to put all of that together.
 In the Bosnia campaign, we had 41 nations in the “coalition of the willing,” 
and we worked out the intelligence support with the commander of SFOR [the 
NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia] almost on a weekly basis. What do you 
need? What are you planning to do? Where are people going to be in harm’s 
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way? Is there anything we can do to make sure that you don’t run into harm? 
Is there anything you would like us to look at? The intelligence services played 
that role. Not tactical military intelligence collection; [the military] did that 
themselves. But [we worked on] reports, for example, that the Iranians had a 
secret training camp in Bosnia. A team spent four days hiding, going through 
the woods, to check that out, but they weren’t soldiers in uniform. One of the 
goals that General Shinseki7 had at the time was to reduce the potential points 
of conflict by reducing the presence of the soldiers among the civilian popula-
tion. So the whole point was to keep it as clandestine as possible. I think you 
can work those things out on the ground fairly easily if you have a willingness 
on both sides. If you don’t, then no matter what they say at the headquarters 
level or the national [capital] level, then it is never going to work. I do see a 
complementary role between the two services.
MODERATOR: How would you specify that complementary role? Or are you 
saying that there might be some general principles that explain what those 
complementary roles are but it really depends more on what needs to be done 
in the circumstances?
 At the time [in the Balkans], we had people who concentrated on the 
national strategic objectives and reported on those. Then we had a small 
group that was assigned to support SFOR in Bosnia and Croatia. That was our 
job—to support General Shinseki. Other people provided the regular flow 
of intelligence. My job on the ground was to support his lead, not to go out 
and do tactical military intelligence collection or anything like that. We didn’t 
do any reporting on the Serbs manipulating their tank parks and moving 
vehicles around secretly and things like that. The military was covering that. 
On at least a weekly basis, sometimes more frequently, we asked, “Okay, what 
do you need?” The commanders would say, “Well, we are going to go and 
inspect this factory. We believe this factory is producing such and such. Go by 
beforehand and make sure that we are not going to run into a hostile crowd 
or we are not being set up for any ambush.” So we were doing a role that was 
complementary to and supportive of their mission. 
 From my much more limited experience in the intelligence community, [I 
would say] there aren’t clearly delineated roles, per se. At the higher level there 
are, but [intelligence] is mostly about supporting the customer. Intelligence 
isn’t done in a vacuum. A lot of those things are worked out based on the 
customer and supporting whatever the customer wants.
 The consequence is that it is really messy and redundant and expensive 
because everybody has different intelligence organizations doing overlapping 
things. You don’t have a lot of coordination to start with, not top-down 
coordination. 
 Right, but I know exactly [what our colleague was talking about before, 
i.e., intelligence focused on high-value targets]. Many of us within the intel-
ligence community were horribly disappointed by the CTC’s [CIA Counterter-
rorism Center’s]8 insistence that they were only going to deal with the top five 
high-value targets of the week. Many of us saw that as a total perversion of 




 We still have to deal with nation-states, but now what can hurt us are 
small numbers of people, even individuals, who can do a great deal of damage, 
as [the] 9/11 [attacks] and subsequent attacks have shown. So one of our mis-
sions has morphed [from warning] into the notion of preventing—capturing 
and killing those people who can hurt us—and requirements have changed 
because of this. When we capture a terrorist, the very first question that 
people are trained to ask is, Do you know of any operations that are planned 
that can cause imminent damage to our country, to our allies? That is always 
the first question. Then you build from there. You jump from that person, 
going through his pocket litter and the information he has, to go immediately 
on to his confederates, linking to them right away and, you hope, wrapping 
them up in a matter of hours before they know that their colleague has been 
captured. That was an emphasis in Iraq and Afghanistan. It then gets to your 
question. The intelligence community and intelligence agencies develop 
certain skills at [finding high-value targets]. And you are asking the question, 
Is that really the right kind of specialization for the intelligence agencies, 
as opposed to the military? You laid out some different ways to consider 
Afghanistan. The environment is so complex because, yes, it is a combat zone, 
but the enemy that we are dealing with is not a uniformed army and doesn’t 
have the kind of assets and physical infrastructure that armies have, so I think 
it does very much call for the experience and skills of intelligence agencies as 
well [as the military] to find, fix, locate those individuals. 
 The problem that has afflicted the U.S. intelligence community, the 
civilian agencies, and the military is unique to the United States. Seen from 
the outside, certainly in Iraq and possibly in Afghanistan, a lot of tension 
arose out of competing interests and competing political interests. Certainly 
what I have witnessed is a struggle for primacy between the CIA and the DoD 
[Department of Defense] when it comes to who is going to take the lead on 
delivering intelligence. That struggle was only possible because of the scale of 
those two organizations. It was not a struggle, certainly, that existed within 
the UK community, and in my understanding, working with close allies 
didn’t afflict our other allies. It is a problem that is very specific, I think, to 
the United States. In Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia—these were very different 
problems from a number of different perspectives, and it was a lot tidier to 
be able to distinguish who was responsible for doing what. The moment you 
get to something as complex, as big, as difficult, as intractable, and as messy 
and as dangerous as Iraq or even Afghanistan, then this neat, tidy division of 
responsibilities falls away very quickly.
 Well, I think that is true. It seems to me that what was missing in 
Afghanistan, for example, was what, I believe, police normally gather just in 
the course of doing their business walking around the neighborhood—or they 
should. As far as I could see, neither the foreign intelligence service nor the 
military—again, this is a U.S. perspective—was able to do that effectively in 
Afghanistan. I understand the coordination problem, but it also seems to me 
that there is an element of information or kinds of information that we are 
not collecting. 
 I completely agree with you, but I think you have to go back to the reason 
behind our deployment to Afghanistan. We deployed to Afghanistan very spe-
cifically to destroy al Qaeda. Now to destroy al Qaeda, we had to dismantle 
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was peace and stability.
the Taliban regime, but the reason we put boots on the ground in the first 
place was to destroy al Qaeda. It was not to create a new state of Afghanistan. 
Therefore, when we first deployed to Afghanistan, there was no requirement 
placed on anyone to go out and understand the communities because that 
wasn’t relevant. So when suddenly it became really important to know and 
understand the community, we had already been there for many years, and the 
damage in some sense had already been done. So we are constantly having to 
play catch-up. Now the requirement is to understand the communities, but I 
think where General Flynn was both right and unfair was in saying, “Well, we 
didn’t have that information.” That is correct, but it is unfair because I don’t 
think anyone was actually tasking anybody to go out and collect that informa-
tion. So, from a U.S. perspective, you may argue, and I can see the sense of 
this, that in fact it is the primary responsibility of the military, because of their 
footprint in the country, to go out and collect that kind of information. But 
the U.S. military isn’t everywhere. So how are they going to get the informa-
tion they need about what is going on in Helmand before they deploy there? 
In Kandahar before they deploy there? The areas where the Germans are, the 
areas where the French are, the areas where all the close allies are? Whose 
responsibility is it to task those coalition allies to go and collect intelligence, 
and where does that information then go? 
The big difference between operations like Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
Balkans was that in the Balkans, all we were trying to achieve was peace and 
stability. Fundamentally different from what we have been trying to do in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
MODERATOR: Your comments 
bring us back to the point 
[our colleague] made when 
we first began to talk about 
requirements. Ultimately, 
those requirements and what 
intelligence organizations do 
depend on what the policy-
makers say is the mission, or 
what they say they want to 
accomplish.
 Let me add one thing 
about policing and intelli-
gence. Cultural intelligence, or 
understanding the community, 
means tracking informa-
tion [on activity] that is not 
inherently or necessarily illegal 
or wrong. When the U.S. 
intelligence community does 
that in Afghanistan or Iran 
or North Korea, Americans 
would say, “Sure, let’s do that.” 
When we do it domestically, 
that is a problem. So that is 
An Afghan Border Police officer searches a man for contraband in 
Bets Kalay village, Kandahar province,  Afghanistan.
The best strategy engages 
not just the police but also all 
of those other governmental 
institutions that come into daily 
contact with the communities.
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where it may or may not be law enforcement’s role; we are still trying to figure 
that out. 
 Yes, you are exactly right. I am a recovering cop, so I will tell you that 
you just don’t do that stuff in the United States. It is exactly when you start 
keeping track of it in some database that it becomes a problem. 
 [In my country] as well, that is a problem. In one of our provinces, they 
tried to make a database. It was struck down [by the court], a big embarrass-
ment for the government and everyone. Putting it in a database, that is the 
problem. But there is a need for that database because that helps you do [your 
job]. I don’t know how we will do that. 
 So the situation is difficult in your country. In Europe—in Britain, 
Germany, Holland, France—most of the domestic intelligence organizations 
are not police. 
 But there is an advantage to that approach because the police function is 
separate from the intelligence function. Normal policing is understood as a 
coercive force to prevent crime, and that is separated from the information 
collection function, so [intelligence collecting] is not as threatening.
 Let me say again that, in my view, based on our experience in the United 
Kingdom, the best strategy engages not just the police but also all of those 
other governmental institutions that come into daily contact with the com-
munities. I mean teachers, health providers, etc., in the hope that, with 
everybody engaged in this information-gathering enterprise, a much better 
understanding of those communities will be developed, and potentially people 
who are becoming radicalized or have become radicalized will be identified 
much more quickly. But if you go to Afghanistan, then none of that [com-
munity] infrastructure exists there. The question, then, is, who should collect 
it? Well, that goes back to who has got the most boots on the ground, who 
is going to have the best ability to collect it, and that almost certainly is the 
military. But then the other people who are engaged [overseas] with those 
communities must not be forgotten. Their information needs to be collected 
and become part of the intelligence product.  
NOTES
1 A “lone wolf” terrorist is someone who acts alone, without 
belonging to or taking orders directly from a larger organization.
2 Omar Abdel Rahman, an Egyptian Muslim cleric (born in 
1938) who came to the United States, was convicted of seditious 
conspiracy for terrorist plotting and is serving a life prison 
sentence. 
3 The exclamation crikey is apparently of Australian origin.
4 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing 
Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2010): 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_
Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf 
5 Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel.
6 Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, or General 
Directorate for External Security. 
7 General Eric Shinseki, U.S. Army, served as commander of 
SFOR from 1997 to 1998.
8 The CTC is an office in the CIA that integrates collection and 
analysis, including the information provided by other intelligence 
and operational agencies, which send staff members to work at 
the CTC. In addition to analysis, the CTC directs operations. 
Established in the 1980s, the CTC is often cited as an example of 
effective interagency cooperation. For this reason, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established a 
National Counterterrorism Center as part of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence.
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Tags, Tweets, and Tethers
Introduction1
On  29 January 2007, I opened my e-mail to discover that a colleague and 
friend, Jim Gray, was feared to be lost at sea. A noted computer scientist and 
Turing Award2 winner, Gray had failed to return the day before from a solo 
trip aboard his 40-foot sailboat Tenacious to the Farallon Islands, which lie 
about 27 miles off the coast of San Francisco. Over the next several days, I ob-
served a massive search effort spring into action. Not only did the U.S. Coast 
Guard search 40,000 square miles, but a large social network also emerged to 
assist in the effort. Sadly, Gray was never found, but the scale and energy put 
into the search itself was inspiring.
Since then, I have observed three other large-scale search operations, although 
none with life and death consequences. Indeed, all three were contests that 
offered prizes to the winners. The first of these, the Vanish competition, took 
place in 2009 with the goal of finding a person who intentionally tried to 
disappear under a new identity. The second, the Red Balloon Challenge, took 
place later that year with the objective of finding 10 red balloons that had been 
tethered to unspecified locations across the United States. Finally, the third, 
the Tag Challenge, took place in 2011 with the goal of finding five individuals 
in five cities of the world. 
In all four of these cases, social networks emerged to assist with the search, 
leveraging communications and information technologies, especially social 
media, to mobilize, organize, coordinate, and share information. They are 
instances of what is sometimes called crowdsourcing, where a large network 
of people collectively performs some operation. The searches, especially the 
Gray search, also illustrate the concept of a “hastily formed network,” where 
a network of people is established rapidly from different communities and 
works together in a shared conversation space in order to plan and execute an 
urgent mission.3 Social media can provide the shared conversation space.
I take a broad view of social media, including not only media such as Face-
book and Twitter that explicitly keep track of social connections like “friend” 
and “follower,” but also the group use of communication media such as 
e-mail, chat, and blogs. Indeed, many social networks are organized around 
e-mail distribution lists and chat channels.
Cases of Large-Scale Search Operations
In this section, I briefly describe each of the four search operations and 
then draw on them to explore the role of social media in a large-scale search 
operation. I examine three areas where social media can contribute to a search: 
mobilization of persons and resources, data collection and dissemination, and 
verification of acquired data. For each of these areas, I offer principles for how 
Although Gray was never found, 
the search operation showed 
how a social network could 
self-organize and deploy massive 
resources to aid the effort.
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social media and other technologies and strategies can facilitate large-scale 
search operations, using the four cases to illustrate. 
The Search for Jim Gray
When news of Jim Gray’s disappearance began to spread on 29 January 2007, 
a massive social network of colleagues and friends in different disciplines and 
industries emerged, offering funds, resources, and expertise to aid the effort. 
Eventually, the effort centered on acquiring and analyzing images from satel-
lite and aerial sources, with most of the imagery coming from Digital Globe’s 
QuickBird satellite.4
At the time of Gray’s disappearance, Facebook had a modest 20 million users, 
and Twitter was less than two years old. Thus, it is not surprising that neither 
played a prominent role in the search. Instead, a core group of volunteers 
organized and coordinated their efforts through a “Friends of Jim” e-mail list 
and a blog called Tenacious Search, named after Gray’s sloop. Although Gray 
was never found, the search operation showed how a social network could 
self-organize and deploy massive resources to aid the effort.5
Vanish Contest
The Vanish contest began on 15 August 2009, when Wired Magazine an-
nounced a $5,000 prize to anyone who could find author Evan Ratliff, say the 
password “fluke,” and take his picture—all within 30 days. In cahoots with the 
magazine, Ratliff had vanished from his home in Northern California armed 
with business cards showing a fake identity, James Donald Gatz. His objec-
tive was not to go into isolation or even off the grid, but rather to see what it 
would be like to disappear for a month and assume a new identity.6 
In addition to using a fake identity both online and off, Ratliff used prepaid 
phone cards, gift cards (paid for with cash), and cash to fund himself while in 
hiding. He concealed his presence on the internet by using free accounts set 
up with the fake identity, connecting through a computer that he set up in Las 
Vegas, and using the anonymity tool Tor to further obfuscate his location. But 
he took some risks, occasionally using his real ATM card and credit cards, or 
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Wired’s editor posted the transaction information online, presumably to provide 
enough clues to keep searchers interested in the hunt. Had Ratliff not taken 
these risks, he might not have been found before the deadline. As it was, Ratliff 
was found in New Orleans on 8 September, a week before the clock ran out.7
Red Balloon Challenge
On 5 December 2009, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) ran the DARPA Network Challenge, offering a $40,000 prize to 
the first person to report the correct locations of 10 tethered eight-foot red 
balloons that had been scattered throughout the United States. The challenge 
was announced on 29 October during a celebration of both the 40th anniver-
sary of the internet and the first remote login to ARPANET, giving potential 
contestants over one month to prepare.8 
The challenge was set up as an experiment in social network mobilization. 
DARPA wanted to “identify distributed 
mobilization strategies and demonstrate 
how quickly a challenging geolocation 
problem could be solved by crowd-
sourcing.”9 Although the task was 
considered intractable by conventional 
intelligence methods, an approach 
built around social networking seemed 
promising. This was confirmed when a 
team from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology’s Media Lab successfully 
mobilized a cross-country social network 
and reported the correct locations of all 10 
balloons in eight hours and 52 minutes.10 
A team from Mercyhurst College’s 
Department of Intelligence Studies ap-
proached the challenge from an intelligence analyst’s perspective, applying the 
concept of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to predict where the 
balloons might be located. They mapped the locations of all DARPA-funded 
sites, expecting the balloons to be nearby. Their strategy also included iden-
tifying lesser-known networks they could tap into, such as law enforcement 
intelligence analysts and interstate truckers. However, they started late and did 
not correctly report any balloons.11
Tag Challenge
Sponsored by the U.S. State Department, the Tag Challenge took place on 
31 March 2012, with the goal of determining “whether and how social media 
can be used to accomplish a realistic, time-sensitive, international law en-
forcement goal.”12 Specifically, contestants had to locate and photograph five 
“suspects” in five different cities of the world: Washington, D.C.; New York; 
London; Stockholm; and Bratislava, Slovakia. The suspects were described as 
jewel thieves who had “stolen a prized diamond” but were actually volunteers 
who had been instructed to follow a 12-hour itinerary designed to look like 
a normal day. The contest offered a prize of $5,000 to the first person who 
submitted verifiable pictures of the suspects within the allotted 12 hours for 
Balloon 1, Union Square, San Francisco
In all four operations, social 
media played a key role in 
mobilization. However, the most 
successful efforts also benefited 
from the use of mass media.
each city. Although the contest was announced two 
months in advance, officials waited until the day of the 
contest to post “mug shots” of the suspects, all wearing 
colorful T-shirts with the competition logo.13
Like the Red Balloon Challenge, the Tag Challenge 
tested the role of social networks and social media in a 
large-scale search operation. It was more difficult than 
its predecessor, however, spanning two continents and 
employing mobile targets that would be more difficult 
to spot than large red balloons. No team found all five 
suspects, but the team CrowdScanner, whose members 
came from five universities in the United States, United 
Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, and Australia, found 
the three suspects in Washington, New York, and 
Bratislava. None of the team’s members resided in the 
target cities, but at least one had been part of the win-
ning MIT Media Lab team in the balloon challenge.14
Social Network and Media Roles
This next part of the discussion turns to the role of 
social media in the mobilization of a large-scale search 
effort, in the dissemination and collection of informa-
tion, and in the verification of acquired data.
Mobilization
In all four operations, social media played a key role in 
mobilization. However, the most successful efforts also 
benefited from the use of mass media, and two of these 
from the application of a recursive incentive structure as 
well. The following discussion elaborates on these findings.
Social Media Can Enhance Mobilization
Social media offer two advantages for mobilization. 
First, they encode existing social networks through such 
constructs as friends, followers, group memberships, 
and distribution lists, making it easy to spread informa-
tion through these networks. Second, the technology 
facilitates the formation of new networks and the 
growth of existing ones.
All four operations made extensive use of social media 
to recruit participants in their search efforts, although 
the technologies they used varied somewhat. The search 
for Jim Gray, for example, was mobilized initially 
through various e-mail discussions among Gray’s 
colleagues and friends. Recognizing the need to provide 
a central means of communication and coordination 
for everyone involved, the group set up the Tenacious 
Search blog. At first, the blog had open authorship 
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In the Vanish contest, the Twitter 
hashtag #vanish drew 600 posts 
a day, while the “Search for 
Evan Ratliff” Facebook group 
attracted over 1,000 members.
rights, acting as a public forum and bulletin board. 
After the blog attracted a large audience, however, 
these rights were restricted to a smaller group, while 
the core group of volunteers moved to a “Friends of 
Jim” e-mail distribution list to coordinate their search 
efforts. At the same time, the blog continued to sup-
port mobilization, with the blog administrator serving 
as a point of contact for outside persons offering tips 
and skills to aid the search. When the search was over, 
team leaders noted how “modern networked technolo-
gies enabled a group of acquaintances and strangers 
to quickly self-organize, coordinate, build complex 
working systems, and attack problems in a data-driven 
manner.” They also recognized that “the process of 
coordinating diverse volunteer skills in an emerging 
crisis was quite difficult, and that there is significant 
room for improvement over standard email and blog-
ging tools.”15
By the time of the other three search operations, both 
Twitter and Facebook were more popular, and both 
played a role in mobilization. In the Vanish contest, 
the Twitter hashtag #vanish drew 600 posts a day, 
while the “Search for Evan Ratliff” Facebook group 
attracted over 1,000 members.16 In the Red Balloon 
Challenge, hacker George Hotz found eight balloons, 
in part by leveraging his existing Twitter network of 
almost 50,000 followers. Another team, Nerdfighters, 
tapped into its network of 5,000 followers of the 
Brotherhood 2.0 vlog (video blog) and created a video 
that went viral. Several teams used Facebook’s friends 
structure to recruit, the result being that Facebook 
alone brought more referrals to the official challenge 
website than any of the search engines, including 
Google.17 The Mercyhurst team set up a Facebook 
group that grew to 447 members within 24 hours.18
Twitter and Facebook were used in the Tag Challenge 
as well, with the winning team creating a Twitter 
account and Facebook page that people could follow 
and like, respectively. The team thought, however, that 
Twitter and Facebook might have played a larger role 
in increasing the credibility of the teams than in actual 
recruitment. One team tried, but failed, to create a 
bandwagon effect by creating a large number of fake 
Twitter followers.19
Social Media Should Be Augmented with Mass 
Media
All of the operations seemed to benefit from mass 
media exposure. This was especially apparent in the 
Red Balloon Challenge, where the top two teams 
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The Harvard Business School 
team found no balloons, 
apparently because they spent 
too much effort on marketing 
rather than execution.
garnered far greater media exposure than the other teams. The winning MIT 
Media Lab team made CNN Headline News on the day of the contest, while 
the Georgia Tech Research Institute team, which came in second with nine 
balloons, leveraged mass media coverage before the event. That coverage also 
helped to boost the search engine ranking for their team’s website. In addition, 
both the MIT and Georgia Tech teams enjoyed the national name recognition 
that came with their schools, which may have contributed to their ability to 
recruit volunteers to work on their behalf.20
In its project report, DARPA observed that “mass media was more predictable 
than viral transmission for the diffusion of the [challenge].” It noted that 
diffusion eventually proceeded virally, but that “the inflection was not until 
the final days before the balloon launch and it followed the extensive media 
coverage of the final week.”21
In the Tag Challenge, the winning CrowdScanner team also leveraged mass 
media and tried to generate attention on blogs and news sites. It was men-
tioned on CNET and ZDNet, as well as by its representative universities’ press 
teams. Organizers noted that most of their competitors focused purely on 
social media, and on Twitter in particular. They observed that this narrower 
strategy was insufficient and led some searchers to be perceived as spammers.22
Although not usually considered either “social media” or “mass media,” public 
websites, which serve primarily as means of disseminating information, also 
played a role in the Red Balloon Challenge and the Tag Challenge, and were 
used by the winning teams. Nevertheless, they too appeared insufficient by 
themselves as a means of mobilization. The Spot Big Red team in the balloon 
challenge, for example, went so far as to purchase the word “challenge” from 
Google, so that anyone searching for the word would see a click-through ad 
linking to their team website. But they had no external media coverage and 
drew few recruits.23
Of course, overall strategy also mattered. In the Red Balloon Challenge, a 
team from the Harvard Business School claimed almost two million “impres-
sions,” which included e-mails to their vast network of alumni, tweets and 
alumni re-tweets, and an ABCNews.com story featuring their team. Still, the 
team found no balloons, apparently because they spent too much effort on 
marketing rather than execution.24
Recursive Incentive Strategies Show Promise
The winning teams in the Red Balloon Challenge and Tag Challenge both 
used a recursive incentive structure to entice volunteers to work with their 
teams. In the Red Balloon Challenge, the $40,000 prize money was allocated 
in such a way that anyone who either found a balloon or was on the referral 
chain to the finder would be rewarded. Specifically, each balloon was worth 
$4,000, with the money partitioned as follows: the finder would receive 
$2,000, their referrer $1,000, the referrer’s referrer $500, and so on, for the 
length of the chain. Any remaining moneys would go to charity.25 To support 
their reward structure, new recruits were given an individualized referral link 
that they could share on social networks.26
In its project report, DARPA 
observed that “mass media 
was more predictable than 
viral transmission for the 
diffusion of the [challenge].”
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The second-placed Georgia 
Tech team said that many 
balloon spotters chose that 
team because of its plan to 
donate the winnings to the 
American Red Cross.
A slightly different strategy was used in the Tag Challenge, but it too was 
designed to reward recruiters as well as finders. Here, $1,000 was allocated for 
each of the five suspects, with $500 for the finder and $100 for the referrer. In 
addition, recruiters were to receive $1 for each of the first 2,000 recruits.27
Although we cannot say with certainty that the recursive incentive strategy 
contributed to the success of the winning teams, it may have been a factor in 
the teams’ attracting mass media publicity and then recruits. However, other 
teams that did not offer any direct monetary incentives at all also did well. 
The second-placed Georgia Tech team in the Red Balloon Challenge said 
that many balloon spotters chose that team because of its plan to donate the 
winnings to the American Red Cross.28 
Collection and Dissemination of Information
This section describes the ways in which social media can be used both as a 
means of disseminating information and as a source of new information.
Social Media Can Facilitate Information Dissemination
Twitter has become a popular medium for live reporting of events, often with 
links to accompanying photos and videos. This use was evident in the Red 
Balloon Challenge, where several balloon sightings were reported on Twitter. 
George Hotz was able to locate four balloons just from reports on his Twitter 
network.
Twitter also played a prominent role in the Vanish contest, with users of the 
#vanish hashtag using the medium to share clues and theories. However, one 
frequent poster, a 16-year-old high school student named Jonathan Mäkelä, 
thought the conversation on Twitter was too public, because it enabled the 
hunted also to know what was going on. Mäkelä suggested that groups 
needed to go private to win; he then set up a private, password-
controlled chat room for those he was sure were not Ratliff. Jeff 
Reifman, a former Microsoft group program manager, devel-
oped a Facebook app called Vanish Team for information 
and discussions about Ratliff, but most of the intelligence 
swap took place on Twitter or in Mäkelä’s chat room.29
In the Tag Challenge, the winning team posted its 
early successes on social media. Team members 
also built a mobile phone app that allowed 
people to see photos of the suspects and submit 
pictures of them if they were spotted. The team 
found, however, that those who actually spotted 
the suspects submitted their photos directly 
through e-mail.30
Social Media Can Be a Source for 
Intelligence Data
Because so much information is disseminated 
through social media, the media themselves pro-
vide a source for raw intelligence data. Again, this 
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Challenge, for example, the iSchools team, representing a consortium of five 
schools, mined publicly accessible internet sites, including Twitter feeds and 
competitor sites, for published reports of sightings. They found five balloons 
this way, but only one by drawing on their own social network.31
In the Vanish competition, Jeff Reifman combed through visitors to his 
Vanish team, thinking (correctly) that Ratliff might be among them. This 
led him to the profile for a James Donald Gatz and the “jdgatz” Facebook 
account that Ratliff had set up with his fake identity. Reifman then found 
three friends of Gatz, who were willing to keep him apprised of Gatz’s private 
posts. After Gatz made his @jdgatz Twitter feed public, Reifman also started 
following it. Meanwhile, Mäkelä had triangulated Ratliff’s IP address to New 
Orleans. Once Reifman saw that @jdgatz was following three New Orleans 
businesses on Twitter, he looked up one, Naked Pizza, on the Web and sent 
off an e-mail asking for help. Naked Pizza cofounder Jeff Leach agreed and 
was the person to say the password “fluke” when he spotted Ratliff outside a 
local bookstore.32
Verification
In any intelligence operation, it is important to know whether acquired data 
is accurate. Collectors can make mistakes, and adversaries can intentionally in-
ject bogus data. Here I discuss two ways in which social media can contribute 
to data verification: first, through technologies associated with social media, 
and second, through crowdsourced verification.
Social Media–related Technologies Can Aid Verification
Some of the technologies used with social media can facilitate verification. 
Tweets from cell phones can reveal the geo-locations of the phones, as can 
photos taken by cell phones and tagged with location coordinates. In ad-
dition, IP addresses can be mapped to at least proximate geo-locations. All 
of these location-based technologies can be used to verify whether claimed 
locations match actual locations. For example, if someone tweets that they just 
found a balloon in Denver and includes a link to a picture taken with their 
cell phone, verifiers can compare the reported location against that supplied 
with the tweet or the photo if that information is available. 
In the Red Balloon Challenge, the MIT Media Lab team received more than 
200 submissions, only 30 to 40 of which proved accurate. To weed out the 
false reports, humans reviewed the submissions. They found one bogus report 
where the reported location, Florida, did not match the location of the IP 
address associated with the submission, Los Angeles. They also found multiple 
bogus submissions reporting exactly the same geo-coordinates. These reports 
contrasted with the multiple submissions they received for actual sightings, 
where the reported coordinates varied slightly, owing to the spotters’ being in 
somewhat different positions and small errors in location sensors. In addition, 
the photos submitted with bogus submissions tended to be fuzzier and lacked 
the DARPA banner. The iSchools team, which found five balloons on Twitter 
and other public media, gave a higher reliability assessment to tweets from 
established users with geo-tagged photos than to those from new accounts 
without followers.33 The Mercyhurst team used their IPB analysis to rank order 
reported sightings, giving priority to ones in areas where they expected the 
Because so much information 
is disseminated through 
social media, the media 
themselves provide a source 
for raw intelligence data.
In the Red Balloon Challenge, 
the MIT Media Lab team 
received more than 200 
submissions, only 30 to 40 
of which proved accurate.
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balloons to be deployed. For those they decided to investigate further, they 
used Google Earth to identify local restaurants and stores they could call for 
verification.34
Verification Can Be Crowdsourced through Social Media
Social media can provide an efficient means for crowdsourcing the verification 
process. In the Red Balloon Challenge, the Nerdfighters team compiled a 
cell phone and address list for 2,000 persons they could dispatch for balloon 
verification through targeted text messages. Their entire operation was coordi-
nated by 10 individuals using Skype. Groundspeak Geocachers drew on their 
network of hundreds of thousands of members to effectively dispatch verifiers, 
and correctly reported seven of the balloons.35 The iSchools team dispatched 
verifiers from a list of pre-recruited observers, as well as people from their 
schools, family, and friends in the vicinities of the reported locations.36
The search for Jim Gray involved farming out satellite image tiles to human 
analysts in order to determine areas where Gray might be found. Initially, 
the team used Amazon Mechanical Turk to crowdsource the review process, 
but eventually turned to expert analysts, who were faster and more accurate 
than the novices tasked by Mechanical Turk. A cluster of these analysts were 
colocated at The Johns Hopkins University, allowing them to collaborate and 
coordinate their review. Promising images were then sent to experts in marine 
imagery in order to determine areas worthy of dispatching people for a close-
up search.37
Conclusions
The four search operations described here demonstrate how social media 
and related technologies can facilitate a large-scale search for persons and 
things. They can aid the processes of mobilization, information collection 
and sharing, and verification of data acquired, as well as communication and 
coordination in general. However, the search operations also drew upon other 
technologies, including image processing, data mining, and geo-location and 
mapping technologies. In addition, they made use of on-site human intel-
ligence; in all three contests, human spotters took photos and reported or 
verified sightings.
Although social media can in principle support large, distributed networks 
lacking any centralized command and control, all four of the operations 
described here were led by individuals and small teams of people who debated 
and developed strategy, initiated actions, and coordinated contributions to the 
search effort. At least in these cases, the media alone were insufficient without 
imposing some form of organizational structure on the network, even if that 
structure was self-organized.
The four search operations also demonstrate that many other factors can affect 
the success of a search effort, including the use of mass media, name recogni-
tion, incentives, and, of course, the nature of the search to begin with. Some 
persons, such as Jim Gray, may never be found, and actual fugitives and intel-
ligence targets may work much harder to hide than did Ratliff in the Vanish 
contest and the volunteer suspects in the Tag Challenge. Social media are not 
a panacea, but neither should they be overlooked or discounted.
The Nerdfighters team compiled 
a cell phone and address list 
for 2,000 persons they could 
dispatch for balloon verification 
through targeted text messages.
At least in these cases, the 
media alone were insufficient 
without imposing some form 
of organizational structure 
on the network, even if that 
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At least one company, Crowdfynd, has been formed to exploit social media 
technologies to help people locate missing items. Its mobile and Web-based 
application leverages the power of crowdsourcing to report crimes as well as 
found items, and to search for missing items by location and a photo display 
of found items.38 It will be interesting to see whether Crowdfynd catches on, 
and what else might emerge to support large-scale searches. 
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Large areas of central India have come under the cloud of a 
violent struggle between government forces and Maoist insurgents. The 
Maoists are active in at least nine out of the 28 states of India, and are trying 
to spread their influence into many more states.1 About 5,772 civilians and 
2,065 members of the security forces were killed by the Maoists between 2001 
and 2012. A majority of the civilians who have died in the violence were local 
tribal members, killed by insurgents who were enforcing Maoist hegemony 
over contested areas.2 
Law and order are dealt with at the state level in India’s federal structure; the 
national government plays primarily a supporting role in terms of providing 
men, matériel, and coordination to the states in their fight against the Mao-
ists. Because the Maoist insurgency so far has been a purely indigenous, 
mostly localized phenomenon, each state has developed its own approach to 
tackling Maoist violence according to that state government’s own experience 
and political context. In the same way, the insurgency in each state has its 
unique flavor, composition, and history, and uses the state-specific theater of 
violence to its advantage. A local group is able to start, escalate, de-escalate, 
or change strategy in one theater, independent of what is happening in other 
theaters. It can use one state as a sanctuary while waging guerrilla war in the 
neighboring state. Groups are also able to transfer men, matériel, and funds 
between the theaters according to changing needs, and to apply the experience 
they gained in one theater to improve their operations in other areas. 
Against this background, this article discusses the importance of inaccessible 
forested areas as initial niches for the proto-insurgencies to grow in less 
developed former colonies such as India. As their subsequent conduct has 
shown, the Maoists seem to have learned from early strategic failures in the 
state of Andhra Pradesh the value of sticking to inaccessible areas, even as their 
insurgency has matured. The article also addresses the relevance of technology, 
or rather the lack thereof, for counterinsurgency in these inaccessible areas. 
Characteristics of India’s Maoist Insurgency
The communist political movement in India has grown into many branches 
since it first emerged in 1920. After the Communist Party of India (CPI) began 
to take part in electoral democracy in 1951, some of the CPI’s more radical 
elements broke away from the CPI in 1964 to form the CPI (Marxist). When 
the leadership of the CPI (Marxist) also embraced electoral politics, the more 
radical Maoist factions within CPI (Marxist), inspired by Mao Zedong’s 
takeover of China, broke away to start violent uprisings in the countryside. 
Although these revolutionary groups have repeatedly fragmented, with some 
of them opting out of violent revolution to become involved in other activi-
ties such as urban trade unionism, several groups have stayed with the violent 
revolutionary path in remote rural areas of India. As the Indian state grew in 
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strength and its reach extended further into the countryside, the Maoists were 
forced from the rural interior regions where they began into less accessible 
forested and mountainous areas. 
According to the U.S. government’s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012, 
Insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed 
toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted 
government or occupying power and completely or partially con-
trolling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular 
military forces and illegal political organizations. The common 
denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining 
control of a population or a particular territory, including its re-
sources. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely 
terrorist organizations.3
India’s Maoists perfectly fit this definition of an insurgent group. This is not to 
say that the Maoists have not or will not resort to terrorism, given that “most 
insurgent groups use terrorism as a tactic in pursuit of their goal” at different 
stages of their growth.4 The distinction between an insurgency and a purely 
terrorist organization, however, is important for understanding the way in 
which the Indian Maoist movement has grown since its beginning. The Mao-
ists started as a proto-insurgency, like the majority of insurgent movements, in 
the rural hamlets that were most conducive for their survival, and established 
their dominance over those areas through armed violence.5 The insurgents 
gradually expanded the territory under their control, with the ultimate objec-
tive to dismantle the local government, take over the entire target area, and 
bring it under some form of communist rule. 
Within the areas they dominate and during armed operations, the insur-
gents try to impress the local population with their military power, often by 
wearing combat uniforms. This is unlike terrorists, who do not normally wear 
distinctive clothes but try to hide their identity and blend in with the local 
population around their hideouts. A terrorist organization usually starts with 
a small number of members dotted throughout a geographically large portion 
of the target area and tries gradually to increase its membership and activities 
through social contacts, media, and networking. Its terrorist activities may 
spread far beyond its locality and the target population. Instead of trying to 
establish and gradually expand its control over limited areas, a terrorist group 
often indulges in terrorist acts at random across the length and breadth of the 
target country, in order to weaken and destabilize the central or regional gov-
ernment and shake public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its 
citizens. Terrorist groups grow by increasing their membership and affiliates, 
and by increasing the intensity and frequency of their acts. The growth and 
expansion of the Maoists, like most insurgent organizations, can be compared 
to that of cancer, which takes over an area and then gradually metastasizes in 
pockets, while the growth of terrorism within the borders of a state can be 
compared to a virus, which spreads more or less evenly throughout the body. 
Some insurgent organizations, however, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam in Sri Lanka, have followed both of these models. Maps 1 through 4  
illustrate early Naxalite6 expansion in India.    
The insurgents try to impress 
the local population with 




Choice of a Niche Area for the Maoists
There are many reasons why the Maoists have been forced to shift their violent 
operations from the rural interiors of states to more remote forested areas, as 
shown in maps 1 through 4. The chief reason, of course, is that the Maoists 
have adopted “protracted war” against the lawfully established state as their 
main form of revolution. This is not the case with most of the other Com-
munist parties in India, which have adopted political mobilization as their 
main strategy and are active in mainstream liberal democratic politics. The 
preponderance of left-wing extremist violence in India is perpetrated by the 
Maoists, who are fugitives in the eyes of the law. The need to protect their 
fledgling organization from annihilation by government security forces forced 
the insurgents to establish themselves in inaccessible areas where state power 
was the weakest. After the Chinese Communist insurgency’s initial setbacks 
in China’s urban areas, in 1927 even Mao Zedong’s forces famously had to 
take shelter in the Jinggang mountains of Jiangxi Province. As Argentine 
revolutionary Che Guevara prescribed, “At the outset, the essential task of the 
guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed … having taken up 
inaccessible positions out of reach of the enemy.”7 
Map 1: Earlier Naxalite area of operation in Bihar
Map 4: Areas of operation of Naxalites 
and Maoists in Andhra Pradesh
Map 3: Earlier Naxalite area of 
operation in Uttar Pradesh
Map 2: Earlier Naxalite area of 
operation in West Bengal
Guerrilla organizations have 
often chosen to establish 
themselves in terrain where 
small size is not a handicap 
but rather an advantage.
The optimal size of a group 
operating in a combat situation 
in a forest is determined 
according to the area of visibility, 
which in turn is determined 
by the density of the forest.
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Size of the Organization
One of the many asymmetries of the struggle between a nascent insurgent 
organization and an established state is the difference in relative sizes. A 
guerrilla organization starts out as a small group and remains much smaller 
than the state for a long period. Therefore, guerrilla organizations have often, 
at least in the early stage of their development, chosen to establish themselves 
in terrain where small size is not a handicap but rather an advantage. Figure 1 
illustrates mathematically why forestland well suits guerrillas’ requirement for 
concealment.
“The trees in a natural forest are randomly placed, as is shown in [figure 1]. 
The circles represent the tree trunks. Suppose a person stands somewhere in 
a forest, where his or her vision is limited by tree trunks. The areas that the 
person can see are shown by the spread of the arrows. … It can be mathemati-
cally shown that the average visible area from a point is inversely proportional 
to the square of the density of the trees and the square of the average radius of 
the trees.”8 
This is represented by the equation shown in figure 2,   
where A  =  the area in meters, 
 n  =  the number of trees per 1 m2 area, and 
 r  =  the average width of the tree trunks in meters.
Thus, on average, only a limited area—which is determined by the density of 
the forest at any point—can be visible from the viewer’s vantage point. There-
fore, when a government security party or a guerrilla squad moves in a forest, 
its capacity to see and detect its enemy is optimal only when all members, 
except the leader, are spread on the outer limit of the visible area at that point 
of the forest. On the one hand, if they are spread beyond that limit, the leader 
of the group will not be able to see all the members of the team, and some 
of the members will not be able to see the leader. On the other hand, if team 
members are not spread out to the optimal limit, their combined capacity to 
see and act will not be at its fullest. Thus, the optimal size of a group oper-
ating in a combat situation in a forest is determined according to the area of 
visibility, which in turn is determined by the density of the forest.9
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Figure 2
Figure 1: Limitations on line-of-sight visibility in forest areas
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Similarly, it can be shown that the larger the group that is in hiding, the 
greater its chance of detection by the enemy. Maoists seem to know this 
intuitively, because most of the Maoist squads are typically small in number, 
particularly in the areas where they expect intrusion by government forces. 
Isolated Population
One major difference between the demography of developed countries and 
that of less developed former colonies is the fact that about 80 percent of a 
developed country’s population on average lives in urban areas, whereas in less 
developed former colonies such as India, less than 30 percent of the people 
live in urban areas.10 Another difference that often escapes notice is the fact 
that many less developed former colonies have isolated populations who live 
in remote, inaccessible areas, and remain essentially disconnected from the 
mainstream sociopolitical and economic systems of the country in which 
they are citizens. Developed countries rarely have such isolated populations, 
and their remote and inaccessible areas are mostly devoid of people (Rus-
sian Siberia being one notable exception). The guerrilla’s dependence on the 
local population was emphasized by Mao, who likened the local people to 
water and guerrillas to fish.11 If an insurgent organization is to survive and 
grow, it must have “inputs of recruits, information, shelter and food—almost 
always obtained from the internal environment [the local population].”12 So, 
although a revolutionary needs remote forests and inaccessible areas in which 
to hide, he also needs some people nearby for his survival and growth. While 
remote and inaccessible areas are available in developed countries, their lack of 
population makes such places unsuitable for proto-insurgent organizations to 
survive and grow. This combination of isolated population and inaccessibility 
is only available in the less developed former colonies. This is borne out by the 
fact that out of the 25 insurgencies since 1945 in which the government lost 
to the insurgents, 19 belonged to those countries whose urbanization was less 
than 40 percent.13
Administratively and Politically Bald Areas  
It also is often evident that the presence of government progressively lessens 
as one goes from urban to rural settings, or from densely populated to less 
populated areas. The strength of the central government’s presence in an area 
is the aggregate of the presence of its agencies in that place. Each agency’s 
presence in an area in turn is a function of population density and the func-
tional necessity of that agency to be in that area. Departments like health 
services, police, education, and others whose functional necessity relates 
directly to the needs of local citizens have little or no presence in areas where 
the population density approaches zero. Many less developed former colonies 
have isolated populations who live in small hamlets scattered over a large area. 
In such areas, most of the citizen-centric state agencies are virtually absent. 
For the same reason, representatives of the state’s political parties and of the 
media and civil society visit these areas only rarely, if at all. 
For the insurgents, these politically and administratively bald areas, devoid 
of any threat or competition from the civil administration and political 
parties, are the most suitable locations in which to weather their vulnerable 
initial years.
 In their bid to enforce Maoist 
hegemony in the contested 
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the data that the insurgents 
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The Growth of the Maoist Insurgency and Its Terrain
Most of what has previously been discussed applies to an insurgency in its proto 
stage. As an insurgency grows, it typically tries to expand into areas beyond the 
initial sanctuary, where the terrain often is quite different. However, the Indian 
Maoists’ areas of operation today still resemble those of their proto stage 35 years 
ago. The following analysis of their activities in Andhra Pradesh from 1978 until 
now shows why the Maoists have remained restricted to the deep forests.
The Andhra Experience 
As described earlier, the Maoist insurgency in any given Indian state can be 
treated as an independent theater of armed conflict for the purpose of our 
analysis. Maoist groups are able to start, escalate, and de-escalate conflict, or 
even change strategy in their theater, independent of what is happening in 
other places. They also are able to use one region as a sanctuary while waging 
guerrilla war in a neighboring theater, and bring to bear the experience they 
have gained to operate more effectively wherever they find themselves. This 
section analyzes the Maoists’ activities in Andhra Pradesh from 1978 to 2012 
and the possible lessons they learned and subsequently utilized in other states. 
Figure 3 illustrates the levels of violence committed by the Maoists from 1978 
to 2012 in Andhra Pradesh, as measured by casualties among security forces 
and civilians. In their bid to enforce Maoist hegemony in the contested areas, 
it is apparent from the data that the insurgents have killed a greater number of 
civilians than they have security personnel. 
As figure 3 shows, the proto-insurgency that started in Andhra in 1978 as the 
People’s War Group (PWG) had evolved into a formidable insurgent organiza-
tion by 1997. The Maoists consistently expanded in size and influence through 
phases of aggression and retrenchment. Figures 4 and 5 offer a closer look at 




































Figure 4: Violence by Maoists in 
Andhra Pradesh 1978–1984
Although the Maoists were 
flushed out of the rural 
areas by 2007, they are still 
holding on to the forests.
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The Maoists expanded their activities primarily within the forested areas till 
1985 (see figures 3 and 4), largely avoiding any public outcry or the attention 
of the state. They even managed to pass themselves off as friendly neighbors 
in the remote forested regions, in spite of their violence. In 1982, one top po-
litical leader of Andhra Pradesh, N. T. Rama Rao, called the Maoists “patriotic 
brothers.”14 
As figure 5 shows, the Maoists started rapidly expanding their activities into 
rural populated areas after 1985. Rao, who had become chief minister of 
Andhra Pradesh by then, changed his opinion about the Maoists and banned 
their organization in 1987. He also created a special operations group within 
the Andhra Pradesh state police called the Greyhounds. This determination 
to create the Greyhounds and strengthen the police is cited as a reason for the 
Maoists’ murder of Daggubati Chenchuramaiah, the father of one of Rao’s 
sons-in-law, on 6 April 1989.15 Many of the sustained security operations that 
more or less flushed the Maoists out of Andhra Pradesh in later years are cred-
ited to the Greyhounds. This is not to underestimate the state’s concentrated 
efforts to boost development in the vulnerable areas, but such actions could be 
undertaken only after the Maoists lost their influence in an area, because the 
insurgents strongly opposed most of the government’s development activities 
such as building roads and spreading access to education.16 The steady retreat 
of the Maoists, first back to the forests and later out of Andhra Pradesh, is 
shown in figure 6. It is interesting to note that although the Maoists were 
flushed out of the rural areas by 2007, they are still holding on to the forests, 













































Figure 5: Violence by Maoists in 
Andhra Pradesh 1985–1997
The insurgent wisely uses time 
as an asset against the state.
Because states face considerable 
difficulty and cost trying to 
collect intelligence in these 
remote, isolated pockets, 
they tend to avoid doing it.
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Lessons Learned by the Maoists from Andhra Pradesh
It seems that the Maoists learned many lessons from their loss in Andhra 
Pradesh, and accordingly made course corrections. The first lesson apparently is 
that they must avoid both overestimating the state’s weakness and prematurely 
expanding their operations to rural and urban areas. As political scholar Colin 
Gray points out, the insurgent wisely uses time as an asset against the state. 
However, if “[an insurgent] force enjoys military success, its leaders are always 
vulnerable to the temptation to … seek to accelerate the pace of history by 
going directly for political gold by means of a swift military victory. As often 
as not, such hubris brings them close to military and political nemesis.”17 A 
profile of Maoist violence from 1985 to 1995 illustrates this error of hubris. 
Since being hounded out of settled rural areas by the police in Andhra Pradesh, 
the insurgents have been very cautious about expanding again into such areas. 
The Maoists have generally minimized their activities outside the forests except 
for some rural areas of Bihar state, where they continue to take advantage of ex-
treme social inequality to win local support.18 In two experimental expansions, 
Maoists managed to move into settled areas close to the forest in Narayanpatna 
in the state of Odisha and Lalgarh in the state of West Bengal. The experiments 
ultimately failed because the states were able to stamp them out. 
This does not mean the Maoists have not expanded their areas of operation 
and influence. Long before their loss in Andhra, the PWG had spread into 
the border areas of Odisha, Chhattisgarh (then a part of Madhya Pradesh), 
Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, which have forested regions contiguous 
with the North Telangana forests on the northern side of Andhra Pradesh. The 
Maoists maintained a less violent mode in these areas and used the areas as 
sanctuaries. This relatively low profile, coupled with the remote, inaccessible 
nature of those areas, allowed the government to ignore the insurgents in that 
region for some time.19 By 2000, however, as the insurgents’ need to expand 
their operations again became imperative, the Andhra Pradesh police gained 
the upper hand and started flushing the Maoists out, even from their hideouts 
in the North Telangana forests. 
The economics of expansion into resource-rich areas, however, was positive 
for the insurgents compared to lying low and defending their bases in Andhra 
Pradesh, particularly in view of the differences in preparedness and political 
will between the various state governments at that time. As the Maoists 
lost their bases in Andhra Pradesh, they gradually made the Bijapur and 
Dantewada districts in Chhattisgarh their main center of operations, while 
keeping southern Odisha (particularly Malkangiri) as their main hideaway.20 
Meanwhile, two Maoist groups, PWG in the south and the Maoist Com-
munist Centre of India in the north, merged in 2004 to form the Communist 
Party of India (Maoist). Though the Maoists have escalated their violence and 
extortion activities outside Andhra, they have generally done so within the 
forested regions and desisted from expanding into open rural areas.
Intelligence
In open rural areas, the insurgents tend to lose many of the advantages they 
have in the forests, some of which have already been discussed. Other advan-
tages may be less apparent. For example, because states face considerable dif-
ficulty and cost trying to collect intelligence in these remote, isolated pockets 
of population, they tend to avoid doing it.21
Whenever they find it 
necessary, the Maoists will 
forego arms and uniforms 
and merge with the local 
population in crowded venues.
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This difficulty can be explained from the practitioner’s point of view. An intel-
ligence agency’s capacity to collect information from an area can be seen as a 
product of five factors: (1) the visibility of the target, (2) the relative presence 
of intelligence operatives in the area, (3) the ratio of possible observers to 
population in the area, (4) the observers’ professional and technical capacity to 
gather useful intelligence, and (5) the availability of communication chan-
nels for the observer to relay collected intelligence. The general lack of roads, 
communication, infrastructure, and facilities in India’s hinterlands makes it 
difficult for the government to motivate its employees to go to those places 
or stay there long enough to develop the kinds of relationships with the locals 
that will yield useful intelligence.
The first factor depends largely on the insurgents themselves. They can decide 
deliberately to minimize their activities to avoid attention. They may use 
camouflage and concealment techniques to avoid detection. While the Mao-
ists’ armed squads normally wear uniforms and openly carry arms, whenever 
they find it necessary, they will forego the arms and uniforms and merge with 
the local population in crowded venues such as weekly markets. As mentioned 
earlier, the bigger a group moving in a forest is, the greater is its chance of 
detection by its enemy. Maoist squads typically are small in size, particularly 
in the areas where they expect intrusion by government forces. Except while 
directly interacting with the villagers, the squads do their best to avoid 
detection. 
Regarding the second factor, until insurgents move in and become active, the 
state government’s intelligence agencies normally will not have much presence 
in these isolated areas, which otherwise are of little interest to them. Moreover, 
once they are established, insurgents will use intimidation to push out what-
ever little non-military presence the government has in those areas. 
The third factor, regarding the ratio of possible observers to the local popula-
tion, is affected by the fact that these areas have very small numbers of people 
who are dotted in countless hamlets over huge territories. It is possible to 
roam around in such areas for days together without being spotted by anyone. 
The capacity of the observer to observe, which is the fourth factor for intel-
ligence work, again is restricted by the density of the forest, as illustrated in 
figure 1. This limitation applies to technical gadgets as well. All devices that 
work in a horizontal direction and depend on line of sight, such as remote 
cameras, night-vision devices, radar, and the like, suffer the same handicap. 
Other technical devices such as satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
that use vertical line of sight have their own limitations in heavily forested 
areas.22 The canopy of the trees in tropical forests such as those of eastern 
India makes it difficult to observe patterns from above. These difficulties 
are compounded by the fact that the Maoists seem to be aware of such 
surveillance from above and accordingly adopt camouflage and concealment 
techniques. 
What is more, regarding the fifth and final factor, the general lack of infra-
structure and communication channels in these remote Maoist-affected areas 
means that even if an observer sees something, it is very difficult and time-
consuming to pass the information on to an intelligence agency. By the time 
the intelligence reaches the agency, too often it has become stale and useless 
Not being able to use 
mobile phones and the like 
in the Maoists’ operational 
areas is much more of a 
disadvantage for the state 
than it is for the Maoists.
Insurgents frequently seek to 
goad the state into indulging 
in overreactions precisely to 
undermine state legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population.
46
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 1
for undertaking any operation. Maoists are aware of this factor and delib-
erately destroy roads and ban the use of mobile phones in their operational 
areas.23 They may even kill people they find using mobile phones, on the 
suspicion that they are police informers.24 According to one source, “In the 
past four years, more than 200 mobile towers have been blown up in the nine 
States by Maoists alleging security forces were being informed about their 
movements and locations with mobile phones.”25            
Use of Technology
One more advantage that the Maoists enjoy in the forests but lose in open 
rural areas also relates to technology. The state’s ability to acquire technology 
and its reliance on technological capabilities is enormous compared to that of 
the Maoists, who have neither the money nor the infrastructure to incorporate 
advanced technologies into their operations. Not being able to use mobile 
phones, surveillance devices, UAVs, and the like in the Maoists’ operational 
areas, therefore, is much more of a disadvantage for the state than it is for the 
Maoists. The difficulties with visibility and line of sight in a dense forest apply 
equally to the use of long-range artillery. Because the land where the Maoists 
operate is often also very hilly, armored vehicles, tanks, and heavy machine 
guns can become more liabilities than assets. 
By the same token, because UAV surveillance over tropical forests is unreliable, 
the use of aircraft for transporting troops and for aerial attacks can be highly 
dangerous. Security forces may not be aware of the presence of insurgents 
in an area, and may come under fire as they fly too close or try to land.26 
Further complicating matters, the Maoist problem is one of domestic security 
for India, in which its own citizens—the insurgents—hide among other 
citizens. The target population is scattered throughout the forests, making 
aerial and other area-based attrition approaches counterproductive. Without 
highly accurate targeting information from intelligence and surveillance, the 
collateral damage from aerial attacks is unacceptable—a problem made even 
worse, of course, in more populated localities. In a liberal democracy such as 
India, the public outcry against any loss of innocent lives from aerial attacks 
by the state can become deafening, which is a risk that a democratic govern-
ment cannot afford. In fact, insurgents frequently seek to goad the state into 
indulging in such overreactions precisely to undermine state legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population.27 As North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap 
famously commented, the Vietnam War “was fought on many fronts … [but] 
the most important one was American public opinion.”28 In the same vein, 
while discussing U.S. involvement in irregular warfare in particular but with 
regard to any liberal democracy fighting an insurgency, Colin Gray observed 
that such a war “will not be won or lost in the local barrios and swamps, but 
in America’s sitting rooms.”29 
It is easy to imagine that access to the internet is a far cry in a place where the 
use of mobile phones is rare. As would be expected, the level and use of com-
puter technology decreases as one moves away from the urban areas of India 
into more remote areas. Furthermore, those remote areas already dominated 
by Maoist violence have the lowest level of access to technology, because the 
Maoists actively oppose the use and spread of information technology in their 
areas of influence. It is their “above-ground” supporters and sympathizers who 
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civil society and reach the sitting 
rooms of urban populations.
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use the internet and social media to influence civil society and reach the sit-
ting rooms of urban populations.30 It is almost impossible, however, to reach 
the underground Maoist operatives through these above-ground supporters. 
The insurgents use only a series of trusted couriers for the exchange of letters 
and money or other communications. In the absence of sophisticated com-
munications technologies, the technique of “big data mining” of social media 
is not available to intelligence services for counterinsurgency planning.31 Simi-
larly, when insurgents use couriers and hard cash, hunting through financial 
transactions may not yield any useful results for the state security services. 
The Maoist leadership’s attitude toward information technology is reminiscent 
of that of Osama bin Laden, whose avoidance of the internet, telephones, 
and mobile phones helped him to escape detection for a decade despite the 
enormous level of effort that was undertaken to find him.32 One wonders 
about the probability of bin Laden being detected if he had been willing to 
live in more humble dwellings without modern comforts, and had sanctuaries 
in the dense tropical forests of a Third World country. 
Conclusion
However much the state may wish to use remote, technology-based solutions 
to fight insurgency, such means may be largely irrelevant or even counter-
productive as long as the insurgents stay in the safety of the inaccessible 
forested areas of a Third World country. If insurgents opt for security over the 
efficiency of using communications technology, the state needs to look for 
solutions that are not dependent on exploiting technology.
Because the state and its security organizations are heavily dependent on the 
internet for their everyday activities, however, they are potentially vulner-
able to the exploitation of big data analytics by a technologically competent 
insurgent. Just as in the business world, where “such information can provide 
competitive advantages over rival organizations,” these opponents will have an 
asymmetric advantage over the state in this regard.33  
On a positive note for the state, if officials adopt a strategy of strengthening 
the vulnerable areas adjacent to those occupied by insurgents through infra-
structure development and access to technology, the state can use the same 
logic to deny an insurgency the ability to further expand. It may look expen-
sive for less developed former colonies to make these structural investments, 
but a cost-benefit analysis needs to be carried out to determine the future cost 
of fighting insurgents over a larger area. During a recent field study, I found 
that the use of mobile phones spread rapidly into remote regions adjacent 
to Maoist-controlled areas once the construction of new roads improved 
accessibility. Better roads and communications will make it difficult for the 
Maoists to expand into those areas, since they will no longer find the security 
of isolation there.        
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How does the “big data” revolution affect intelligence sharing 
between countries? The sharing of intelligence derived from big data—such as 
intercepting text and voice communications carried over the internet—could 
improve intelligence about threats such as transnational terrorist groups by 
providing intelligence agencies with a much larger pool of data and new 
software tools that permit faster and more focused analysis. This is why intel-
ligence agencies in the United States and many other countries have moved 
aggressively over the last decade to develop the capacity to collect and mine 
online data.
Intelligence agencies now collect and store electronically enormous amounts 
of information that they want to keep secret; however, the very ease of storing 
and sharing this collected data also makes the data vulnerable to foreign states, 
hackers, and others that want access to it without authorization. Some of 
these are “outsider threats,” such as the intelligence agency of a foreign state, 
and can be thwarted with varying degrees of success by denying access to an 
intelligence agency’s network. Here I focus instead on “insider threats,” by 
which I mean individuals who have legitimate access to some secret intel-
ligence and exploit their position to share the information with outsiders. 
Big data magnifies the threats that such insiders pose, because they may be 
able to access a great deal of sensitive data and reveal it at a low cost to foreign 
states, criminal or violent organizations, journalists, or human rights groups. 
Concerns about such insider threats could reduce the willingness of states to 
share intelligence with each other, thereby reducing the international commu-
nity’s ability to collectively define and respond to security problems.
I suggest a number of ways that states may decide to address this sort of 
problem. These solutions include 
 ¡ sharing only with the most trustworthy partners, 
 ¡ establishing hierarchical relations among the intelligence agencies of 
different countries so that one can closely monitor the other, 
 ¡ greater transparency and oversight of the use of big data by intelligence 
agencies, and 
 ¡ foreswearing at least some international intelligence sharing. 
Each of these solutions has strengths and weaknesses, and it is likely that we 
will see a mix of these strategies implemented by different groups of countries. 
One counterintuitive implication of this discussion is that increased transpar-
ency about the process of data collection and analysis is valuable not only 
because it is consistent with democratic norms, but also because it actually 
reduces the problem of insider threats and makes promises by one country to 
share intelligence with another more credible and effective. 
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Big Data and Intelligence Sharing
Shared intelligence goes beyond the exchange of factual information and 
includes, in many cases, the sharing of analytical products. Sharing allows 
countries to spread the costs of intelligence acquisition and analysis across all 
of the participants, and, as is the case with most exchanges, the benefits from 
sharing increase when participating states specialize. Thus, sharing should lead 
to the production of both more and higher-quality intelligence. 
Before going into how big data alters these calculations, it is important to 
understand what big data means in the context of this discussion. I suggest 
that big data is composed of three technological trends. These trends are well-
known and have implications well beyond the issue of intelligence sharing, 
so I will mention them only briefly here. The first is the ability to collect and 
store large amounts of electronic communications. Intelligence agencies have 
been collecting such information for some time, but today the scale is much 
larger, since individuals rely on electronic forms of communication far more 
heavily than in the past. A second trend is the ability to analyze this data 
more effectively and quickly than before, using software tools such as search 
algorithms, network analysis, geographic information system tools, and other 
approaches. Thus, while the scale of data collection has grown enormously, 
the tools for analyzing data have also improved, making it somewhat easier to 
solve the “needle in a haystack” problem. Third, much lower storage and re-
trieval costs make it much easier to both collect and analyze electronic data, as 
well as to share the data and analysis widely within and across organizations. 
Big data may create powerful incentives for states to share intelligence more 
frequently and intensively. There are three reasons for this, as well. The first 
is that information technology substantially reduces the marginal cost of 
sharing intelligence. Sharing intelligence in an electronic format at scale 
requires large investments in information technologies such as storage space 
and protocols for remote access to data. Once these investments are made 
and the technologies and practices are in place, it is very inexpensive from a 
technical standpoint for one country to share an additional piece of informa-
tion with another. In principle, any intelligence in an electronic format could 
be shared with any user almost instantaneously at a very low cost. Second, the 
creation of such sharing technologies could have powerful network effects. 
Once a critical mass of states develops the capacity to use such technologies 
and protocols for sharing intelligence, participation should become increas-
ingly valuable as more countries are able to share intelligence with each other. 
Related to this, the information technology infrastructure required for sharing 
on a massive scale is expensive and complicated to develop and maintain. It 
requires investments in hardware, communications equipment, and skilled 
operators who can design and manage the entire system. The fixed cost is 
likely higher for intelligence agencies than for comparable activities in the 
private sector, because the collection and analysis ambitions of intelligence 
agencies are much higher, and also because intelligence agencies have concerns 
about information security that might lead them to prefer trusted suppliers in-
side and outside the government over the ones with the cheapest rates. Some 
states may lack the financial and technical means to create and maintain such 
systems. This gives them stronger incentives to collaborate more closely with 
other states, since collaboration spreads some of the costs across the budgets of 
multiple countries.
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It is important to recognize that participants in intelligence-sharing arrange-
ments differ in their ability to provide useful intelligence to each other. The 
United States is clearly the dominant actor in all of the sharing networks 
in which it participates. It spends far more on intelligence than any other 
state, has global collection and analysis needs, and was the first to develop or 
implement on a large scale many of the big data applications for intelligence. 
This dominant position has two implications for intelligence sharing. First, 
the network effect is really a U.S. network effect. Other states have a great deal 
to gain from sharing intelligence with the United States, while the marginal 
benefit to the United States of sharing with any particular state is likely to be 
much lower. Second, the United States is better positioned to “go it alone” 
in intelligence sharing. It may be able to collect a considerable amount of 
electronic intelligence without the cooperation of other states, relying on its 
own satellites, sensors, and other means of data collection. In some ways, 
the United States accrues fewer of the benefits that arise from specialization 
in intelligence collection and analysis. This means that Washington is well-
positioned to exert the greatest influence over the content and interpreta-
tion of intelligence-sharing agreements, and that big data may increase the 
dominance of the United States over its partners and permit it greater leeway 
to operate without their active support. Big data, then, produces somewhat 
mixed incentives for the United States to share intelligence. On the one hand, 
big data allows the United States to distribute the costs of collection and 
analysis over more partners, and to gather and analyze more data shared by 
these partners. On the other hand, U.S. dominance of many of the technolo-
gies that are applied to intelligence sharing may reduce its need to rely on 
partners for critical intelligence. How the United States is likely to respond to 
these incentives, I suggest in the following sections, depends on its ability to 
effectively manage and oversee its partners’ information security practices. 
Big Data and Insider Threats
Given the benefits, why might two states not share intelligence with each 
other? Why would they forgo the potential benefits of sharing? Theories of 
international cooperation identify an important barrier to sharing in situa-
tions where mutual benefit is possible: the enforcement problem, which is 
very relevant for the issue of insider threats.1 The enforcement problem arises 
when a country reneges on or “defects” from a commitment to share intel-
ligence. Defection may be either deliberate or involuntary, in the sense that 
lower-level state officials defect without their leadership’s approval. A sender 
of intelligence can defect by altering intelligence’s content, withholding it 
altogether, or exaggerating the accuracy of its sources. Senders that defect 
deliberately manipulate shared intelligence with the intent of influencing 
the recipient’s subsequent actions. Alternatively, individuals within a sending 
state might be operating under the commands of another power or group 
that controls the intelligence that these individuals then pass to partner states. 
Corruption or other administrative weaknesses might limit the state’s ability 
to effectively collect intelligence in the first place. Sending states also might 
not share fully or honestly if some of their personnel who control the relevant 
intelligence disagree, on political or policy grounds, with the decision to share 
it. A recipient of intelligence might defect by forwarding shared intelligence 
to a third country if it concludes that its interests are served by passing along 
intelligence, even if this might conflict with the interests of the sender. A 
recipient also might inadvertently forward shared intelligence to third parties, 
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such as hostile states or the media. Individuals who have access to the shared 
intelligence may be agents of a third state or other outside group and may 
violate their government’s policy by sharing intelligence with their controllers. 
The costs of defection can be large for both senders and recipients, which is 
one reason why the enforcement problem looms particularly large when states 
consider sharing intelligence. Recipients may be deceived into providing ben-
efits to senders that provide them with low-quality intelligence. More impor-
tant, though, are the potential indirect costs of cooperating with a sender that 
defects. A recipient may base important foreign policy decisions involving the 
use of force on flawed or misleading intelligence shared by other states. Costs 
for the sending states can be substantial as well, including sharing secrets or 
sources and methods with third parties. These costs increase when the partici-
pating states have developed specialized and complementary intelligence ef-
forts: specialization increases the costs of defection. The most valuable sharing 
partners have much useful intelligence, but they also can do the most damage 
when they defect from promises to share. Defection can remove access to the 
partner’s specialized assets and seriously weaken the recipient’s ability to gather 
useful intelligence on a target. 
Another reason why the enforcement problem is a powerful barrier to intel-
ligence sharing is because it is difficult to determine whether a partner has 
reneged, for at least two reasons. First, intelligence almost always includes an 
analytical element, which may be more easily manipulated by a state than 
the raw information on which it is based. Second, and perhaps more impor-
tant, intelligence by definition includes secret information, although most 
intelligence producers use open sources of information as well as secret or 
clandestinely obtained information. States and their intelligence communities 
go to great lengths to secure secret intelligence and to prevent their targets 
from discovering their sources and methods of intelligence collection and 
analysis. For this reason, intelligence agencies are reluctant to share all of the 
intelligence they control, even within their own governments. This concern 
for security makes it very difficult for one state to determine whether another 
has defected on a promise to share intelligence. Keeping details of intelligence 
collection and analysis secret is, on the one hand, recognized as a legitimate 
security practice, but on the other, it makes it easier for a sending state to alter 
or fabricate the information it passes to others. The barriers to sharing raised 
by security requirements also pose difficulties for the sending states. Sending 
states may want to ensure that recipients do not pass the shared intelligence 
along to enemies, either deliberately or inadvertently, but at the same time, 
the recipients do not want to divulge their security arrangements, to prevent 
others from illicitly gaining access to the intelligence they possess. 
Big data can magnify these costs and risks of intelligence sharing, especially 
those associated with inadvertent defection by insiders in other states. The big 
data revolution makes it less costly and difficult to share large amounts of in-
telligence with a greater number of states. States participating in such arrange-
ments, in turn, will need more technical and analytical personnel to process 
this information and develop it into analytical products for the consumers 
in their country. This means that there are more “insiders” in the recipient 
countries who could potentially share this intelligence with third parties. It 
also means that there is a potentially much larger trove of intelligence for 
insiders to steal. The fact that the intelligence is in an electronic format rather 
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than on paper makes it much easier to convey to third parties. Furthermore, 
the highly-skilled technical personnel whom states need to manage their larger 
and more complex information-sharing infrastructures are in high demand in 
other sectors of the economy, and governments may lack the salaries to com-
pete effectively to hire the most desirable candidates. This may be a particular 
difficulty for intelligence agencies, which place a high priority on monitoring 
the backgrounds and work practices of their employees to minimize insider 
threats, because information technology experts have a reputation for valuing 
their autonomy both in and outside of the workplace. Intelligence employees’ 
need for access to a wide range of internal systems and processes in order to 
do their jobs means that traditional security practices such as compartmental-
ization and “need to know” may hinder their performance. This requirement 
gives them potential access to large volumes of intelligence information, as 
well as the skills to cover their tracks should they choose to copy and share 
such intelligence with a third party.
Possible Solutions to the Insider Threat Problem
If enforcement problems make sharing intelligence difficult, how can these 
barriers be overcome? This section looks at four possible solutions: selecting 
trustworthy partners, establishing hierarchical relations between states that 
share intelligence, increasing transparency and oversight of the use of big data 
for intelligence purposes, and scaling back and limiting intelligence sharing. 
Trust
A straightforward solution to the problems created by big data and insider 
threats is to select intelligence-sharing partners that are trustworthy. In this 
context, trust is an expectation on the part of one state that another state 
will not defect from promises to share intelligence in a secure manner. Trust 
emerges most robustly when parties do not fear that their partner’s interests 
diverge from their own.2 Divergent interests may give the sender an incentive 
to deliberately communicate incorrect intelligence, in an effort to convince 
the recipient to act in a way that is most favorable to the sender. On the other 
side, a receiving state might pass along shared intelligence to third parties 
without the sender’s knowledge or permission. From this perspective, states 
should focus on selecting their partners carefully, only sharing intelligence 
with those that have common interests and a history of living up to their 
promises.3 
Furthermore, there is much evidence that mutual trust facilitates the reliable 
exchange of information. In the area of intelligence sharing, many of the states 
with which the United States shares intelligence most intensively—Canada, 
the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe, Japan, and South 
Korea—are long-standing allies with successful histories of cooperation on in-
telligence sharing and a range of other issues. Big data may erode the utility of 
such generalized trust, however. The fact that so much more intelligence could 
be shared today than in the past, and that more personnel may have access 
to it, increases the risks from insider threats within the intelligence agencies 
of partner countries. Breaches of security by even one individual could do 
substantial damage to foreign partners. For example, Edward Snowden’s 
revelations about the collection of cell phone and e-mail communications 
data by the National Security Agency exposed a remarkably wide range of 
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information, and Bradley Manning’s alleged leaking of hundreds of thousands 
of internal documents to WikiLeaks provided quite detailed information 
about a huge range of topics. Big data, then, might make reliance on past 
trustworthiness, as a way to screen desirable from undesirable intelligence-
sharing partners, a riskier strategy than it previously has been. 
Hierarchy
Selecting only partners that are trustworthy has another cost: it can exclude 
partners that may have particularly valuable intelligence. In practice, it appears 
that states not infrequently share intelligence with partners they consider less 
than completely trustworthy. The United States is one prominent example. 
In these circumstances, intelligence-sharing agreements between states can be 
constructed as a hierarchy. Hierarchy differs from anarchy, often considered 
the normal state of affairs in international politics, in that a subordinate state 
voluntarily gives up some autonomy to a dominant state. The dominant state 
can monitor the subordinate state for defection and punish such defection 
when it occurs.4 
Hierarchy can help to manage the risks of defection. The dominant state in 
the hierarchy takes the role of making important decisions about the form of 
the intelligence-sharing partnership. Subordinates give some of their decision-
making autonomy to the dominant state, in return for which the dominant 
state provides the subordinate with some combination of its own shared intel-
ligence, diplomatic support, economic assistance, and other valuable goods 
and services. Hierarchy provides one possible solution to the enforcement 
problem by allowing the dominant state to take direct and intrusive steps 
to ensure that the subordinate is not defecting from its promise to securely 
share intelligence. In the context of big data, hierarchy would involve the 
setting of commonly agreed standards for preventing insider threats. It would 
also require the dominant state to play an active role in vetting how well the 
subordinate partners implement these standards. This role can be carried out 
in a number of ways. For example, the dominant state can assign liaisons 
who directly participate in, and can thus oversee, the intelligence activities of 
subordinate states. Such liaisons can play an important technical role in facili-
tating cooperation, by, for example, ensuring that each country’s information 
technology can communicate efficiently and securely. But liaisons also serve as 
a useful way to check on the day-to-day internal security practices of subor-
dinate states. The dominant state can also pay for a disproportionate share of 
the physical and information technology infrastructure needed to carry out 
large-scale data sharing, helping its partners develop more sophisticated data 
collection, storage, and analysis capabilities. Such cost-sharing typically comes 
with strings: for instance, the dominant state asserts the right to audit how 
funds are spent and technology is used. This gives the dominant state some 
direct control over the processes that are used by subordinates. 
Hierarchical arrangements also create costs and risks for the participants. 
Most obviously, they give much greater freedom of maneuver to the dominant 
state than to subordinate participants. Subordinates surrender some degree 
of control over their internal standards for preventing insider threats, which 
will lead some to conclude that these sacrifices are not worth the benefit of 
sharing intelligence. Hierarchy works most effectively when the participating 
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states’ underlying interests are compatible enough to prevent large incentives 
for defection, since compatible interests allow states to use the institutions of 
hierarchy to bridge their differences. What do subordinates get in return? As 
suggested previously, the dominant state typically provides valuable goods and 
services to the subordinate, such as access to some of its much more extensive 
collection of intelligence products, technical support for developing the 
capacity to collect and analyze large amounts of data, and financial induce-
ments. These, in turn, are some of the costs that the dominant state pays to 
entice subordinates to join it in a hierarchal relationship. A more important 
cost, though, is that the dominant state must reassure its subordinates that 
it will not defect on them. There is a risk that the dominant state might use 
its extraordinary position in the relationship to secretly obtain intelligence 
from its partner that the latter does not wish to share. The dominant state 
might also be subject to its own insider threats. This possibility will be of 
particular concern to subordinates, which often prefer that the details of their 
intelligence-sharing arrangements, including their subordinate status, not be 
revealed to outsiders. How the dominant state reassures potential subordinates 
that it will not defect, deliberately or inadvertently, is a key question that must 
be addressed if a hierarchy is to function smoothly and serve the interests of 
participating states. 
Transparency
Another way to address the issue of intelligence sharing is through greater 
public transparency, especially on the part of the dominant state, about the 
processes it uses to collect and share intelligence. To this point, I have as-
sumed that all insider threats are identical. But it is likely that the motives 
and goals of insiders willing to reveal intelligence are at least somewhat varied. 
Two types of insiders dominate current discussion of the problem. The first, 
more traditional type are insiders who volunteer, are paid, or are coerced to 
provide intelligence to a foreign power or organization. The second type are 
insiders who are disturbed by the scope and scale of contemporary intelligence 
collection because, in their view, it violates privacy rights or the law. These 
different types are likely to behave quite differently. Those in the first group 
have powerful motives not to publicize their theft or unauthorized sharing of 
intelligence, because their illicit actions will be brought to an end and they 
probably will be prosecuted. But publicity is the key motive for the second 
type, who hope that revealing the extent of intelligence collection will spark 
public outrage and lead to restraints on intelligence activities. Prosecution 
may even be part of their publicity strategy.
These different types of insiders may be countered with distinct policies. Tra-
ditional counterintelligence practices, such as background checks, should have 
some chance of catching both types. Insiders of the second type, however, may 
also be dissuaded from releasing information by greater official transparency 
about how and what data is being collected, and under what circumstances 
this data is analyzed by intelligence agencies. Such transparency about the 
general processes of data collection and analysis (but not, of course, about the 
content of this data) may mollify insiders who want a vigorous public debate 
about the trade-offs between security and privacy. Subjecting such practices 
to some sort of systematic legislative and/or judicial oversight would also 
ensure that new collection techniques, which emerge frequently because of 
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rapid changes in communication and commercial technologies, are regularly 
included in the oversight process. 
In addition to preventing some insider threats, greater transparency could 
help to reinforce international hierarchies for intelligence sharing. Recall that 
one difficulty with hierarchical relationships is that the dominant power must 
figure out a way to reassure subordinates that it will not abuse its extraordi-
nary position. Greater transparency about big data and intelligence collec-
tion and analysis within the political institutions of the United States, for 
example, could also provide some information to foreign partners that could, 
for example, monitor open hearings in Congress and the courts. Assuming 
that these institutions have some incentives to exercise vigorous oversight 
and to push the executive to detail and justify its data collection strategies, 
they might both reduce the danger from insider threats and also reassure 
intelligence allies overseas that their dependence on the United States is not 
being secretly exploited.5 At the same time, transparency is not free of risk. An 
important dynamic is the trade-off between using intelligence for counterter-
rorism or other goals, and privacy rights. Greater transparency risks revealing 
sources and methods to opponents, which can then take active countermea-
sures to more effectively mask their communications and activities. Striking 
a balance between enough transparency to mollify the critics of intelligence 
agencies (and reassure foreign partners) and sufficient secrecy about the details 
of how intelligence is collected and analyzed is not easy.
Go It Alone
In some cases, technological and political developments arising from big data 
might render intelligence sharing less attractive compared to other options. 
If insider threats in partner countries are judged to be severe, an intelligence 
service might be better served by “going it alone” and refraining from sharing. 
The United States may be uniquely well-positioned to pursue this sort of 
approach, because it has more alternatives to foreign intelligence services as 
sources of intelligence in the big data domain. A large fraction of internet 
communications traffic transits the territory of the United States, providing 
the opportunity to intercept foreign communications of interest. Many of the 
dominant hardware, software, communications technology services, and on-
line communications services (such as e-mail, social media, and cloud storage) 
are headquartered in the United States. These firms often have terms of service 
that give them considerable latitude to share the data and communications 
they facilitate, and their status as American firms gives the U.S. government 
legal leverage to encourage or require them to collaborate with requests 
for data from the intelligence community. In addition, the U.S. military 
and intelligence community have unparalleled technologies for collecting 
intelligence remotely through networks of satellites, surveillance drones, and 
other devices. 
The key advantage of going it alone is that it makes one country less reliant on 
another country that may be unwilling or unable to live up to the terms of an 
intelligence-sharing arrangement. But even if the quantity of intelligence col-
lected by a single state could match that gathered by a group of states sharing 
intelligence, the quality of the intelligence is likely to suffer. Good intelligence 
analysis is typically based on both a range of sources and a close knowledge 
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of the context in which the target of analysis is embedded. Both of these 
elements may be lacking when intelligence collection comes to rely primarily 
on intercepted communications and related sources. Analysts might misjudge 
the behavior of targets when they have only one type of information. Targets 
may begin to communicate strategically, saving their most important messages 
for offline communications and using electronic media to communicate less 
important or misleading information. Human intelligence is a useful correc-
tive for these problems, and often a foreign partner is far better positioned to 
collect it. Another advantage of collaboration among intelligence agencies is 
that it exposes the agencies to the different points of view, assumptions, and 
judgments made by their counterparts, pushing them to critically review how 
they reach their own analytical conclusions. Much of this advantage would 
be lost if intelligence collection and analysis came to rely more exclusively on 
information that could be collected only by the domestic intelligence services.
The age of the internet and global social media—big data—has come on us so 
suddenly that most individuals, businesses, and governments are scrambling 
to determine the proper boundary between the private and the public, the 
secret and the open. Wherever this boundary eventually falls, intelligence ser-
vices will continue to share some of the information they collect. Each of the 
strategies discussed here has benefits and drawbacks, but some combination 
of them is likely to provide the best way forward for dealing with intelligence 
sharing in the age of big data. 
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The information given by 
a friendly service is the 
property of the friendly 
service that gave it.
MODERATOR: I would like to suggest we not restrict our discussion to the 
issue of sharing intelligence between nations, but that we also consider the 
domestic experience represented by the participants in this meeting. In the 
United States, we have a lot of problems with information and intelligence 
sharing, both within the federal government and between the federal gov-
ernment and the states. I suppose I am asking whether we can learn about 
international sharing from considering our domestic problems. I am inclined 
to think that our domestic experience is relevant, that the problems that crop 
up among U.S. agencies, for example, are not too different from the problems 
that nations have with sharing intelligence.
 Let me explain what our experience is in Europe. We distinguish two dif-
ferent types of relations: bilateral or trilateral and multilateral. Normally, the 
operational sharing, all of which is of a sensitive technical nature, we do with 
a partner, or two or three partners. Multilateral sharing, of course, is used to 
spread a warning: to communicate the name of suspects, for example. In Eu-
rope, for 50 years now we have had a club called the Club of Berne. Members’ 
internal security services are invited to join the Club. There are 25 members, 
all of which are members of the European Economic Community (EEC), plus 
Switzerland and Norway. Now Croatia also will be invited to join. What do 
we do? We have a cyphered communication system, which is very convenient, 
and we can extend it to other countries like the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) in the United States, Australia, and Japan. It depends on the case. 
We exchange names of suspects, and other information. We also meet twice 
a year at the director level. The directors can talk quite confidentially about 
many things, and we also have working groups on counterespionage, on 
technical issues, and on terrorism. After 9/11, the antiterrorist group was 
changed to a bigger one called the CTG, the Counter Terrorist Group, and we 
now have more meetings and work more intensively. We also have tried, even 
before the Arab Spring, to have contact with services in North Africa. So the 
Berne Club is an organization that is not very well known, but which works 
well. It is again easier for internal security services [to share information] than 
for external services. The Berne Club can’t exist unless smaller clubs of three 
or four—the British, the German, the French—meet regularly, but there is 
no such global organization because we think that this is a problem for the 
EEC. The EEC will want to develop its own international intelligence service. 
Members are not ready for that yet because it’s a question of sovereignty.  
Another thing that I wanted to raise—this is very important in matters of 
intelligence—is that the information given by a friendly service is the prop-
erty of the friendly service that gave it. You [the recipient] do not have the 
right to share it. This is a principle for all the services. The advantage that all 
services, both intelligence and law enforcement, have is that we have special 
judges. We can prepare the manner in which we are going to communicate 
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the information together with the service that gave the information to us. We 
must protect the source. This is very important.  
 As the situation in Syria deteriorated, we established a JIC, a Joint Intel-
ligence Center. It exists at both the domestic level and the international level. 
We have partners from the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the United 
States. All services are represented in this center, which is a very effective 
center: it collects and analyzes information for all the requirements of the 
intelligence services that are focused on Syria.
 I think, from my experience, that intelligence sharing is based on two ele-
ments. First is the legal framework in which your country is operating and the 
framework in which the intelligence sharing partner’s country operates. I will 
come back to that in just a minute. The second element is a very calculated 
decision on the risks and benefits of sharing that intelligence. In Europe, it is 
relatively straightforward in terms of the legal framework because we are all 
bound, for instance, by the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
we have similar jurisdictional approaches to the way in which investigations 
are conducted. These ultimately lead, we hope, to a successful conviction in 
court. That becomes much more problematic when you are dealing with other 
countries that are not bound by the European Convention of Human Rights; 
that situation has led to very different interpretations between, for instance, 
the UK and the U.S., on the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. 
That problem relates specifically to the way in which information has been 
extracted from prisoners and detainees. Also, it leads to a potentially very dif-
ficult situation in which the UK might want to share some lead intelligence on 
a target of interest to the U.S., but there is concern about how that intelligence 
will be exploited, because it is very clear in the UK that we cannot conduct 
straightforward kill operations. The U.S. has a different position. That does 
cause problems for us in the UK and for some of our European partners.  
 You mean, in Iraq, all of those operations in which the British killed 
people were originally intended just to capture them?
 Absolutely. The purpose of those operations, the primary purpose of those 
operations, had to be to capture. We could not legally conduct kill-or-capture 
operations. It was always capture. If the individual chose not to surrender in 
circumstances where lethal force had to be used, that was regrettable, but then 
lethal force was used. That was our default setting, and of course, that does 
British soldiers in Iraq
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then create problems when you are dealing with your closest ally which had a 
different approach.
The second element [governing the sharing of information] is the risk/
benefit analysis. The situation post-9/11, I think, has fundamentally changed 
the way in which the need to share intelligence has developed. We got to 
a point where the default setting was “need to share” rather than “need to 
know” when it came to counterterrorism. I think we need to consider coun-
terterrorism separately, because when it comes to counterintelligence and 
counterespionage, I think the rules remain very different. In those cases, you 
take a very calculated view on the reliability of the partner service with which 
you potentially want to exchange information. You know, Moscow rules1 
still apply, and I suspect there are one or two other target countries [besides 
Russia] that conduct very successful and very aggressive penetration opera-
tions against most of our partners. Therefore you would choose very carefully 
what it was you want to share with those countries, for fear of that intelligence 
becoming compromised. 
But when it comes to counterterrorism, then again the default setting has 
been “need to share” rather than “need to know.” From my experience, that 
default setting has become slightly eroded. The reason it has become eroded 
is because of concern for what would eventually happen to that intelligence. 
If any of the intelligence services acquires intelligence on a target that is the 
subject of an investigation, then I think they will find it very difficult to keep 
control of that intelligence, and not be required to release that intelligence 
into the criminal justice system. Certainly, when I first joined the service, 
which is not that long ago, you were confident that when you acquired intel-
ligence and you recorded that intelligence, you were never going to have to 
release that intelligence unless you chose to do so. The situation now is very 
different. Certainly my former colleagues who work in the counterterrorism 
world now work on the assumption that absolutely everything that they do, 
say, and record could become a matter of public record [through a trial]. That 
potential just makes the whole business of exchanging and managing intel-
ligence that much more difficult, and creates concern in the minds of some 
of our closest allies. We have seen it with the United States, where the United 
States has asked for assurances that intelligence that is going to be shared with 
us will remain out of the criminal justice system. That is no longer, I think, a 
guarantee that we can give.
 Not to say this is a contradiction, but it seems to me that you are arguing 
that, on the one hand, sharing intelligence in counterterrorism is easier 
because the threat is more shared, so to speak. On the other hand, it is more 
problematic because, from the viewpoint of the intelligence organization, it 
may become a [public] criminal matter.
 What I am saying is that the constraints and the concerns when it comes 
to sharing intelligence on counterterrorism are very different from the 
constraints and the concerns that exist from sharing intelligence on counteres-
pionage and counterintelligence matters. I think there are several reasons why 
it [sharing counterterrorism intelligence] is easier. One is because in counter-
terrorism, there is a threat to life. Therefore, with any intelligence we receive 
that relates to a threat to life, we are under a duty to do something with that 
intelligence. Where that becomes problematic is where you think, know, or 
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believe that this intelligence will then be exploited 
in a way that is contrary to the legal framework in 
which you are operating. Then it becomes a ques-
tion of whether you share that intelligence in a 
way, with caveats, so you have a reasonable degree 
of assurance that this intelligence will be exploited 
in a way that is appropriate [according to the laws 
you are operating under]. It works both ways, and 
it has become really problematic for the UK gov-
ernment to receive intelligence from governments 
where we believe that intelligence could have been 
extracted in a way that is unlawful [in the UK]. 
It has become such a problem that the Foreign 
Office is now investing what is, for the UK, very 
significant sums of money in enhancing capability 
and capacity in certain countries’ criminal justice 
systems so that they can conduct operational 
activity and extract information and intelligence in 
a way that is compatible with our legal framework. 
We have gotten ourselves into terrible trouble in 
the courts through having to admit that we have intelligence that was ex-
tracted through the use of torture.  
MODERATOR: Could you explain why there has been this shift that has made 
it more difficult to prevent the intelligence from getting into the criminal 
justice system? What is the origin of that change?
 In the UK, you absolutely have to disclose to the defense any evidence or 
intelligence that you have on which you have based your investigation, and 
which has resulted in someone being arrested and brought to trial. So we 
have now got vetted [security cleared] defense lawyers, and there are special 
procedures for managing the way that intelligence will be used in trial. But 
they are still jury trials and they can be held in camera2 up to a point, but you 
still have to disclose to the defense, and therefore by and large to the defen-
dant, how that intelligence has been acquired. It is a real problem in terms of 
compromising our own tactics, techniques, and procedures, and then there 
is a real problem in compromising intelligence that has been acquired from a 
foreign country.
 It is interesting to hear how that is done on the other side of the channel, 
because [in France] until now we could tell the court, “This is our investiga-
tion, we have nothing to add.” We didn’t give our sources when we presented 
the case. Now we do because there are special judges, special courts. But 
sometimes, of course, the lawyers for the defense will say, “Maybe this infor-
mation you have was obtained under torture.” When we receive information, 
we don’t specify whether it is from abroad or from a [domestic] source. Also, 
can you imagine asking a friendly service if they have obtained the informa-
tion under torture? No, you receive the information and you check the 
information. That’s all.  
 But the French judicial system is very different. We [in the UK] have an 
adversarial system where the prosecution has to prove someone’s guilt. You 
know the defendant will have a good idea of how the case is being developed 
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against him or her. If the defendant suspects that some of the intelligence 
could have come from a friendly country in another part of the world where 
there is less—there is a different respect for human rights and where they are 
not bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, then the defense 
lawyer is under a duty to find the best possible defense. The lawyer can then 
go on a fishing expedition, and will ask, “Where does this information come 
from, how was it acquired, was it acquired law-
fully, is it admissible?” because of course, the first 
thing the defense lawyer is going to try to achieve 
in court is to get the most damaging evidence 
removed as inadmissible.
 The same is true in the United States. It is 
called “defense by CIA.” The defense asks for all 
these intelligence documents to prepare the cli-
ent’s defense and the government has to give up 
the prosecution because it can’t turn all of that 
information over.
 We [in France] have another problem that 
now preoccupies us. The court, the judges—
most of them—more and more often ask that 
we declassify our documentation. Of course, 
we can’t accept this, because we have to protect our sources and protect the 
information coming from abroad. An independent commission examines the 
documents, and they say we can declassify this or that. Until now, the inde-
pendent commission always protected sources, but there is a lot of pressure 
now. Courts and judges are more and more aggressive, so of course we are 
concerned about this for the future.
A last point. In terms of my professional experience of managing liaison 
relationships, there have been instances where it has been easier to share intel-
ligence with certain organizations within the U.S. system than with others, 
where it had been made very clear that we shouldn’t be sharing certain intel-
ligence [given to us by one U.S. organization] with other U.S. government 
organizations. This is less common in France, but it has happened in France as 
well, but maybe that was the bad old days. 
 I think that the counterterrorist threat and the whole world of counterter-
rorism has changed intelligence in every way; in particular, it has changed 
intelligence sharing. It used to be that you could give a colleague from another 
country or another service a piece of paper and say, “This is the number, say, 
of SX-20 missiles that we believe the Soviet Union possesses. This is the result 
of our analytical product.” They would either agree or disagree, and you might 
have some minor technical differences and so on, and then you passed docu-
ments back and forth. There was no particular legal action expected on either 
party at the end of that. The counterterrorist threat, however, always contains 
the expectation that this is a matter that could go to court. So right from the 
beginning, every partner has to assume that the other partner has specific 
responsibilities and restrictions and limitations on what can happen to data 
and how data can be transmitted. 
The defense asks for all these 
intelligence documents and the 
government has to give up the 
prosecution because it can’t turn 
all of that information over.
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Our colleague and I shared some experiences trying to work with the incred-
ibly difficult German legal system, where, when we gave them a piece of 
information, it was almost guaranteed that it was going to get into the court 
system. We have the same problem in the United States when information is 
given to us. If it looks like it is prosecutable or could result in an investigation, 
we don’t want to receive it. Give it to the Bureau [FBI] because it is going to 
become a legal matter. It is eventually going to have to go through some kind 
of a legal system. So while we may want it as intelligence, we don’t want to be 
the action agency for it. We want the Bureau to obtain it on their own so that 
they have a clear chain of evidence from the origin of the information right 
to the moment where they take it in trial, so that they can do their job. The 
other thing about intelligence sharing that I think is important to understand, 
at least from the point of view of the problem that the Americans have, is we 
don’t go to you anymore, to anybody, with a piece of paper. We say, “Open 
your pipeline.” Many countries don’t have a pipeline.
 When you say pipeline, what are you… ?
 When you are dealing with counterterrorism in particular, people don’t 
want analytical conclusions. They want raw data. We—the Americans, British, 
French, and others—set up a program in Europe a few years ago that eventu-
ally involved six nations and 12 intelligence services in an 
operational mode. Simply to get the information to those 
partners that needed it to do the operational part required 
us, the United States, to construct an entire transmission 
system from NSA [National Security Agency] headquarters 
all the way through several modes, nodes, and everything 
else, into a certain office in Paris where that information 
could be received. Now, we are talking about huge data 
pipelines that nobody in Europe had. It would not have 
done us any good at all to try to set up that program 
without providing the partners with the intelligence—not 
the analytical product, but the raw, continuing data 
stream. That required several countries to make agreements 
between [their own] external and internal services on 
data sharing, which had never existed before. They didn’t 
share that data with one another [in the past]. They had 
to share the data with one another now because that was 
the only way that we, through our system, could get the 
data to them and move the data around in an efficient manner. The public 
has no idea of how much data is flowing around. Or maybe I shouldn’t call it 
data. But I have read all the academic theories and papers and everything else 
about how this should be done, and they have no idea what the daily stream 
looks like. It looks like what you see in that movie, The Matrix—falling dots 
and ones and zeros and everything else—that is the world you are entering 
into. Out of all of that crap, there might be one iota of importance. But those 
machines need to be talking to one another to get that one iota of difference. 
It is beyond human capability. 
 Was there any filtering done?
 No, not really. You can’t filter it. That is the problem. You cannot filter it.
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 Okay, but when this data is transmitted, that data alone won’t reveal … 
 It is not a product that any human being has intervened with and said, 
“Oh, this is Mr. So-and-So, and he is talking to Mr. Jones.” First of all, you 
should not be sharing intelligence broadly with anybody. You should be 
sharing intelligence on subjects of mutual concern. I don’t care whether it is 
internal or external. I do not believe in “need to share.” I don’t really believe 
Bradley Manning3 needed to be reading diplomatic cables between different 
posts that had nothing to do with his job. But we set up a system where he 
had it.  
Anyway, the problem of the huge data sets—I shouldn’t use that term data 
sets because they are not data sets. It is just raw garbage traffic, SIGINT [signals 
intelligence], HUMINT [human intelligence], everything. You have got to have 
an agreement among the partners, whether it is one, three, or 90, that this is 
the kind of data that they want to have. That is sometimes difficult to achieve. 
You can continue to share pieces of paper on other matters. You don’t set 
up one system to preclude another one. But when you are talking about the 
counterterrorism world, because it [the information] could result in arrests, 
trials, and convictions, you have got to offer all of those partners—everybody 
has got to be sharing the same original data. Believe me, that is hard to do. 
I examined something once where we were looking at passing some simple 
stuff by classified fax system to a partner or to a major ally. We realized that 
the nature of the software itself militated against simply sending faxes back 
and forth, because the other data that was in the original document before 
it got redacted for whatever purposes internally remained inherently in the 
document according to the way Microsoft structured the software. So we 
actually had to go to Microsoft and make a change in the software so that we 
could securely pass data that we meant to pass, without creating the kind of 
case that our colleague described, in which somebody would innocently get a 
Microsoft document, but then the trial lawyer knew the Microsoft system well 
enough to figure out how to look at all of the earlier versions so he could see 
what people had redacted, changed, and everything else. This is not what you 
want to wind up with in court. So you don’t want to be passing that to an ally. 
You want to make sure what you are passing to an ally is your best estimate or 
the reality, and that it is in a form that the ally can use.  
 But that is separate from that raw data flow you were talking about.
 That is separate from it, but it is just an example of the kind of real problem 
that you run into that people don’t expect or understand. But let’s go back 
to the big data pipe. The other problem that you are inevitably going to have 
is that somebody is going to come along and say, “You are sharing stuff with 
another intelligence service that you are not sharing with us.” And we say, 
“Well, you have no need for it.” But they don’t like that.  
The other thing is that in the world of counterterrorism, you are going to deal 
with intelligence matters, and you’re going to pass intelligence to partners 
whom you may not want to deal with. That’s simply the way it is. What you 
do in that case is you have to make sure that what you are sharing is very 
clearly delineated and defined, and that the sharing is restricted to that. We 
then get back to the problem of the big pipeline. How the hell do you restrict 
You can’t filter the data. That is 
the problem. You cannot filter it.
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that pipeline? It is not an easy process. It can be done, it is done on a daily 
basis, and occasionally there are mistakes, and occasionally traffic gets into 
that pipeline that is supposed to be restricted—that shouldn’t get into it. Then 
you have hell to pay. But you know, these are the realities that you are dealing 
with every day.  
The last thing I will say about [intelligence sharing] is that everybody wants 
to come to Washington. People are thinking, “Let’s move our liaison opera-
tions to Washington because then we get closer to headquarters.” That is the 
worst place to be. The people who are furthest removed from any idea of 
what is going on on the ground, anywhere in the world, are in Washington, 
D.C. They think they are the greatest experts, but what you have always got 
to remember, when you’re dealing with the people in any national capital, is 
that you are dealing with political appointees. You’re no longer dealing with 
professionals. The decisions are being made by political appointees, and I 
have seen over and over and over again a very good intelligence relationship 
ruined because somebody says, “Wow. Let’s get around the local representative 
and let’s move everything to Washington where we have direct access.” The 
next thing you know, you’ve got someone from a foreign intelligence service 
with his briefcase going all over Washington, asking, “Will you give me this?” 
“No, I won’t give you this for the following reasons.” He’ll go to another 
agency: “Will you give me this?” “Did the other guy say he won’t give it to 
you?” “Yes.” “Oh, I’ll give it to you then because I want to establish a relation-
ship.” That is what winds up happening to you. People start bartering, and it 
becomes a nightmare.  
 A fundamental reality that I think is important to bear in mind in all of 
this—and the various folks here have touched on it already—is that in the 
counterterrorism world, speed is probably more important than in almost 
any other aspect of intelligence work, and I think it complicates information 
sharing. You see this as soon as you go to work in the CT area. It is not just 
that days matter, but hours matter and sometimes minutes matter. Not in 
every case, certainly, but in some cases. You know, these days the person who 
learns that some suspect character is taking flight lessons—but is not inter-
ested in learning how to land the plane, only in how to maintain it in flight—
and doesn’t pass that information up the chain rather quickly and make sure it 
ultimately gets shared around, is in very, very serious trouble. So I think that’s 
an underlying reality that complicates this whole question as well, because you 
have to make these decisions as to what gets shared very, very quickly. In some 
cases, anyway. 
 Maybe we should think of it as a balance. The American partner brought 
huge amounts of material, but we sometimes had the possibility to verify 
something through our own sources, human sources, and everybody realized 
that it was an advantage to share very concretely. 
MODERATOR:  So in other words, there will inevitably be specialization. 
Some information that is passed to another country can only be made effec-
tive because of particular local knowledge or access to people. The FBI is the 
agency that is going to talk to people in the United States, not the French 
Service, and vice versa. Without even planning it, there is a kind of specializa-
tion that is implied.  
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 Yes, you share because your partner can do something that you cannot, or 
can do it better.
MODERATOR:  I wanted to ask our colleague: When you are talking about 
the JIC concerning Syria, is its work intended to be operational or more 
analytical? Is it to understand what is happening in Syria, or to deal with the 
consequences of what is going on in Syria?  
 Yes, it is analytical, but it can be used operationally. This center is just for 
the armed forces. It is concerned about the terrorists or the fringe groups that 
are active in Syria.
MODERATOR:  So for example, it watches the movement of people into Syria 
to join in the fighting? And possibly is stopping them from moving there?
 Yes. Collecting information from all the refugees and all the people who 
are coming to Jordan as visitors, actually. It is concerned about all of these 
people [coming from Syria]. 
MODERATOR:  When that JIC was set up, was what would be shared clearly 
established? 
 It is a common interest, actually. For all partners in the JIC, it is a common 
interest. The United States is interested in Syria. France the same, the UK the 
same, Jordan the same. So I think in this matter, there is no sensitive informa-
tion about these things. The members have a common interest in these things. 
In my opinion, regarding the Syria situation, the terrorists who move there or 
the fringe groups, there is no sensitive information at all.
 That is a very important point. When you start dealing with counterter-
rorist information, classification doesn’t really matter any longer.  
 I disagree.
 Wait a minute. Let me finish. Classification doesn’t matter in the sense 
that you need to move on the data, on the information. So yes, you are going 
to respect your classification guidelines and everything else, but what does 
matter is the methods that you have used to gather that data. They may need 
to be protected. But the data itself you can move. That is what I meant.
 The way that counterterrorism needs to be approached has required 
a change in the way that the military and law enforcement community 
operates. The United States may always have been much more sophisticated 
than the UK in this, but when we first started conducting kinetic opera-
tions against high-value targets in Iraq, it took a long time to explain to the 
military that there was enormous value to be had in collecting pocket litter. 
It took a while to get some of our specialist units to understand that the body 
at the end of the operation wasn’t necessarily the most important thing, but 
the mobile phone, the computer, all the rubbish that was in the flat or the 
building in which the target was found—all of that stuff potentially was gold 
dust. That concept in itself has required the military to change and adapt the 
doctrine by which they operate, and it has also required a huge infrastructure 
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behind it to enable what is called the personnel and material exploitation 
phase of an operation.  
When it comes to the law enforcement community, the other aspect is that 
the sheer volume of information that needs to be moved and needs to be 
shared, certainly in the UK’s experience, has meant that agencies that were 
traditionally UK-focused, and UK-focused alone, now operate in the inter-
national arena. It started off with the [British internal] security service having 
a liaison officer in Paris, which was in itself a big deal for SIS [Security Intel-
ligence Service, the British external service], because up until that point, SIS 
wanted to protect the liaison relationship, wanted to be the “front of house” 
for the whole of the UK’s intelligence and law enforcement community. Just 
the sheer volume and scale of the exchange that was required brought the 
recognition that it would make sense to have a security service officer present 
in Paris who was liaising directly on issues that were of specific interest to the 
security service. We now have got to the point where we have any number of 
UK police counterterrorism liaison officers posted around the world to liaise 
with local police and to facilitate the ongoing investigations that are taking 
place. I believe there is a UK CT liaison officer in Jordan, for instance. 
 Yes, that’s true.
 Until recently, that role was the sole preserve of SIS. We wouldn’t have 
allowed anyone else to come anywhere near our liaison relationships. They 
were ours, we protected them, and we guarded them very jealously. In the real 
world, you can’t do that anymore. So that has required the Metropolitan Police, 
and others—we now have immigration officers overseas, and so on—culturally 
to change the way they operate, and it has also brought them into this really 
difficult world of information sharing: what are the legal constraints, what are 
the operational considerations that need to be thought through, and so forth? 
My understanding is that the same thing has happened in the United States. 
There has been a similar encroachment, as it were, by NYPD [New York Police 
Department] and potentially others, into areas that have traditionally been the 
preserve of the CIA.  
 But I think counterterrorism is not a competition between countries or 
between services or between agencies.
 I agree; it shouldn’t be. But the reality is different. 
 If you hide something from other agencies or from other services, this may 
be the most important information those other agencies need to complete the 
whole picture about the situation or about somebody. When you hide this 
information, maybe it will allow this person or this organization to [carry out 
an attack] someplace: maybe in your country, maybe in my country, or in 
other countries. If you share the information, just a small piece of informa-
tion, because of other information that the other service has, then maybe it 
will bring the end of this terrorist attack or terrorist organization. So, in my 
opinion, sharing information is very important for everybody.
 You are exactly correct, but respect for the sources and methods used to 
obtain that information is extremely important. For example, if Jordan has a 
singular source within a group who is providing information about a potential 
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attack in the United States, and you pass that information to a local police 
representative as opposed to the CIA or the FBI representative in Amman, that 
information may appear in the newspaper because the police agency has a 
close personal relationship with the reporters, and then your singular source is 
in danger.  
 That happens? [Laughter]
 I know, it’s a mystery to me, too. [Laughter] So it is very important that 
the agencies involved in the collection of intelligence [overseas] understand 
that those of us who are involved at the U.S. federal level have certain rules 
and regulations that we follow in regard to intelligence collection, whether 
counterespionage, counterintelligence, or counterterrorism, in respecting 
your sources of information, the CIA’s sources of information. It is extremely 
important, and I can guarantee that American domestic law enforcement for 
the most part does not understand that. 
 American law enforcement culturally uses what they call CIs, confidential 
informants. Snitches. It is one criminal ratting out another criminal. There is 
no real respect for that person as a source. They don’t protect them. I am not 
talking about the federal level, the FBI level. I am talking about police at the 
local level.
 First of all, U.S. law enforcement is very fragmented, decentralized, and 
you’re dealing with different agencies and different people who don’t have 
that experience of dealing with classified information. Also, they don’t all 
get along, especially not the federal agencies and the state and local agencies, 
so the only way that [sharing information] is going to work in that case is if 
people get to know each other and they come to trust each other.  
MODERATOR:  But it seems to me that, as our colleague was saying before 
about Europe, one of the ways intelligence sharing can work is when there 
is a set of procedures that all involved agree to follow. In that case, there is 
no question that the personal relationship alone is what makes information 
sharing possible. Also, in the case of the JIC focus on Syria, our colleague 
didn’t say, “Well, it’s just because these guys got to know one another.” 
Common interests were important to encourage sharing in that case, but 
procedures—not just personal relationships—seem to make sharing possible. 
 But you have to be careful about whether the information might end up 
in court, because then you can’t protect sources and methods.
 Yes, exactly. There is an assumption that everything is going to end up 
in court, and therefore you don’t want to risk the exposure of sources and 
methods.
MODERATOR:  But in the case of the Syria JIC, for example, the information 
is not criminal, so that should not affect the exchange of information.
 But when you stop someone who has tried to go to Syria, he can end up in 
court in the future. You don’t know that, but it could be happen. 
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 I am fairly confident when I say that the security classification on a piece 
of information makes no difference as to whether it will be disclosed in court 
or not. So you can put the lowest or the highest security classification on 
information, and if the court wants to see it, the court will see it. Also, it is 
very difficult to disassociate the security classification that you give a piece 
of intelligence from the sourcing. I am not quite sure that point has been 
accepted by everyone here, but if you have a very sensitive source, then you 
are probably going to classify whatever information you get from that very 
sensitive source with a very high classification.  
There is also—let’s be frank—a game that is played when exchanging intelli-
gence with liaisons, with partners: your default setting is to ensure that this in-
formation that you are sharing is going to be protected in an appropriate way. 
Therefore, the likelihood is that you are going to put a high level of classifica-
tion on it rather than a very low level of classification, even if that information 
actually doesn’t really warrant a high level of classification. You do this also 
because you want to give the impression that you’re giving something that is 
valuable rather than something they probably could have gotten themselves 
just from doing a bit of open source research.  
 You mentioned procedures, so let me give you some ground rules for 
successful intelligence sharing based on my experience. First, you have to have 
a “round table.” No one is at the head of the table. Everyone is equal. Second, 
every participant has to be prepared to share all the information. You can’t 
have someone say, “I can’t take that or share that.” Third, any participant can 
opt out of an operation, depending on their rules or their abilities. You just 
have to acknowledge that that is going to happen. But I want to stress that 
you have to have a round table. You cannot have a hierarchy at that level if 
you want effective sharing. 
 Another important thing is to remember that there is over-sharing. If you 
share everything that comes in, then you are sharing items that aren’t good, 
and then other people won’t take your information seriously. So you have to 
decide what is worth sharing.
 But if there is a threat to life, then you have to share. You can caveat it, 
you can say that you don’t think it is credible or that you aren’t sure, but you 
have to share it.
MODERATOR:  If the procedures are important, then it’s important to know 
whether they are being followed. How do you do that?
 Trust but verify. [Laughter]
MODERATOR:  Okay, but what does that mean? How do you verify?
 You find out from a bad experience. When a third party provides you with 
information that you gave someone else, for example, then you know [that the 
people you gave it to violated the procedures]. You also need to pay attention 
to how your partners are behaving. Are they professional? 
If the procedures are important, 
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 Yes, the reputation of a service matters. Also, countries will want to follow 
the procedures because if they don’t, they risk losing access to information.  
 Countries also give aid, and in other ways try to build a relationship. Or 
you give training and so forth, so that gives you some leverage, and it helps 
reinforce the procedures, makes them common knowledge.
 Police forces also sometimes have officers from other departments who 
work with them, are integrated with them, but that is more difficult for intel-
ligence services to do. That is anathema for an intelligence service.
 It seems to me that we have been talking about two very different models 
that both seem to work. The first is informal, just between two countries or 
organizations, with few procedures or rules, where personal relationships are 
very important. The other is formal. A good example of this is the Joint Ter-
rorism Task Force in the United States, usually run by the FBI, where there are 
more procedures and rules, and personal relationships are not as important; 
the sharing occurs because of the way the task force is set up.
 In Europe, the more formal model is Interpol. The Club of Berne is less 
formal, maybe.  
 But if we are talking about sharing between countries, culture and lan-
guage are important, not just procedures. For personal relationships, culture 
and language are important. 
NOTES
1 Moscow rules were the unwritten rules of spycraft impressed on U.S. operatives who worked 
in Moscow during the Cold War. For more, see the International Spy Museum website: 
http://www.spymuseum.org/exhibition-experiences/argo-uncovered/moscow-rules/
2 A Latin legal term meaning a discussion or procedure done in private. 
3 U.S. Army private Bradley Manning (aka Chelsea Elizabeth Manning) was convicted in 
2013 of leaking large numbers of classified documents to the website WikiLeaks.
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One of the first and most successful cases of terrorism preven-
tion in American history is also one of the least known.1 The case involved 
what the U.S. government later called a conspiracy “to levy a war of urban 
terrorism against the United States.”2 A group of men plotted to bomb a 
number of targets in the New York City area, including the federal building at 
26 Federal Plaza in Manhattan, which housed the New York headquarters of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the United Nations (UN) Headquar-
ters building; the Lincoln Tunnel and Holland Tunnel; the George Washing-
ton Bridge; and several military installations.3 The case, known as the Day 
of Terror plot, ended in 1995, when 10 defendants were convicted following 
a nine-month trial that remains the longest and most complex international 
terrorism trial in American history. Federal Judge Michael B. Mukasey said 
the planned attacks would have caused destruction on a scale “not seen since 
the Civil War,” and would have made the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
“seem insignificant.”4  
The fundamental reason that security officials were successful in foiling the plot 
is clear: the FBI had an informant, Emad Salem, among the plotters. But how 
did this informant happen to be there? If Salem’s presence had been simply 
good luck, then the Day of Terror plot might offer few lessons for future coun-
terterrorism efforts. But government officials maintained that the success of the 
case was due to more than just luck or coincidence, but rather was the result 
of a long-term project to cultivate contacts among the Muslim community. 
“There was some damn good police work involved,” said one FBI agent.5   
The FBI was able to gather information about the Day of Terror plot from 
several confidential informants, but the key source of intelligence was Salem, a 
former Egyptian military officer who immigrated to the United States in 1987. 
He was a burly, bearded, enigmatic figure who worked as a private investi-
gator, and also supported himself as a jewelry designer. During the trial in 
1995, the New York Times described him as “a commanding presence. His 
bald pate is tanned and his rim of neatly trimmed black hair slicked back. 
He tends toward expensive suits, especially double-breasted models that 
cover an expanding bulk.”6 Another account described him as “handsome, 
muscular, meticulously well groomed, and quite the charming actor.”7 He 
appears to have been something of a chameleon, at times dressing in Islamic 
robes, at other times in jeans and T-shirts; to some he appeared to be a 
religious man, while to others he came across as being not religious at all.8  
According to press accounts, Egyptian officials said Salem had entered 
the Egyptian army as a private and was “pensioned out” as an officer 18 
years later, although he maintained a relationship with Egyptian military 
intelligence. He arrived in New York City from Cairo on 25 September 
1987, leaving behind a wife and two children in Egypt. According to press 
accounts citing U.S. government sources, he had agreed to report to the Planned bombing sites
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Egyptian authorities on any contacts with Egyptian military personnel who 
failed to return home after receiving training in America.9    
Within a week after his arrival in the United States, Salem met a woman 
named Barbara Rogers, a secretary at Mount Sinai Medical Center. They were 
married only six weeks later on 8 November 1987, in a Muslim ceremony. 
Salem told Rogers he had been an intelligence officer in the Egyptian Army, 
and that he had been in charge of security for the president of Egypt—stories 
he later would repeat to his FBI handlers, but which he eventually admitted 
were lies. In his trial testimony in 1995, he said he had actually been a radar 
officer in Egypt.10  
During Salem’s first several years in the United States, he worked as a secu-
rity guard at several different stores in New York City, including Bergdorf 
Goodman and Henri Bendel. He drove a cab briefly but quit when an angry 
customer threw a two-cent tip in his face. His wife explained to a newspaper 
reporter that such an insult was difficult for a proud man to take. “You have to 
understand,” she said. “This man had his own driver in Egypt.”11 From 1991 to 
early 1993, he made several trips to Egypt, including at least once with Rogers. 
He and Rogers separated in 1990, and he later moved into the apartment of 
a jewelry designer, Karen Ohltersdorf. He became an American citizen in 
August 1991, and soon afterward he and Rogers began divorce proceedings. In 
late 1991, he married Ohltersdorf, although he was still married to Rogers; he 
and Rogers were eventually divorced in 1993.12  
Salem Becomes an Informant  
Salem first came to the attention of the FBI in August 1991, when he was in 
charge of security for the Best Western Woodward hotel in Manhattan. FBI 
agent Nancy Floyd visited the Woodward as part of a program in which she 
went to second-rate hotels, hoping to find misbehaving Russian diplomats 
who might be willing to share secrets. Salem proved able to provide leads on 
just the sort of people the FBI was looking for, and Floyd later used him to 
gain information on Russians suspected of gun-smuggling and selling coun-
terfeit green cards.13  
Salem indicated to Floyd that he could provide information about the “Blind 
Sheikh,” Omar Abdel Rahman, so Floyd introduced him to John Anticev and 
Louie Napoli of the New York City Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).14 The 
New York JTTF, the first to be established in the nation, had been formed 
in 1980 in response to incidents of domestic terrorism. Anticev and Napoli 
attempted to recruit Salem to be an undercover informant, offering to match 
his hotel salary of $500 a week, but Salem hesitated at first, telling them he 
already had a full-time job.  
In October 1991, Salem was injured at work when he fell off a stepladder and 
hit his head while trying to adjust a boiler. The manager of the hotel later said 
Salem’s behavior changed after the accident: he began shirking work, and 
other employees started complaining about him. He apparently was let go 
from the hotel job.15 As Salem told the story later during the trial, he found 
himself out of work for a while because of his injuries, and when the FBI 
agents came back in November to renew their offer, he decided to take them 
up on it.16  The “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel Rahman 
“We had given him six weeks 
to get under [infiltrate the 
group]. He did it in two days.”
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Salem insisted on one condition, however: that his identity would never be 
disclosed. The FBI agents told him that if he wore a wire (a hidden recording 
device), he might have to testify sometime down the line, so Salem refused 
to wear one. The agents therefore agreed to his condition, telling him they 
would use him purely as an intelligence asset. If surveillance was necessary to 
develop trial-worthy evidence, other agents would move in to conduct it.17 
This condition would later play a critical role in Salem’s being terminated as 
an informant in 1992.  
The Nosair Trial
Soon after they brought him onto the government payroll, Salem’s FBI han-
dlers approached him with a request. The trial of El Sayyid Nosair, suspected 
in the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane, was beginning in New York, and Nosair 
had developed quite a large circle of admirers and supporters among radical 
Islamists and others. Would Salem be able to infiltrate the group of followers 
around Nosair, and help the FBI keep tabs on what they were up to? Salem 
agreed, and he quickly turned out to be very good at undercover work. A 
source told journalist Peter Lance, “We had given him six weeks to get under 
[infiltrate the group]. He did it in two days.”18 
Salem began to attend the trial and visit mosques, and he befriended 
Nosair’s cousin, Ibrahim El-Gabrowny. El-Gabrowny, a vocal supporter of 
Nosair, headed a fundraising committee and called for support for Nosair 
from mosques and Muslim associations. At one point during the trial, El-
Gabrowny introduced Salem to Nosair, describing Salem as “a new member 
in the family.”19 Soon El-Gabrowny told Salem that he and some friends were 
assembling materials for a bomb. He was vague about what their target might 
be, but Salem thought he sounded serious, and when El-Gabrowny asked him 
to join the group, he accepted.20
Before the Nosair trial ended, Salem was invited for dinner at El-Gabrowny’s 
house. During dinner, El-Gabrowny indicated that he was concerned about 
being bugged by the FBI, so he turned up the television and then began to 
discuss the building of high-powered explosives. El-Gabrowny asked Salem if 
he knew how to make bombs, and Salem said that he did, because of his army 
experience in Egypt.21 By early 1992, Sheikh Abdel Rahman, the spiritual 
leader of the group planning to carry out the attacks, had also welcomed 
Salem into the group, and Salem even traveled to Detroit with Abdel Rahman 
and others to attend a conference on the Islamic economy.22  
“Don’t Call Me When the Bombs Go Off”    
By June 1992, Salem still had not learned what the group was planning to do, 
but he had been told that the operation would involve 12 bombs and that 
guns would be needed in case the participants encountered police.23 In early 
July 1992, however, a dispute developed between Salem and the FBI that would 
result in Salem being released as an undercover informant.  
The problem arose when Agents Napoli and Anticev, who were in charge of 
the Salem operation, gave their superiors a briefing on the progress they had 
made, and were told it was now time to build a case that could be taken to 
court. In order to do that, Salem would have to wear a wire, which he had 
El Sayyid Nosair
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previously said he would never do. At about the same time, another problem 
arose for Salem: the FBI asked him to take a polygraph examination, apparently 
because they were suspicious he might be working for Egyptian intelligence. 
He was given three tests during the spring and summer of 1992, and although 
the agent who administered the tests believed he had passed, when experts 
in Washington reviewed the results, they determined he had lied on at least 
one of the tests.24 In June or July 1992, Salem went to the FBI’s New York 
City headquarters to meet with senior FBI officials Carson Dunbar and John 
Crouthamel. They told Salem he would have to wear a wire and be prepared 
to testify in court about the plot that was developing, but he continued to 
refuse.25  
In July 1992, Salem was dismissed as an informant, but he continued to get his 
weekly salary of $500 to tide him over until he found another job. To explain 
his disappearance to the conspirators, Salem told El-Gabrowny he needed to 
go to Spain to take care of a problem in his jewelry business.26 Nancy Floyd 
continued to meet with him at a Subway sandwich shop near the FBI New 
York office to give him the cash. Salem warned her that something was going 
on with Sheikh Abdel Rahman’s cell, and told her the FBI should be keeping 
track of the cell members.27   
Floyd had her last meeting with Salem in early October 1992, and again he 
warned her that the FBI should be worried about what was going on. She told 
him she had been transferred to another area, and was no longer involved in 
the case. As he left the Subway shop, he turned toward her and said, “Don’t 
call me when the bombs go off.”28  
After the World Trade Center Bombing, Back on the 
Payroll 
On the afternoon of the day the World Trade Center was bombed, 26 Feb-
ruary 1993, Salem called Floyd in a panic from a room at St. Clare’s Hospital 
in Manhattan, where he had been admitted for an inner-ear infection. He 
told her he was worried that no one had listened to him, and that they might 
now think he had been involved. Floyd told Salem the FBI had accomplished 
all it could with the information he 
had given them, but she would talk 
to her supervisor to see what could be 
done for him. She called her boss in the 
National Security Division (now called 
the Counterintelligence Division), who 
said that it would be up to the Terrorism 
section to handle Salem if they wanted 
to. So Floyd called Napoli and told him 
that Salem wanted to talk.29  
At 1:00 a.m. that same night, Napoli and 
Anticev were in a meeting in the office 
of the FBI’s assistant director in charge of 
the New York field office. Running the 
meeting was Mary Jo White, who had 
recently been appointed U.S. attorney 
World Trade Center bombing aftermath
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for Manhattan. Napoli mentioned that they had an asset “that was very close 
to these people,” and told White about Salem. White said she wanted to meet 
him, but Napoli answered, “Well, we were paying him like five hundred a 
week. This time, you know, considering what’s happened, he’s probably gonna 
want—a million dollars.” To which White answered, “I don’t give a damn 
what he wants. If he can deliver, give it to him.”30 
After weeks of negotiation between Salem and lawyers and agents representing 
the FBI, it was agreed that the government would pay Salem over one million 
dollars to once again become an undercover source and serve as a witness at 
any future trial. They also guaranteed that he would be put into the witness 
protection program afterwards. It didn’t take long for the decision to rehire 
Salem to pay off. In April 1993, Salem told Detective Louie Napoli that he 
had been approached by Abdel Rahman’s interpreter, Siddig Ibrahim Siddig 
Ali, who told Salem that he was planning a series of simultaneous bombings 
against four major New York City landmarks: the Lincoln and Holland tun-
nels, the UN, and 26 Federal Plaza, where the New York offices of the FBI were 
located.31
Although the FBI was already involved in the massive investigation—code-
named TRADEBOM—into the World Trade Center attack, an investigation 
was now begun into the new plot, dubbed TERRSTOP. The FBI’s Special Op-
erations Group outfitted Salem with an array of listening devices, including 
two recorders in the trunk of his car and a specially designed pair of pants 
with an electronic chip in them that recorded voices. Salem got back in touch 
with Siddig Ali and began providing supplies to the conspirators, including a 
video camera for surveillance and a van that the FBI had wired for sound.32  
The investigation was almost exposed in May, when Siddig Ali confided to 
Salem that there were additional plans to assassinate several political figures 
sympathetic to Israel, including U.S. Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York 
and Brooklyn Assemblyman Dov Hikind. Authorities informed the officials 
about the threats against them but stressed how sensitive the information 
was: because only a few of the conspirators knew about these plans, it was felt 
that Salem might be exposed as the source if the information on the threats 
became public.  
Despite the FBI’s efforts, however, the threat to Hikind leaked to the press, 
and on 25 May, the New York Post ran headlines announcing this new, second 
terrorist plot. Salem believed his cover had been blown. He later told his ex-
wife, Barbara Rogers, that when Siddig Ali heard the news, he lined up Salem 
and several others who knew about the plot against Hikind and put a revolver 
to each man’s head. “Allah is going to tell us who the traitor is,” Siddig Ali 
said.33 But luckily for Salem and the FBI, when no one confessed, Siddig Ali 
concluded it might have been a coincidence, or that the FBI could have gotten 
its information through some sort of surveillance of the group.34   
The FBI and the JTTF continued monitoring the plot until the group had 
begun to actually mix the explosives that would go into their bombs, on the 
night of 23–24 June 1993. It was then that the safe house was raided and the 
Day of Terror plot was foiled.   
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For Salem, the stress involved in living a double life as a terrorist conspirator 
and government informant brought on an asthma attack, and after the FBI 
raided the bomb factory, he ended up in the emergency room of Mount 
Sinai Hospital, seeking treatment under a false name.35 But he recovered, and 
prospered from his role in the case. At the 1995 trial, it was revealed that the 
government had agreed to pay Salem a total of $1,056,200 for his work as an 
informer, and until he received that payment, he was given $7,000 a month. 
Before that, his payment as a government informant had been $500 a week, 
plus expenses. The federal witness protection program, which reportedly 
moved him 14 times from the time he entered it in June 1993 until the trial, 
also paid him $2,600 per month for living expenses.36   
The Case Goes to Trial  
Soon after the 24 June arrests, it was discovered that the terrorist conspirators 
were not the only ones whom Salem, the informant, had been secretly spying 
on and tape recording. He had also been making secret recordings of his 
conversations with government agents, going back at least to the Nosair trial. 
He apparently wanted the tapes as an insurance policy in case the government 
backed away from its promises of money and protection. The “bootleg” tapes 
came to light when Salem hurriedly left his West Side Manhattan apartment 
after the Day of Terror plot was broken up, leaving behind cassettes of the 
secret recordings. Judge Michael Mukasey allowed the transcripts of the 
hundreds of hours of tape to be given to the defense lawyers, but ordered that 
they be kept secret. The New York Times obtained a copy of the transcripts 
nevertheless, and their existence became public. Eventually the transcripts of 
the tapes were introduced into evidence during the trial.37  
The tapes revealed some new details about the terrorist plot. Salem could be 
heard saying that the conspirators also discussed bombing Grand Central Ter-
minal, the Empire State Building, and Times Square.38 But more significantly, 
they showed how sensitive and troubled the relationship was between Salem 
and his FBI handlers. At some points, FBI officials appeared to encourage 
Salem to risk pushing the cell’s members to make incriminating statements 
and possibly entrap themselves.   
The trial opened in New York federal court in January 1995, and ended nine 
months later, after the jury had heard testimony from more than 200 witnesses 
and listened to more than 100 hours of the tape recordings that Salem had 
secretly made. The jury deliberated for seven days before pronouncing all 10 
defendants guilty of attempting to carry out a campaign of terrorism.  
Conclusion  
What might have been America’s most devastating terrorist attack prior to 9/11 
was foiled because an FBI informant provided authorities with precise, tactical-
level intelligence on the plot as it was developing. But the history of this case 
demonstrates the obstacles that law enforcement agencies face in obtaining and 
using this type of human intelligence. 
The FBI and the New York JTTF had originally recruited Emad Salem as a 
confidential informant in the fall of 1991, but senior officials in the FBI and the 
JTTF were not receptive to the information he was providing. This was in part 
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because they did not trust Salem’s motives. In addition, they were reflecting 
the conventional assessment of the terrorist threat in the United States at that 
time. Terrorism was seen as a primarily international problem, backed by 
hostile states such as Libya; although officials recognized a limited domestic 
threat from disgruntled or deranged individuals, they saw domestic terrorism 
as much less threatening.  
This case also demonstrated several techniques that have been shown to be 
critical today in the fight against terrorism. One technique is the use of a 
joint terrorism task force, linking the FBI, local law enforcement, and other 
government agencies together in a cooperative effort.39 A second technique 
is electronic surveillance: much of the evidence introduced in the case came 
from secret wiretaps, some of which were authorized by the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court.40    
In addition, the Day of Terror plot demonstrated the utility of taking a slow, 
careful approach to terrorism investigations: letting plots go forward long 
enough so that the full scope of the conspiracy can be determined and as 
many of the plotters can be caught as possible. “We had to let the information 
develop,” said a former FBI assistant director who had been involved in the 
case. “Taking them off the street at an early stage of the investigation, I don’t 
believe would have afforded us the opportunity to discover and resolve the 
intent to blow up the tunnels.”41      
This case raised a number of issues that continue to be debated today con-
cerning the prosecution of terrorist suspects, such as how to balance the 
need for security and civil liberties in terrorist investigations, and how to 
balance the need for physical security during the trial with the right of the 
accused to an open and public trial.42 The case also was an early example of 
how terrorists and their supporters make use of modern information tech-
nology: throughout the trial, supporters of Abdel Rahman and the other 
defendants used the internet to solicit funds for their defense.43    
Finally, the Day of Terror plot remains useful for study today because it pro-
vided an early model for how a group of loosely affiliated extremists can come 
together, train, plan, and very nearly carry out a terrorist attack intended to 
inflict wide-scale death and destruction. The conspiracy proceeded through a 
number of distinct stages, including member recruitment, group paramilitary 
training, target selection, and weapons acquisition. Similar patterns can be 
seen in a number of terrorist plots that have been foiled since then, suggesting 
that such a template may prove useful in analyzing and preventing complex 
terrorist plots in the future. 
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 12 December 2013, writer and director 
Peter Berg came to Monterey, California, for a special pre-release screening of 
his new film, Lone Survivor. Based on the book of the same title by Marcus 
Luttrell, the film depicts Operation Red Wings (June 2005), in which 
Luttrell and three other members of SEAL Team Ten were dropped into the 
mountains near a village on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.2 Their mission 
was to capture or kill a Taliban leader who was responsible for the deaths of 
a number of Marines. Shortly after they landed, the team was discovered by 
three goatherds: an older man and two boys. The SEALs’ decision about what 
to do with these villagers and the aftermath of that decision are at the heart of 
Luttrell’s book and Berg’s film. After the screening, Mr. Berg sat down for an 
interview with Rebecca Lorentz of CTAP and Elizabeth Skinner of CTX.3 
Spoiler alert: This discussion covers many of Lone Survivor’s major plot points, 
so if you intend to see the film, you might want to save this article to read 
afterward.
REBECCA LORENTZ: Thank you, Mr. Berg, for agreeing to do an interview 
with us. We just finished watching a screening of Lone Survivor. Can you 
explain what you were most nervous about when you got ready to screen the 
movie for the public?
PETER BERG: I think I was probably most nervous about the fact that we had 
a unique audience. We knew that part of our audience base for Lone Survivor 
would be the families, moms, and dads of the 19 soldiers who were killed: the 
men’s children, their brothers and sisters, their widows. I knew they were 
going to see the film, and I wanted to make sure that they felt we had paid 
our respects, that we had done our work, 
that we had honored their sons. The other 
challenge was with the Special Operations 
community as a whole. I knew that Navy 
SEALs and Green Berets and PJs [para-
rescue jumpers] from the Air Force, Force 
Recon from the Marines, Delta, SEAL 
Team Six—we knew that these guys were 
all going to see the film, and they were 
going to have very strong opinions. If we 
were not accurate, if we hadn’t done our 
work in advance and made a real effort 
to understand how that SEAL community 
operates, we would be ripped apart by 
that part of the audience. So we were very 
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conscious that we had a very opinionated and involved audience that was 
going to see this film.
LORENTZ: When you began to make the film, what surprised you the most 
about delving into the military operations?
BERG: That is a good question. Everything was new to me as I started to re-
search the SEAL community. I spent a month in Iraq, and I was able to embed 
in the Foxtrot Platoon in SEAL Team Five and see the closeness of the men, 
the brotherhood, the bond between men of different shapes and sizes and 
races and religion. The unity among men and the singular focus they have, 
the willingness to protect each other and the love they have for each other was 
something that I had never seen before. You know, these are guys who have 
problems with each other, they would argue. They didn’t always get along; but 
when it came time to work, the level of professionalism and commitment and 
self-reliance was kind of mind-blowing to me. 
LORENTZ: I have got to say, we just watched about a two-hour film, and it 
was really intense. My heart is still beating. How have you recovered from 
doing that film over four years, from that intensity?
BERG: It has been a really unique, special experience for all of us involved 
in the film. Again, these are 19 men who died, and we have come to know 
their families, we have come to know their friends, we have come to know their 
coworkers within the SEALs. It has been very emotional for all of us, and 
movies like this don’t come along that often. I can tell you I am very emotion-
ally connected to this film, very close to Marcus Luttrell and also the SEAL 
community in general. It is going to take some time to let this go, I mean, for 
me to find another project that will mean as much to me as this one has. 
LORENTZ: Yes. There is the moment in the film when the SEALs have the 
goatherds, and they have to make a decision about what to do. How heavy do 
you feel that moment weighs with regard to ethical decision making? 
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BERG: The decision that Mike Murphy made to let those goatherds go and 
spare their lives—that was the core of why I wanted to do this film. I think 
it shines a very bright light on what we are asking our Special Operations 
soldiers to do today, and how outside of the box their thinking needs to be, 
how situationally aware they need to be, how prepared for the unimaginable 
they need to be. That captures so much about the story. Special Ops personnel 
are trained to do almost anything. Everything that happens to them in the 
field is new. It is not in books, and there is no manual. I could certainly form 
an argument as to why they probably should have killed those goatherds, and 
if I did, I would now have 19 Special Operations soldiers still alive. Trying to 
imagine what Mike Murphy was thinking, and what was going through his 
mind with zero information—that’s out of my pay grade.
ELIZABETH SKINNER: Did the actors react emotionally, and how did you 
work with them to get them into that intensity?
BERG: We had Marcus Luttrell come to the set about a month before 
shooting. He came with eight Navy SEALs—four current and four who were 
retired—and we set up a training facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico. For a 
month, the actors lived with Marcus and eight SEALs, all of whom knew the 
guys who were killed. That was a very formative experience for those actors. 
Prior to that, they had met the families of the SEALs they were playing—so 
Taylor Kitsch spent time with the Murphys, and so forth. I tried to immerse 
the actors into the families as much as I could and then into the SEAL teams 
as much as I could. They got it. It is impossible to read Marcus’s book, spend 
time with the SEAL families, and spend time with the SEALs, and not get very 
emotionally connected. So those actors were very, very invested in what they 
were doing.
SKINNER: You were creating the illusion of extreme violence and this combat 
experience that none of you who were involved in the filmmaking had actu-
ally experienced. You were involved with the SEALs to get a sense of how that 
83
February 2014
For a month, I sat with 
Luttrell and ran through that 
gunfight beat by beat. Those 
cliff jumps, tree by tree. Those 
injuries, bullet by bullet.
felt, but as a director, you tried to create a reality and present it to people who 
have been through it. How did you gain that perspective on how that violence 
should look?
BERG: Good question. In the book, Marcus described that gunfight in vivid 
and graphic detail. It was a five-hour gunfight in reality, and the first thing I 
did was really analyze what Marcus had written. I invited him to my house, 
and for a month, I sat with Luttrell and ran through that gunfight beat by 
beat. Those cliff jumps, tree by tree. Those injuries, bullet by bullet. I sat 
with one of the men’s fathers, and he read me the autopsy report of every 
injury: every bone, ankle, knee, thigh, groin, stomach, throat. I was trying 
to educate myself and get as complete a knowledge as I could. I tried to be as 
comprehensive and understanding as I could have been about the reality of 
that gunfight.
We tried to be very specific about every gunshot—where someone was getting 
hurt. Every hit, every injury. The makeup guys were very specific about what 
these injuries would look like, the sound guys about what they would sound 
like. We tried to go into the detail of that violence and not just throw it at the 
audience.
LORENTZ: Is it difficult to direct a movie that has such a varied audience? You 
know that the Special Forces will see it, but you know American citizens will 
see it who have nothing to do with the war.
BERG: Directing any movie is difficult. It is always tricky to figure out who 
is going to like it and who is not going to like it. You know, generally, I am 
willing to kind of take the Serenity Prayer and say there is only so much I can 
control.4 But in making Lone Survivor, knowing I was going to have to see 
each mother again when this film was over, knowing that I was going to have 
to see Marcus Luttrell again when this film was over. . . . Knowing that I am 
going to come to places like this [Monterey]—this is a very unique audience. 
To have elite members of Special Operations Forces from all around the 
world, warriors and families of warriors and academic soldiers—people who 
are going to look at this with a very unique and critical eye—it didn’t make it 
harder to make the movie, but I was certainly aware that these types of screen-
ings would occur, and it probably made me work a little harder to at least be 
able to justify my choices. It made me want to do things like go to Iraq for a 
month and live with the SEAL platoon, so that at the end of the day, if a Navy 
SEAL comes up to me—which has happened many times—and says, “Why 
did you make this choice?” I can have an answer. 
SKINNER: Do you consider this an anti-war movie?
BERG: People have asked me if I am pro-war or anti-war. I am anti-war. I 
mean, who in their right mind would be pro-war? I have had friends who 
have died. I have been to many military funerals. I have enough respect and 
appreciation for what we ask these men and women to do. 
These men will fight, and these men will die very, very painful and bloody 
and gruesome deaths. I think it is important for any citizen—everybody 
should understand what the costs are. If we are at war where people 
are dying, we need to have an opinion, whatever that opinion is. If you are 
I think we as citizens have to 
look at the reality of what it 
means to send soldiers to war.
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supporting it and believe the cause is right, you then support it and make sure 
that our soldiers come back home, and support them. If you don’t support it 
and you think it is wrong, then do something about that, too. For me, it is 
not pro-war or anti-war. I think we as citizens have to look at the reality of 
what it means to send soldiers to war. 
ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE
Peter Berg is an actor, writer, and director who has been working in Hol-
lywood for more than 20 years. He wrote and directed the feature film Friday 
Night Lights (2004) and the award-winning TV series of the same title.
Rebecca Lorentz is the manager of CTAP. 
Elizabeth Skinner is the managing editor of CTX.
NOTES
1 The Combating Terrorism Archive Project aims to collect and 
archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics used by 
military and other security personnel from around the world 
in the twenty-first-century fight against global terrorism. 
Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts will 
create an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in 
counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and 
in the future.
2 The other members were team leader Mike Murphy, 
communications officer Danny Dietz, and navigation specialist 
Matt Axelson. Luttrell was the team’s medic.
3 This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every effort 
was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the 
participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions 
of all participants are theirs alone and do not represent the 
official positions of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, the 
U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. government, or any other 
official entity. 
4 A common variant of the Serenity Prayer by Reinhold Niebuhr 
begins, “God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot 




Navy SEALs operating in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. (L-R) Sonar 
Technician (Surface) 2nd Class Matthew G. Axelson, of Cupertino, California; Senior Chief 
Information Systems Technician Daniel R. Healy, of Exeter, New Hampshire; Quartermaster 
2nd Class James Suh, of Deerfield Beach, Florida; Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Marcus 
Luttrell; Machinist’s Mate 2nd Class Eric S. Patton, of Boulder City, Nevada; and Lt. Michael 
P. Murphy, of Patchogue, New York pose in Afghanistan. With the exception of Luttrell, all 
were killed June 28, 2005, by enemy forces while supporting Operation Red Wings.
THE CTAP INTERVIEW
Part Two: A Roundtable Discussion of Lone Survivor
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 12 December 2013, writer and director 
Peter Berg came to Monterey, California, for a special pre-release screening of 
his new film, Lone Survivor.2 A few days after the screening, MAJ Patrick Col-
lins, U.S. Army Special Forces; LTC Gabor Santa, Hungarian Army Special 
Forces; and CDR Brian O’Lavin, U.S. Navy SEALs, met to discuss the film 
with Rebecca Lorentz of CTAP and Elizabeth Skinner of CTX.3 
Spoiler alert: This discussion covers most of Lone Survivor’s major plot points, 
so if you intend to see the film, you might want to save this article to read 
afterward.
BRIAN O’LAVIN: Last week we watched a private screening of the movie 
Lone Survivor, so we’ve gotten together now to discuss some finer points of 
the movie. First off, going around the room, what are your initial thoughts 
about the movie: did you like it, did you not like it? Were there aspects that 
you thought were well done and aspects you thought maybe could have been 
improved on, or any kind of general comments?
PATRICK COLLINS: I thought it was a good movie. It was definitely very 
action-packed and entertaining. It doesn’t follow the book exactly, but it 
definitely is very close. I know during the gunfight scene, the writers had a lot 
of advice from Marcus Luttrell [the author of the book Lone Survivor, from 
which the Lone Survivor film is adapted], so I am just going to assume that 
was all pretty accurate. 
GABOR SANTA: Well, first, I liked the movie very much, even though I haven’t 
read the book yet. I am pretty sure I will take time to read the book after 
seeing this movie. In military college, my military occupation specialty was 
long-range reconnaissance, and we always had this concern: what if we met a 
little kid while on an operation? In long-range reconnaissance, we do special 
recon all the time, like these guys in the movie. You know, it is a never-ending 
discussion about what would be the best option to choose. In my personal 
opinion, which is not an official Hungarian position, and with all due respect 
for the movie makers—they did a great job—and with all my respect for the 
soldiers in the field: I am not quite sure that those men really made this 
decision to let the goatherds go, the one they made in the scene. Just thinking 
militarily, this was probably the worst choice they could make: leaving 
those guys free, immediately, with no physical restriction like tying their 
hands or just delaying them a little bit from going back to the village. As far 
as I saw, those SEALs were much smarter than that. I can understand that 
from the director’s perspective, he had to do something that would be more 
effective for the civilian population, because this movie was made for civilians, 
not for the small military community. If you know whether they made that 
decision, then okay, I’m not sure we should talk about a better solution here. 
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But that was my impression: that the movie cannot show 100 percent what 
really happens in the field. But it still was a good movie.  
O’LAVIN: I looked at the book before coming here, and it seems like those 
men put themselves in a kind of rapid-decision-making mode. At least Lut-
trell’s account was that way: “Hey, we need to make a decision—is it X or 
Y?” In the book, as soon as the goatherds ran off, everyone on the team was 
asking, “Gosh, couldn’t we have done something else?” But yes, I thought 
the movie was good. I think it was a fitting memorial for those three guys 
who died. It seemed in his 60 Minutes interview that Marcus was still going 
through a lot of post-traumatic stress and survivor’s guilt. And obviously 
the families of the soldiers and sailors who went down during the attempted 
rescue are still coping with their losses. From that perspective, I thought it was 
really well done. I also thought the sounds from the gunfight scene were well 
done: the snaps of the bullets and the different sounds that all the guns made 
were pretty accurate. Patrick, have you gone through the book at all?
COLLINS: Yes, I read the book a while ago.
O’LAVIN: How well do you think the movie stuck with some of the key 
points in the book?
COLLINS: The director also talked about that decision being one of his main 
focuses—that dilemma of “Hey, do we let them go, or do we kill them, or 
how do we do this now that we are compromised?” I think that decision 
actually took a lot longer than what was reflected in the movie. In the movie, 
it was only over a span of about five minutes. They were saying rapidly, “Hey, 
what do we do? What do we do? Okay, let’s just do this.” Then that was 
it. In actuality, it took a lot longer, and they did make a very strong effort 
to get comms [communications] during that time, to seek guidance. But 
unfortunately, they would have had to move from where they were, and I 
think they were afraid of moving along that ridgeline during the middle of the 
day because they would have been more visible to the [Taliban] fighters. So it 
really was a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” type of dilemma. But I 
thought that was something in the movie I would like to have seen a bit better 
explained—why they came to that decision during that time.  
If I remember right, in the book, the men went over that: “If we keep them 
here until dark, some of their family members might come looking for them. 
We don’t know when they are expecting them back. If we leave the goats and 
we just take the guys up to go and try to get better comms, somebody is going 
to see the goats running around and somebody is going to come up. If we kill 
them, they might hear the gunshots, they may come up if we …” I mean, it 
just goes on and on and on. It was just a horrible dilemma, and I don’t know 
if we can say whether they made the right decision or not.  
SANTA: No, you can’t. No one can say that. You have to make a decision 
alone, and no one has the right to blame you if you do something wrong, 
because you’re alone. And those men were alone. 
What actually surprised me a little bit is that they had so many comms 
problems and they had no contact with the higher [command]. We have 
87
February 2014
I think the movie was a 
fitting memorial for those 
three guys who died.
It really was a “damned 
if you do, damned if you 
don’t” type of dilemma.
multiple choices of how to make contact with highers, and all of them failed? 
I am not saying that someone made mistakes before the operation, but that 
is surprising from a military perspective. From the movie’s perspective, it was 
actually a good thing because the audience gets more excited, but from our 
perspective, it is kind of hard to believe that none of their comms worked.  
O’LAVIN: And that is the risk you run, obviously. You have four guys going 
somewhere as a small unit, and they can carry only so much stuff. So perhaps 
they took a risk on backup comms. In the movie, the comms in that area just 
weren’t very good for whatever sort of meteorological or terrain reasons. That’s 
what I took away. 
ELIZABETH SKINNER: I have a question concerning the communications at 
headquarters. How realistic was the scene where Commander Kristensen has 
gotten the satellite call in Bagram, and he tries to get the general’s attention, 
but he seems to be told off? I was wondering if you had a reaction to that scene 
or anything to say about it.
O’LAVIN: The general was saying, “Hey, how come I’m just hearing about this 
now, when you should have been telling me about this two hours ago at least, 
that you had a small, isolated force that hadn’t made communications with 
you for a while?”
In most cases, if something like that happened, you would start requesting 
that assets be pushed over the last position you knew they were in, and that 
is why you call higher. You would say, “I haven’t heard from my team, and I 
want some dedicated ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] platforms 
pushed over the site so we can try to figure out what is going on and why 
they haven’t made comms.” But if you know that folks are going into an area 
with bad communications, that should start making you a little bit concerned 
about the size of the element you are sending, if it is especially small and you 
know that they are going to have comms problems. That should lead you 
to think, “Maybe we need to rethink the size of the force we are sending, or 
the force structure itself. What is the mission risk that I am willing to accept 
compared with what I’ll gain from this operation?”
SKINNER: It surprised me, as you were saying, how surprised they were by the 
fact that they didn’t have communications.
O’LAVIN: Comms never work. That is, you test every one of your radios 
before you leave, and then 50 meters outside the front gate, you can’t talk to 
other vehicles. You wonder what sort of voodoo magic is going on in those 
things, only 100 meters away from where you tested them! 
COLLINS: It’s like Murphy’s Law: whatever communication can go wrong 
will go wrong. As you wrote in your message inviting us here, we can prob-
ably come up with some lessons learned concerning the two communication 
windows that they missed. 
SANTA: One of the lessons is that you really have to have contingency plans 
for missing communication windows, especially for the recon element. You 
don’t want them to be compromised, so you give them really wide commu-
nication windows. I am guessing that the windows for that team were at least 
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four hours between, or even more, so they wouldn’t have to go to the hilltop 
every 30 minutes to set up the radio, the communications set, and take the 
risk of being compromised. Then, if you miss two or three of those wide-
spaced windows, you assume something really happened. So what I missed 
was the contingency plan. When Commander Kristensen was reporting to 
his highers that they had missed three communication windows, if I were the 
higher commander, I would probably ask what went wrong. Missing two or 
three communication windows means something happened, so I have to react. 
I should have a contingency plan, like, “Okay, now I need to rescue them, 
because either they got compromised or something happened to trigger the 
mission abort criteria, or something else happened.” 
That higher commander could have been acting like he did because there was 
no additional action report. Which goes to the same point I made earlier, that 
the decision they had to make as a recon element was very basic. They should 
have had contingency plans for a case such as meeting the goatherds. It seems 
fairly obvious near a village in Afghanistan that you will find goats and sheep 
walking around. They should have had a contingency plan: “We got compro-
mised. Let’s do plan C. Okay, we go to this point and get extracted, or just kill 
the target and get extracted,” or something. These are the two main points I 
really missed from the action. They might have had some plan, but just didn’t 
want to put it into the movie.
COLLINS: I think it just wasn’t well portrayed in the movie. They were found, 
and it was a risk that they probably looked at: “Is it better for us to move 
during the day and get as far away as possible or to hide out?” It’s another one 
of those dilemmas where you’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t. 
So I think all of those contingencies were in place, but maybe the movie didn’t 
portray them well enough. 
As for the higher’s action, I think Commander Kristensen wanted to start 
spinning assets [sending rescue helicopters] right away after the first two 
missed comm windows. The problem was that the Apache escorts weren’t 
available. There was another TIC [troops in contact] going on, and the 
Apaches were handling that issue, so Kristensen had to wait. By the time he 
finally decided to take off, he just said, “Hey, we are not going to wait any 
longer. Let’s just go!” That’s when the Chinook got shot down. So the assets, 
in theory, were in place, but they just weren’t available for that QRF [quick 
reaction force]. You need those escorts, especially if it is an air infiltration, and 
those Apaches should have been dedicated versus just waiting there to be used 
for anything.
REBECCA LORENTZ: As operators, when you are watching a depiction of an 
actual military operation, is it difficult to separate watching this as entertain-
ment, or do you pay attention to the TTPs [tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures] throughout?
COLLINS: I think whenever I watch a film like that, I look more at the TTPs. At 
the same time, it is entertaining, but I admit I do look at the TTPs quite a bit.
O’LAVIN: I think any professional is paying attention. Obviously, the better 
the manipulation of the weapons and all of those details, the better you are 
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able to say, “Yes, they have some good folks helping with the tactical/technical 
aspects of the movie.”  
COLLINS: Whenever I watch a movie that is about something I’m familiar 
with, I watch it with critiques ready. In the first second after Lone Survivor 
started, I was thinking, “Okay, what would I do if I were there? Would I do 
the same, or am I going to do something else? How could it be wrong or 
worse or better?” When I realized that something went wrong, it couldn’t 
really entertain me anymore because the same could happen to me. In the 
field, you don’t have time to be as smart as when you’re sitting comfortably, 
watching a movie with popcorn and a Coke in your hands. I don’t know how 
the temperature was in those mountains, but in a really rough environment 
like that, you can’t make the perfect decision. Making the decision in the field 
is really, really hard. At least for me, watching these guys make a decision 
that cost their lives—that wasn’t really entertaining at all. None of the scenes. 
From a certain perspective, yes, it was entertaining—nice TTPs, actions—but 
I wasn’t happy at the end.  
O’LAVIN: You know how the movie is going to end. It’s a downer as soon as 
things start going bad.
SANTA: Yes, and for the whole time I was thinking, “Okay, if they didn’t take 
that step, or didn’t turn right but went left, hopefully they could survive.” This 
is all I had in my mind while watching the movie: what they should do differ-
ently to survive. For me, it is not an entertaining movie. It is more like you 
want to do something for them. You know it is too late, but you really want to 
do something even if it is only a movie. At least I wanted to do something. I 
don’t know how you guys felt about that.
COLLINS: I think you’re right. I think at the end of it, everybody was ready to 
grab their kit and go to Afghanistan.  
O’LAVIN: Well, nobody wanted to ask Peter Berg a question, either. The 
mood in the theater was identifiably morose. 
COLLINS: Yes, even having read the book, I was sitting there watching and 
hoping that something would change.  
LORENTZ: How do you think the general public will view this movie? How 
do you think it will be received?
O’LAVIN: It’s one of the questions I have. I think one of Peter Berg’s goals was 
to try to show the general public the sacrifice and the realism of the battles 
that some of these units are having to fight somewhat frequently. So I think 
this movie will bring the realism home, and maybe some folks will say, “Hey, 
what exactly are we still doing in some of these places years and years later? 
What objectives are we really trying to accomplish—or do we really think 
we can accomplish—in some of these places? Is it worth the sacrifice of these 
folks to do that?”  
LORENTZ: Did any of you have your spouse there? I ask because in the 
[U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Defense Analysis] department, we have this 
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question. The movie was very, very difficult to watch as a civilian, as a lay-
person. We wondered what spouse would watch this and be able to sleep again.
O’LAVIN: I came home and told my wife, “If we go, you’ll probably need two 
boxes of tissues,” because it is pretty hard to watch these guys basically dying 
over a 30-minute period. You know everything that is going to happen, and 
then, obviously, there’s the memorial scene at the end for all of the folks who 
were killed, with the pictures of families and the men when they were alive.
SANTA: Wives always ask, “What are you guys doing out there? What is that 
noise I hear behind you on the phone?” “Well, that is the generator. Don’t 
worry.” So they know all of this stuff, but they just don’t really know how 
tough it is. We don’t talk very often about how tough the life is. I guess they 
deserve to know what we are doing, but at least personally, I don’t want to 
have my wife in a situation where, whenever we are out [on deployment], she 
thinks, “Okay, my husband might be rolling down a hill hitting his head like 
100 times on rocks.” You don’t want your wife to have to think about this. But 
they are human beings, and they are our life partners. They actually should 
know, but it is just not comfortable for me to talk about this. But I guess it’s 
okay for them to watch these movies. 
COLLINS: Yes, my wife didn’t go, and I think it is for the same reasons these 
guys talked about. She just—doesn’t want to see it. 
SKINNER: In previous interviews and in the interview he did with us, Berg 
talked in a very compassionate way about these men and their families, and 
what he went through to try and bring this movie to life. The actors actually 
went and met the families and got to know them. I’m curious: was his com-
passion for those men apparent to you, or did the movie feel at all exploitative 
of these deaths?
COLLINS: I don’t think it seemed exploitive. I guess anybody can say that this 
guy is making a multimillion-dollar movie about this story. It is obviously 
tragic, but I don’t think it was exploitive at all. I think the memorial scene 
at the end was very good, and from the way he talked about it in the theater, 
I think he took the families’ feelings into consideration a great deal before he 
put together the movie. That was good.  
LORENTZ: One of the questions we asked Berg was “What surprised you 
most about your experience of embedding with the team?” and he answered 
that it was the camaraderie between the men that surprised him, how tight 
they were. Was that what you would think he would say?  
COLLINS: Yes, I think so. 
LORENTZ: Were you surprised to hear that?
O’LAVIN: I don’t think so. I think the film reflected that—the brotherhood. 
That was my experience, and I think that is why most guys hang around, if 
they enjoy the folks that they work with. You sign up for the challenge—to be 
one of the cool guys. But then, what keeps you in is that you like all of the guys 
that you work with. They are a lot like you, and you can hang out with them 
on the weekends or at night or whatever. So that doesn’t surprise me at all.
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COLLINS: I agree. I have yet to meet a team that isn’t tight like that. Even if 
they all hate each other, they all love each other, too. It is like a brotherhood.  
SANTA: It actually surprised me that he was surprised to see that this brother-
hood is so tight within a team. I don’t see why it is so surprising for a civilian.
O’LAVIN: Maybe “surprising” was just the word he used to mean what stood 
out the most about his experience.
LORENTZ: I agree, that is probably what stood out the most. But I do think 
that on the civilian side of things, there are not many other places where you 
see that.  
SKINNER: If, God forbid, any of you should die in some situation like this, 
would this movie feel like a fitting memorial to you? Would you want to be 
portrayed in something like this?
O’LAVIN: I don’t think it dishonored anyone, or the memory of the folks who 
were portrayed in the movie. I think that was a good thing. They could have 
made it a documentary of mistakes folks made, and then it wouldn’t have 
been as fitting a memorial. Personally, I don’t know if I would want a film 
made about me, just from the perspective of reliving the loss. They talked to 
the families beforehand and everything, but for family members or children 
to have to relive this event, I don’t know if that is necessarily something that 
I would want. But it would be up to my family, because I wouldn’t be there 
anymore.  
COLLINS: Yes, I agree. I think one of the reasons this story was made into 
a movie—similar to Black Hawk Down or some of the other great military 
movies that were made—was because it was an extraordinary kind of situ-
ation. We have people who are fighting and dying over there, doing heroic 
acts all of the time, but what separates this one story is that it shows really 
extraordinary circumstances: a lot of things going wrong on our part and a 
lot of things going right on the enemy’s part, which isn’t always the case. So 
yes, I agree with Brian.
SANTA: I am not sure I can answer this question. If I were in an operation, I 
wouldn’t really be thinking, “Is there a director who is going to make a movie 
about this?” and then control my actions so that it will be a good movie. 
[laughter] From a military perspective, I don’t really see any point to an-
swering this question. But for a civilian population, you definitely need these 
types of movies. I don’t know how the real action was on the ground, but even 
if this movie changed things a little bit to make these guys more heroic, they 
definitely deserve it because they started the operation, they fought through 
until they died. They tried to save each other, they tried to accomplish their 
mission, and they fought for their country, for their mission, and for that 
other country. So they definitely deserve to be seen as heroes by 350 million 
people, plus the rest of the world and me. That is good stuff.  
LORENTZ: Do you have a favorite part of the movie, either for good or for 
bad reasons?
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SANTA: Well, there are a couple of scenes. One is when the little Afghan kid 
at the end hugged Luttrell, and Luttrell hugged him back—that was really 
touching. And this pashtunwali [Pashtun code of honor], when Afghan vil-
lagers take care of the foreigner or someone who comes to their house—well, 
we learned about this tradition, but I didn’t really understand it, that this is 
what it really means. You give your whole heart to the one who comes to your 
house, and that scene made me understand that. Even that little kid under-
stood that pashtunwali required him to watch over this guy [Luttrell]. So that 
scene was probably my favorite. 
COLLINS: I liked the early portion of the movie leading up to the operation. 
I thought all of that was pretty accurate, everything from the two guys 
competing against each other in the run to hazing the new guy, and all the 
planning stuff. I thought all of that really portrayed what team life is like in 
the different war zones, at least from my experience.  
O’LAVIN: Yes, everything that showed the brotherhood-in-arms and the 
caring for each other. It isn’t one specific scene, but everything in the movie 
that emphasized that aspect stood out for me, was reinforcing why I’ve stayed 
in the service. The only other question I really have—and we may have 
answered this—is, How do you think films like this influence the public? Is 
it positive? Is it negative? Are we over-glamorizing war with these types of 
movies? This question isn’t necessarily limited to just this movie. But this one 
is much harder to watch, if you will, than films like No Easy Day or Act of 
Valor—or other more fictionalized movies. Net positive? Net neutral?  
COLLINS: I think in some ways, it does glamorize war and it serves as a recruit-
ment tool, especially for young men who are thinking about joining the Army 
or the Navy. But I think everybody wants to be in a firefight until they are in 
one, and then, as you know, things change. So I don’t know. I think if I had 
seen this movie before I joined the Army, it would just have made me want 
to join even more, so I guess it does glamorize the fighting a little bit. But 
overall, I think it definitely does show the sacrifices and the things that a lot of 
our soldiers and SEALs are doing over there.  
SANTA: Well, I think that it can have a positive effect on young teenagers 
who were thinking about joining the Army or the Special Forces—especially 
those kids who like Xbox and PlayStation 4. It’s funny, but I have personal 
experience with my son, who is a teenager. The military is not his life, but he 
knows much more about Black Hawks than I do. For these kids, it’s really 
exciting to think, “Wow, that happens in real life as well!” So they are 
probably really happy to see these movies. But human beings don’t really 
like sacrificing their partner or another human being for a country’s cause. For 
those people, I think the movies have a kind of negative effect. When you read 
in a newspaper that 3,000 are dead, you don’t really take seriously that those 
are human beings. But when you actually can see it, that has more of an effect 
on you than a number in a newspaper. I think most of the population who 
watch this movie will have a negative reaction, instead of thinking, “That is a 
great movie, and I want to watch it three times more.”  
O’LAVIN: It’s impossible to generalize, but what do people in your country 
[Hungary] think of movies like Lone Survivor and Black Hawk Down? Is it 
similar to how they are received here [in the United States]?
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SANTA: No, definitely not. My country hasn’t been in a war for some 60 years, 
and in our defense strategy, we don’t really expect any war within the next 
50 years. So we are in the middle of peacetime. Since 1956, we haven’t really 
heard any gunshots except for crime. So the current Hungarian generation 
doesn’t really know what war means. For them, these types of movies are only 
entertainment, nothing else. Even if they know that this movie is based on a 
true story, for them it is just an Xbox game or a PlayStation game. They will 
come out of the movie thinking, “Okay, it was good. What’s next?” I would 
guess that applies to all of those countries that are not involved in any war as 
deeply as you are.  
LORENTZ: Very interesting. That was a great discussion. Thank you all very 
much for talking with us. 
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THE WRITTEN WORD
The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of 
the Earth
MAJ Anthony A. Keller, U.S. ArmyMark Mazzetti’s nonfiction thriller The Way of The Knife cap-
tures the essence of the relationship between the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), while 
engaging the reader in a contemporary and easily comprehensible read. 
Although cooperation between the CIA and JSOC developed long before 9/11, 
Mazzetti decodes the complexities and global reach of U.S. counterterror-
ism engagements and effectively demonstrates how the CIA transcended the 
“cloak-and-dagger” operations of the Cold War to forge a more dynamic 
relationship with JSOC. As a result, the two services have brought the full 
range of espionage, drone technology, and small wars to bear in support of 
U.S. national interests. Precision drone strikes and the use of small military 
elements from the Pentagon and the CIA’s clandestine forces have made for a 
deadly combination in the fight against terrorism since 9/11. 
Mazzetti describes how, in the first days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, members 
of the CIA and officials of the George W. Bush administration1 formulated a 
plan to begin the hunt for al Qaeda in eastern Afghanistan and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The CIA and the Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) conducted joint operations beginning shortly after 
9/11, based on intelligence acquired through the ISI’s complex spy networks of 
tribal warlords and the use of U.S. surveillance drones. This was the beginning 
of CIA and JSOC operations to capture or kill Taliban leaders and al Qaeda 
operatives. Mazzetti illuminates not only the turbulent relationship between 
the CIA and the ISI but also the deeper and longer standing relationship that 
the Taliban maintained with the ISI. The loyalty of the ISI, he makes clear, will 
always lie with Pakistan and its national security; for its members, every other 
concern is secondary to that.  
Mazzetti also examines how the CIA has evolved as an offensive organization, 
from the spy agency’s infancy as the Office of Strategic Services during World 
War II to the modern CIA. He uses several case studies from the last 50 years, 
documenting covert operations from Latin America to Central Europe, to illus-
trate the Agency’s gradual modernization. Mazzetti tells us that in November 
1984, President Ronald Reagan signed a secret document that allowed the CIA 
and JSOC to train Lebanese hit men in retaliation for the bombings against 
the Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 Marines (p. 51). While the author 
fails to clarify when exactly the rift between the CIA and the Pentagon began, 
he does point out that the more recent problems were not at the tactical level 
but primarily at the national policy level, between Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and the CIA leadership. “The confusion in Afghanistan [during the 
initial invasion] was partly the result of normal battlefield turmoil, but it had 
its origins in the jockeying between the Pentagon and the CIA for supremacy in 
the new American conflict. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld felt stung 
that CIA paramilitary teams had been the first into Afghanistan” (p. 18). 
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To make the spy game more complicated post-9/11, it now had a new player, 
JSOC, which reported directly to the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command, 
but, more important, to Secretary Rumsfeld as well. By 2004, elements of 
JSOC had operatives around the globe, from South America, Africa, and Asia 
to the Middle East. The use of drone strikes along with small operational 
units of the CIA and JSOC became the modern-day cloak-and-dagger method 
used to hunt and exterminate al Qaeda operatives. Mazzetti notes, “In 2004, 
Rumsfeld issued a secret directive—known internally at the Pentagon as the 
‘Al Qaeda Network Executive Order’—that expanded the powers of special 
operations troops to kill, capture, and spy in more than a dozen countries”  
(p. 128). The order gave JSOC broad authority to conduct operations on a 
global scale. 
In the subsequent chapters regarding Pakistan, readers learn that Pakistan’s 
game plan for supporting the Afghan insurgency was written in 1989, 12 years 
before the 9/11 attacks, in the library of the U.S. Command and General 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While a student at the college, 
General Ashfaq Kayani of the Pakistani Army wrote his thesis on the topic of 
Pakistani support for the Afghan resistance movement and the use of a proxy 
militia to fight against the Soviet occupation and the then-Communist Afghan 
government. This same game plan would be covertly implemented again by 
the ISI after 2001, but against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and the new 
elected Afghan government, instead of the USSR and its puppet regime. It took 
three years after 9/11 for anyone in the United States to realize that the current 
head of the ISI, that same General Kayani, had been the author of the thesis. 
As bureaucratic infighting continued in Washington, one gleam of hope for 
the future of counterterrorism was the fusion between the CIA and JSOC. 
Their cooperation proved successful in the capture and killing of high-level 
operatives from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Pakistan and other 
regions of the globe. Mazzetti describes this relationship in terms of a master-
piece painting: it was perfect for what the White House wanted, which was 
a machine to capture or kill terrorists. The ability to share intelligence and 
resources allowed the CIA and JSOC to analyze critical intelligence in a timely 
manner and execute successful high-risk raids. War by proxy under covert 
U.S. guidance also became a template used by the Bush administration for 
operations in multiple regions of the globe. In Africa, for example, the use of 
Ethiopian troops in Somalia against al-Shabaab was critical to the Bush team’s 
counterterrorism strategy. 
The increasing use of drones by both the CIA and JSOC during counterterrorist 
operations has proved to be a less than perfect solution, not infrequently 
because of flawed intelligence. To illustrate this point, Mazzetti describes 
one particular operation in Yemen against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). A joint CIA-JSOC operation mistakenly killed the deputy governor of 
Ma’rib province, Jaber al-Shabwani, with a drone strike while he was meeting 
with AQAP operatives to discuss a truce. U.S. officials had been told—inaccu-
rately—by their Yemeni counterparts that no one within the Yemeni govern-
ment had a relationship with or was in negotiations with AQAP, and believed 
that the meeting was among high-level AQAP leaders only. Many of the 
successes of the CIA will never be known, but its failures are always publicly 
placed upon the Agency’s shoulders.
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Readers of this book should find themselves grateful for the role the CIA and 
JSOC play in support of U.S. national security policy. Mark Mazzetti capti-
vates the reader by offering a historical perspective on the transformation of 
the CIA and the agency’s powerful partnership with JSOC. I highly recommend 
The Way of the Knife for anyone, particularly any member of the Department 
of Defense, who doubts the resolve of the United States to combat interna-
tional terrorism. 
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HBO Serial Television Drama, Created by David Simon
MAJ Matthew P. Upperman,  
U.S. Army “The game is rigged, but you cannot lose if you do not play.” —Marla Daniels—a character in The Wire (season 1, 
episode 2)
It’s all about “the game.”1 In HBO’s The Wire, a crime drama series 
that aired from 2002 through 2008, the game is centered on the drug trade 
in present-day Baltimore and on the players’ attempts to win—whether as a 
drug dealer controlling a corner or a police officer trying to make a difference.2 
Despite the show’s focus on domestic police work, it is full of excellent parallels 
and lessons that can easily be applied to the special operations and intelligence 
communities, or any organization that is involved in irregular warfare (IW) or 
unconventional warfare (UW). Instructors at several universities, including 
Harvard and Duke, have used The Wire as the basis for courses covering studies 
in sociology and social anthropology. Warfighters and policymakers alike should 
not overlook the value of this show. The writers impart no “silver bullet” solu-
tions for the problems of inner-city Baltimore, but The Wire does offer mental 
and emotional exercise for viewers, especially when it is watched through the 
lens of operational and intelligence planning in IW/UW.
The series centers on the development and operations of a major 
crimes unit within the Baltimore Police Department as it grapples 
with the illegal drug trade that plagues the city (and all of the 
social baggage that goes along with drug crimes). All five seasons 
are woven together and include the points of view and struggles of 
a complicated web of players. These include drug dealers, citizens, 
police, city hall employees and city prosecutors, newsmen, school 
staff, policymakers, longshoremen, and the transnational com-
ponents of the illicit narcotics trade, among many others. Every 
season presents a new angle to the city’s problems, and viewers are 
presented with dramatic twists in which the creative grassroots 
efforts of community organizers and local police are derailed, 
political jockeying and policy objectives address symptoms but fail 
to tackle core issues, struggles to control territory and information 
occur within and between government organizations—the list 
goes on. Although the series portrays the drug trade in inner-city 
America and one city’s efforts to tackle it, The Wire’s story lines 
will be familiar to military and interagency operators overseas.  
The first major takeaway message that this show has to offer is 
the need for a holistic view of the operating environment and 
any external strains that can or do affect the system. In The 
Wire, success too often hangs on the wrong metrics or faulty 
data; bureaucratic infighting results in missed opportunities; 
and competing priorities, political agendas, and misguided police 
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work all contribute to the city government’s failures to solve the problem. 
Nevertheless, opportunities for small successes develop out of creative 
ideas from members of the major crimes units, attention to good policing 
(including developing an intimate understanding of the players and environ-
ment), and the help of allies in City Hall and the city prosecutor’s office who 
have a deep understanding of the problem and a wide view for implementing 
solutions. In addition, sound intelligence operations, from collection to 
analysis, help in formulating comprehensive strategies. As the show demon-
strates, however, the successful efforts of a few can be undermined by both 
the mistakes of others and endemic strains within the bureaucratic system. 
The show thus conveys familiar emotions, such as the frustration implied 
in the question, “Are we really making any difference?” In episode 10 from 
season 5, for example, Baltimore Police Colonel Cedric Daniels rants about 
how the mayor has not carried out promised systemic changes to the police 
department:
I’ll swallow a lie when I have to; I’ve swallowed a few big ones 
lately. But the stat game? That lie? It’s what ruined this department. 
Shining up s*** and calling it gold so majors become colonels and 
mayors become governors. Pretending to do police work while 
one generation f****** trains the next how not to do the job. And 
then I looked Carcetti [the mayor] in the eye, I shook his hand, 
I asked him if he was for real. Well, this is the lie I can’t live with.
A second important takeaway involves slotting the right individuals into the 
right jobs. Successes—in the inner city and on the battlefield—often spring 
from leaders who have the courage to go against the grain in order to alter 
the status quo; provide a relatable vision for others to follow; and empower, 
mentor, and enable subordinates to come up with creative solutions. This 
truth is illuminated in The Wire by stories of a “good” beat cop or having the 
right mayor in city hall. There are also plenty of examples of “what wrong 
looks like.” The Wire does an excellent job of illustrating how the wrong poli-
cies and the mistakes people make affect efforts all the way down the chain. 
The following quote comes from The Wire’s Major Howard “Bunny” Colvin, 
who is venting his frustration with poor police work and leadership in the 
police department:
This drug thing, this ain’t police work. No, it ain’t. I mean, I can 
send any fool with a badge and a gun up on them corners and jack 
a crew and grab vials [of drugs]. But policing? I mean, you call 
something a war, and pretty soon everybody gonna be running 
around acting like warriors. They gonna be running around on 
a damn crusade, storming corners, slapping on cuffs, racking up 
body counts. And when you at war, you need a f****** enemy. 
And pretty soon, damn near everybody on every corner is your 
f****** enemy. And soon the neighborhood that you’re supposed 
to be policing, that’s just occupied territory.3
A third takeaway for those involved in IW/UW is the importance of a deep 
understanding of the players in the operating environment and building 
relationships with the right individuals, whether it be cultivating a snitch 
with access and placement, knowing all of the “corner boys” (low-level drug 
Opportunities for small 
successes develop out of 
creative ideas from members 
of the major crimes units.
“You call something a war, 
and pretty soon everybody 




dealers), working with influential citizens, or learning whom to leverage at 
city hall to get support. For members of the Baltimore Police Department, 
building relationships helps them break down bureaucratic stovepipes and 
create cooperative approaches, including properly applying social outreach 
and using locals to help solve local problems.  
The Wire’s relevance to the special operations community lies in operating in 
complex environments; understanding and navigating core issues in the face 
of ambiguous opposition (enemy and social forces alike); and understanding 
the disconnect that often exists between policymakers, bureaucrats, and the 
several echelons of community leaders and police (read: the warfighters). 
Apart from The Wire’s entertainment value, military practitioners will be 
surprised by how many of the show’s themes resonate with their deployment 
experiences; they may even find themselves contemplating how they could 
have approached situations differently had they seen the show earlier. 
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NOTES
1 Editor’s note from Anna Simons: Credit is due to LTC Sam 
Curtis, an early fan of The Wire, who insisted that everyone 
deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan needed to watch it. Like 
Matt Upperman, Sam considered everything—from the 
challenges the police face in Baltimore to the tradecraft they 
develop over the course of the series—to be relevant to his 
work overseas. I watched the series on Sam’s recommendation 
and came away with this: We Americans haven’t been 
able to “fix” Baltimore, and yet we expect to go halfway 
around the world and “fix” Iraq and Afghanistan?!
2 The Wire is no longer being broadcast, but it remains widely 
available on DVD or through online streaming services.
3 Season 3, episode 10.
100
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 1
PUBLICATION ANNOUNCEMENTS
The newest research published by JSOU Press!
These four new JSOU Press publications are now available electronically from the JSOU public website, https://jsou.
socom.mil, in the Publications section under 2013. They are also available in the JSOU Library Management System: 
https://elibrary6.eosintl.com/U60005/OPAC/Index.aspx 
Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 
Manual, Third Edition  
edited by Chuck Ricks 
Issue Date: September 2013
This third edition builds on the success of the manual’s earlier versions and 
continues to incorporate the evolving policy guidance and strategic vision that 
guide ongoing interagency counterterrorism efforts. It provides an outline of 
the organizations, missions, programs, and relationships that comprise the 
interagency process. This manual provides insight and information regarding 
various counterterrorism organizations in the U.S. government’s national 
security apparatus. It also includes an explanation of the expanded concepts 
of civilian power and their implications for diplomacy and development that 
emerged from the publication of the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Devel-
opment Review in 2010. Expanded sections on countering terrorist finance op-
erations, interagency responses to cyber threats, and strategic communication 
reflect a general acknowledgement of the importance of these capabilities. As 
before, this new edition includes updated collections of definitions, organiza-
tions, programs, and acronyms to provide the special operations warrior with 
an improved, practical, quick-reference guide to the interagency community.
The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or 
So Much Hype? 
by Russell D. Howard and Colleen Traughber 
Issue Date: October 2013
In this monograph, retired Brigadier General Russ Howard and Ms. Col-
leen Traughber delve into the nexus between violent extremist elements and 
transnational criminal elements by first clarifying whether a real problem 
exists and, if so, identifying the appropriate role for Special Operations Forces 
in confronting it. The authors bring rigor to the subject matter by dissecting 
the issues of intention and opportunities for criminal organizations and 
violent extremists. The authors note that these motivations and opportunities 
can vary widely among the different organizations. They further make clear 
that the trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, and contraband (HWDC) is a 
natural way for the criminals and extremists to cooperate. To bring the issue 
into focus, the authors systematically examine case studies dealing with the 
nexus between specific organizations and HWDC trafficking opportunities. 
The authors then explore how this nexus will affect SOF and interagency 
partners, including issues for SOF such as the traditional delineation between 
law enforcement activities and military activities. 
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The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained 
Environment 
edited by Chuck Ricks 
Issue Date: November 2013
In February 2013, more than 125 SOF personnel from Canada, the United 
States, and eight other countries gathered at MacDill Air Force Base in 
Tampa, Florida, for a two-day symposium on “The Role of the Global SOF 
Network in a Resource Constrained Environment.” This was the third 
symposium in a series held by the Joint Special Operations University and 
the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command Professional Develop-
ment Centre. The event featured a mix of individual presentations, panel 
discussions, and social interaction to introduce issues, engage in productive 
discussions, and strengthen SOF network relationships. The subject matter 
ranged from the tactical (The Acid Test of Reality-Experiences of the Operators) 
to the strategic, with senior civilian and military leadership from both Canada 
and the United States assuming active, contributing roles. This report offers 
insights and suggestions on how to deliver operational success while accom-
modating both changing mission sets and resource-constrained environments.
Piracy: The Best Business Model Available  
by John Alexander 
Issue Date: November 2013
In this monograph, Dr. Alexander sets the stage with a brief historical account 
of how maritime piracy has evolved over the centuries to its current state: a 
vast enterprise whose increasing profitability has attracted a confluence of 
nefarious actors, including warlords and international criminal organizations. 
Dr. Alexander speculates on the potential for an intersection between pirates 
and ideological terrorist movements such as al Qaeda and associated groups. 
Such a future would significantly elevate the stakes in a U.S. whole-of-govern-
ment counter-piracy response. What role should the U.S. military, and SOF in 
particular, play in addressing the global issue of maritime piracy? Dr. Alex-
ander points out many of the thorny legal considerations that contextually 
color any efforts to address counter-piracy, and notes that the best solution to 
criminal acts occurring hundreds of miles at sea may in fact lie with efforts, 
including the use of SOF, to improve the security apparatus on shore.
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